Old Dominion University

ODU Digital Commons
Economics Faculty Books

Department of Economics

10-2001

The State of the Region: Hampton Roads 2001
James V. Koch
Old Dominion University, jkoch@odu.edu

Vinod Agarwal
Old Dominion University, VAGARWAL@ODU.EDU

Rob Baade
Old Dominion University

John R. Broderick
Old Dominion University, jbroderi@odu.edu

Michael Clemons
Old Dominion University, mclemons@odu.edu
See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/economics_books
Part of the Business Commons, Community-Based Research Commons, and the Regional
Economics Commons
Recommended Citation
Koch, James V.; Agarwal, Vinod; Baade, Rob; Broderick, John R.; Clemons, Michael; Daniel, Steve; Harlow, Jeffrey; King, Wil; Lomax,
Sharon; Miller, Deborah L.; Oliver, Jim; Plum, Ken; Talley, Wayne; and Yochum, Gilbert, "The State of the Region: Hampton Roads
2001" (2001). Economics Faculty Books. 9.
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/economics_books/9

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Economics at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics Faculty Books by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.

Authors

James V. Koch, Vinod Agarwal, Rob Baade, John R. Broderick, Michael Clemons, Steve Daniel, Jeffrey
Harlow, Wil King, Sharon Lomax, Deborah L. Miller, Jim Oliver, Ken Plum, Wayne Talley, and Gilbert
Yochum

This book is available at ODU Digital Commons: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/economics_books/9

New Point
Comfort

AT NORF0Li
US. NAVAL SH/PY
I

HAMPTON R™DS NA•
I

NORFOLK GARDENS 8!
I

GEN. MACARTHUR Ml

"Et-=

SE.ASH;~

~ O R T STORY

October 2001
Dear Reader:

T

his is Old Dominion University’s second annual "State of the Region" Report. While it represents the work of many
individuals connected in various ways to Old Dominion, the Report does not constitute an "official" viewpoint of
the University, or its president, Dr. Roseann Runte.
This year’s Report was produced with the goal of making Hampton Roads an even better place to live. Those who
know and love the region of Hampton Roads frequently boast of its numerous strengths and successes, but we do so
with the understanding that it would be possible for us to improve the region’s performance in certain areas.
However, in order to improve our situation, we must have accurate knowledge about "where we are," and what the
policy implications are of the various choices in front of us. This year’s Report should be quite helpful in supplying
such information. At the end of the day, we hope we have stimulated thought and discussion about things that matter.
The 2001 Report focuses on eight issues and topics:

The General Economic Situation in the Region: It’s true the region’s per capita income trails national averages, but
much of the gap between Hampton Roads and the nation disappears when cost of living differentials are taken into
account. Further, the region’s per capita income gap may not be due so much to lagging wage rates, but rather to
much lower levels of business income and wealth for Hampton Roads as compared to other regions.
Major League Sports Teams: There is remarkably little economic evidence in favor of major league sports franchises,
even in cities such as Baltimore. Cities and regions that subsidize major league sports teams nearly always find it a
losing proposition. If a region, such as Hampton Roads, attempts to attract a major league sports team, then it
should do so for reasons of pride and identification rather than economics.
The Port of Hampton Roads: Since the early 1990s, the Port has stagnated in terms of the volume of the cargo it
handles. This is due almost solely to a decline in bulk cargo (mostly coal). Nonetheless, the Port continues to provide
major a economic impetus to the region because it has become much more efficient and competitive over the past
decade.
African Americans in Hampton Roads: This year’s Report surveyed more than 1,100 Hampton Roads residents,
about half of whom were African American. African Americans see several issues differently than other citizens do.
Notably, they have a different perspective on the role and effectiveness of the policy of affirmative action. African
Americans also are much more likely to vote Democratic and attend church than the region’s other citizens. This is the
first significant public-opinion poll ever taken of African Americans in Hampton Roads.
State Legislative Redistricting: The region’s political power in the Commonwealth has fallen precipitously over the
past decade. The recent legislative redistricting process reduced the number of Hampton Roads delegates and senators by about 15 percent, and the region has lost nearly all of its most senior and powerful legislators. We are at a
low ebb in terms of political clout in Richmond, but brighter times may be on the horizon.

The Dillon Rule: While the Dillon Rule does not explicitly appear in many Virginia statutes, it is the accepted legal
and legislative standard in Virginia. In essence, it says no city, town, county or region may exercise any power not
explicitly granted it by the General Assembly. We argue that the Dillon Rule, while not without points in its favor, has
outlived its usefulness.
Banking in Hampton Roads: The economic impact of the disappearance of the headquarters of large banks from
the region, and from Virginia, has been quite negative. In this chapter we contrast Virginia and Hampton Roads to
North Carolina, and demonstrate that the wave of banking mergers and consolidations that occurred over the past
two decades, but particularly in the 1990s, has not been good for Hampton Roads.
Private K-12 Education: Here we examine the nature of private and independent K-12 education in Hampton
Roads. There is great diversity in private education in the region. Private institutions typically have lower average
class sizes, but have fewer computers and offer lower teacher salaries than do public K-12 schools.
This Report would not have been possible without the generous financial assistance and support of the following
individuals and organizations:
The Aimee and Frank Batten Jr. Foundation
George Dragas Jr.
Frank Batten Sr.
Hampton Roads Partnership
R. Bruce Bradley
Thomas Lyons
Raymond W. Breeden Jr.
Arnold McKinnon
Arthur A. Diamonstein
Anne B. Shumadine
The following people were instrumental in the research, writing, editing and design of the Report:
Vinod Agarwal
Sharon Lomax
Rob Baade
Deborah L. Miller
John R. Broderick
Jim Oliver
Michael Clemons
Ken Plum
Steve Daniel
Wayne Talley
Jeffrey Harlow
Gilbert Yochum
Wil King
My hope is that this Report will inform you and stimulate your thinking about regional issues. Hampton Roads is a
superb place to live, but we can make it even better.
Sincerely,

James V. Koch
Board of Visitors Professor of Economics and
President Emeritus
Old Dominion University

ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE
AND INCOME

Economic Performance and Per Capita
Income: The Inside Story

H

ave you ever wondered why per capita income in Hampton Roads has lagged the rest of the United States for more than a
decade? Interestingly enough, it is not because those who work in Hampton Roads earn lower than average wages and

salaries. Instead, it is because they own fewer assets, don’t earn nearly as much as others do from businesses they own, and aren’t
receiving as much in the way of transfer payments (such as welfare) as individuals in other regions of the country. That’s the surprising finding we report in this chapter.

But, First, A Look At The Growth Rate Of The Regional
Economy
In 2000, the Hampton Roads economy did rather well, at least compared to the past few years. The region’s economy
grew by 4.1 percent, which was its largest regional economic growth rate since 1987. Nonetheless, despite this rapid
increase in 2000 Gross Regional Product (GRP), Hampton Roads’ economic growth rate continued to lag behind that of
both the United States and Virginia. As shown in Graph 1, since 1990, the economic growth rate of Hampton Roads has
trailed both the Commonwealth and the nation as a whole.
Defense spending reductions are the primary reason why Hampton Roads’ economic growth has trailed the rest of the country.
Fortunately, this situation is expected to change in 2001 as the region’s economic growth rate is expected to exceed that of both
the United States and Virginia. Why? Because defense expenditures will increase by 7 percent or more and the rest of the
country is going through economic recession. Defense expenditures tend to stabilize the Hampton Roads economy. Hampton
Roads grows less rapidly than other regions during prosperous times, but it also contracts less rapidly when the American
economy is in recession.
There is additional good news. The nondefense sector of the Hampton Roads economy grew at an estimated 5.6 percent in
2000, well above the high GRP regional growth rate. Lest we ignore the significance of this development, it means the civilian
economy in Hampton Roads recorded a banner year in 2000. This bodes well for the region’s future, for it suggests the region
has been creating lots of private jobs. The region’s unemployment rate sank to about 3 percent, its lowest regional yearly unemployment rate in more than 30 years.
2000 defense spending, hampered by the loss of nearly 300 relatively highly paid federal civilian employees, expanded at an
estimated “real” (inflation adjusted) rate of only 1.8 percent, well below the regional nondefense and GRP economic growth
rates. This dragged the GRP growth rate down to the overall level of 4.1 percent. The defense sector’s slower growth rate in
2000 resulted in further decline in the defense-dependent portion of the region’s economy. As a proportion of GRP, the defensedependent sector fell from a high of nearly 42 percent in 1990 to an estimated 28 percent in 2000. The opposite side of the
coin is this: the nondefense sector now accounts for 72 percent of GRP.
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GRAPH 1
YEAR-TO-YEAR REAL GROWTH RATES
HAMPTON ROADS, VIRGINIA AND THE U.S.
1990 - 2001
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Per Capita Income And Standard Of Living
An important measure of Hampton Roads’ economic standard of living is the personal income generated in the region relative to
its population – per capita income, or income per person. Many individuals focus only on “money” per capita income – that is,
income that is not adjusted for the cost of living. However, an accurate comparison of Hampton Roads’ economic standard of
living relative to other metropolitan areas (MSAs) requires adjusting for price differences between it and the other MSAs. Graph
2 shows a “real,” price-adjusted percentage comparison between Hampton Roads’ per capita income and that of the United
States from 1969 to 1999. A value of 100 implies equality, or parity, between U.S. “real,” price-adjusted per capita income
and that of Hampton Roads. Values above the parity line represent years in which Hampton Roads’ “real,” price-adjusted per
capita income exceeded that of the nation, while values below the line indicate the opposite.
It is evident in Graph 2 that “real,” price-adjusted per capita income in Hampton Roads generally was below the national
average during most of the 1970s, above the average throughout most of the 1980s and modestly below the average during
most of the 1990s. As we will demonstrate in a moment, defense expenditures explain most of these trends.

GRAPH 2
HAMPTON ROADS PRICE-ADJUSTED PER CAPITA INCOME
AS A PERCENT OF U.S. PRICE-ADJUSTED PER CAPITA INCOME
1969 - 1999
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From an economic development perspective, Graph 2 immediately begs two questions. First, since 1969, what has caused the
fluctuations in Hampton Roads’ relative economic standard of living, especially the more recent decline of more than seven percentage points from a high of 105.5 in 1985 to its current 98.4 percent? Second, why can’t Hampton Roads break away from
its seeming 30-year reversion to the U.S. mean?

Fluctuations In Relative Per Capita Income
The most important cause of the fluctuations in the region’s real, price-adjusted per capita income relative to that of the nation
over the last 30 years is year-to-year variation in national defense expenditures. Graph 3 supports this assertion by comparing
the Hampton Roads per capita income parity percentage of Graph 2 with real national defense expenditures. The left side, or
vertical axis, of Graph 3 represents Hampton Roads’ real, price-adjusted per capita income relative to that of the United States.
The right side, or horizontal axis, measures real national defense expenditures. One can easily see that fluctuations in Hampton
Roads’ relative per capita income over the last 30 years have closely tracked that of real national defense expenditures.

GRAPH 3
HAMPTON ROADS PRICE-ADJUSTED PER CAPITA INCOME AS A PERCENT OF U.S.
PRICE-ADJUSTED PER CAPITA INCOME AND U.S. REAL DEFENSE SPENDING (1992 = 100)
1969-1999
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Thus, the fall in the area’s relative economic standard of living in the 1970s resulted from winding down the Vietnam War, while
the rising regional prosperity of the 1980s rise resulted from the Reagan administration’s military buildup. Likewise, the decline in
real, price-adjusted per capita income, from 105.5 percent in 1985 to 98.4 percent in 1999, can be attributed to the end of
the Cold War and the subsequent decline in defense expenditures during the Clinton administration. This decline in the region’s
real, price-adjusted per capita
income (7.5 percent between 1985
and 1999) can be traced largely to
GRAPH 4
employment and consequent income
SOURCES
OF
THE
DECLINE
IN HAMPTON ROADS'
declines within the specific catePER CAPITA INCOME RELATIVE TO THE U.S.
gories displayed in Graph 4.
1985 - 2000
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accounted for roughly one-half of this
fall in per capita income.
Other
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50%
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Active-Duty Military
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35%
more than a third of the 7.1 percent
decline. That is, the region lost
Government Civilian Employees
active-duty military personnel and
11%
those who remained were not paid
as well (relatively speaking) as in the
past. Finally, the reduction in civilian
federal workers, the majority of
Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
whom worked at the Norfolk Naval
Shipyard and the Naval Air Rework
Facility, accounted for slightly more
than 10 percent of the drop in Hampton Roads’ relative per capita income.
But, here’s the most important point. Fluctuations of Hampton Roads’ relative economic standard of living over the past 30
years, as measured by real, price-adjusted per capita income, do not appear to be the product of any inherent problem or
defect within the region’s economy. Rather, these fluctuations, including the most recent decline, were a result of deliberate
national policy decisions to change the level of national defense spending. The bottom line is this: Hampton Roads’ regional
economy is not sick, but it continues to be highly dependent upon military expenditures.
The national defense policy-induced cycles displayed in Graphs 2 and 3 are likely to be repeated in the future. The region is
about to go through an upward turn in its relative per capita income similar to, though not as extensive as, the 1980s. The
upward movement in the region’s relative price-adjusted per capita income will initially be prompted by the Bush administration’s
supplements to the current defense budget. These will cause an increase in the military to civilian wage ratio and supply additional spending for both ship maintenance and construction. Federal fiscal year 2002 military spending will be particularly
important to the region, as national defense spending is projected to rise by 7 percent, even after adjusting for inflation. This will
stimulate real, price-adjusted per capita income in the region and will push the area’s economic standard of living to roughly one
percentage point above parity with the nation. That is, Hampton Roads is likely to move from 98.5 percent of the national
average real, price-adjusted per capita income to approximately 101 percent.
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A Closer Examination Of Per Capita Income
In Hampton Roads
Per capita income generally is broken down into four major parts: (1) wages, salaries and fringe benefits; (2) property income;
(3) business income; and (4) transfer payments (unearned income). Let’s look at each of these, for they provide some surprising
information.

WAGES, SALARIES, AND FRINGE BENEFITS
The most important determinant of the level of a region’s per capita income is how much the region’s workers receive in wages,
salaries and fringe benefits. In Hampton Roads, wages, salaries and fringe benefits constitute roughly 70.8 percent of personal
income per capita. As seen in Graph 5, since 1978, when compared to the entire United States, this portion of Hampton
Roads’ personal income, measured on a per capita basis and adjusted for prices, actually exceeded that of the nation. In 1999
the region’s per capita wages, salaries and fringe benefits stood at 109.5 percent of, or 9.5 percent above, the national
average. Hampton Roads typically earns total wages, salaries and fringe benefits somewhat above the national average,
something many people do not believe is true.

GRAPH 5
PRICE-ADJUSTED WAGES, SALARIES AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS PER CAPITA
HAMPTON ROADS AND U.S.
1969 - 1999
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Of course, one can gain additional income either by earning a higher wage rate, or holding more jobs or by working more
hours in the jobs one holds. As we will see in a section below, a much higher proportion of Hampton Roads residents actually
hold jobs than is true in the rest of the country. This is one of the reasons why the region’s per capita wage, salary and fringe
benefit income is above the national average.
But, these data do provoke an obvious question. If the total of what people are paid in wages, salaries and fringe benefits in
Hampton Roads exceeded the national average in 1999, then why is it that the region’s per capita income was only 98.4 percent, or 1.6 percent below the national average (see Graph 2)? The answer to this question lies with the nature of the nonlabor
income received by households. Generally defined, nonlabor personal income comes in three forms: the return to ownership of
property, business income and transfer payments.

NONLABOR INCOME: OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY
Household income from ownership of property is the return from financial, real estate and solely owned or partnership business
assets. Economists say the income generated from these assets is “the return to capital.” Returns from these assets are often overlooked in popular thinking about per capita income because such returns are not widely spread across households. In fact, they
are highly concentrated among households – so much so, that in 1998, the top 1 percent of U.S. household income earners
owned almost 50 percent of all assets, while the top 10 percent owned 80 percent of all financial assets in 1998.
Despite the obvious, heavy concentration of these returns to ownership among a very limited number of households, the size of
these returns plays a critical role in the determination of a metropolitan area’s level of per capita income. Consider two fascinating examples of how important these returns are to Hampton Roads’ level of per capita income.

10

•

In 1999, West Palm Beach, Fla. was the highest priceadjusted per capita income metropolitan area in the U.S.
If Hampton Roads simply swapped its return to financial
and real estate assets with West Palm Beach, then
Hampton Roads would become the highest per capita
income metropolitan area in the U.S. and West Palm
Beach’s ranking would drop to 105, very close to
Hampton Roads’ actual 1999 rank.

•

Seattle’s per capita income is one-third larger than
Hampton Roads. Bill Gates, Paul Allen and Steve Ballmer,
the founders of Microsoft, all reside in the Seattle metropolitan area. In1999, they had an aggregated net worth
of $116 billion, according to Forbes. If only these three
people moved from Seattle to Hampton Roads, then the
yearly income generated from their assets would push
Hampton Roads’ per capita income to approximately that
of Seattle. Microsoft’s wealth does make a difference!

T H E

S T A T E

O F

T H E

R E G I O N

GRAPH 6
PRICE-ADJUSTED PER CAPITA RETURNS TO FINANCIAL AND REAL ESTATE ASSETS
HAMPTON ROADS AND U.S.
1969 - 1999
Hampton Roads
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As illustrated in Graph 6, for the past 30 years Hampton Roads has lagged behind the national average in the returns it has
earned from its ownership of financial and real estate assets.
Adjusted for prices, the region’s return to ownership of these assets has been roughly 10 percent below the national average.
Further, given the concentration of these assets in other high-income MSAs, Hampton Roads’ per capita return to ownership of
financial and real estate assets was only one-third that of the top 10 per capita income metropolitan areas in the United States.
What this boils down to is: Hampton Roads has wealthy people, but not nearly as many as other regions, and its wealthy
residents are not as rich as those in the highest income metropolitan areas in the United States. You may already have
known this, but most people have not considered its impact upon the region’s per capita income.
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BUSINESS INCOME
Hampton Roads also trails the nation where business income is concerned. Business income is assumed to come to individuals
who own a business, either as a sole proprietor, or as a partner. As seen in Graph 7, in 1999, Hampton Roads’ real, priceadjusted return to personal business ownership was only 55 percent of the U.S. average. This alone accounts for an almost
GRAPH 7
PRICE-ADJUSTED PER CAPITA BUSINESS OWNERSHIP INCOME
HAMPTON ROADS AND THE U.S.
1969 - 1999
Hampton Roads
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$1,000 difference in annual per capita income. The region’s relative lack of business income reflects the dearth of small to
medium-sized businesses in the region. Nationally, in a typical metropolitan area, there are roughly 21 people in the work force
for each business. In Hampton Roads, however, there are roughly 26 people per business. That is, the region simply doesn’t
have as many of these types of businesses. As seen in Table 1, when Hampton Roads is compared to a selected group of some
of the highest per capita income regions in the both the United states and the South, it has approximately one-quarter more
workers per business.
Hampton Roads’ relative lack of personal ownership of small and medium-sized businesses (and the income generated by
them) has been a serious impediment to increasing the region’s level of per capita income. Small to medium-sized businesses tend to incubate entrepreneurs and their subsequent “spin-off” businesses. Specifically, in many cases, existing businesses develop employees who learn the lessons necessary and acquire the experience to start new firms.
Given the “Catch-22” nature of the spread of new firms in a region (it takes existing businesses and the learning they generate
to help start new businesses), public policy designed to stimulate and make life easier for small and medium-sized business
development would be helpful. For example, it might make sense to focus more of the region’s economic development efforts on
small and medium-sized businesses, and smaller startup businesses that are generated by the research and development activities
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TABLE 1
Employed Workers per Business
Selected MSAs
1995
Selected MSAs
Employees per Business
Gloucester County
54.8
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC
20.8
Richmond-Petersburg, VA
19.8
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA
18.4
Denver, CO
18.3
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC
20.4
Atlanta, GA
20.4
Baltimore, MD
22.1
Norfolk-Virginia BeachNewport News, VA-NC
25.7
U.S. Average
21.2

of universities and medical schools. Such businesses often start
small, and sometimes struggle, but they frequently are the seed
corn of future economic development. Their rapid growth –
when they succeed – has led economic growth guru David
Birch to label them “gazelles.” The evidence suggests Hampton
Roads falls short here. Further, perhaps more economic development focus should be placed upon attracting and retaining
small businesses to the region. The Hampton Roads Economic
Development Authority and the Virginia Peninsula Alliance for
Economic Development tend to concentrate their efforts upon
attracting medium- to large-sized businesses to the region. Such
successes are highly touted when they occur (an illustration
being a firm such as John Deere). However, the per capita
income data we have introduced here imply that Hampton
Roads might be better off if it focused its efforts on attracting
and retaining many small firms. The publicity might not be as
attention-getting, but the long-term results in economic development might be much better.
Hampton Roads’ relative lack of ownership income, whether
from business or real estate and financial assets, is evident not
just in comparisons to the highest income-earning MSAs but
also to those of similar population. As seen in Graph 8,

Sources: U.S. Census, U.S. Department of Commerce and
Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project

GRAPH 8
PRICE-ADJUSTED PER CAPITA OWNERSHIP INCOME
HAMPTON ROADS AND MSAs WITH 1 TO 2 MILLION PEOPLE
1969 - 1999
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Hampton Roads has, over the past 30 years, been consistently and substantially below its population peers in the accumulation
of ownership income. In 1999, Hampton Roads per capita ownership income was 75 percent of the average of its population
peers.

NONLABOR INCOME: TRANSFER PAYMENTS
In addition to its lack of ownership income, Hampton Roads receives a smaller share of transfer payments relative to other metropolitan areas. Transfer payments include payments for welfare, unemployment compensation and Social Security. As might be
expected, they are paid largely to those households at the lower end of a region’s income distribution. Adjusted for prices, in
1999 Hampton Roads received only 84.5 percent per capita of the national average of transfer payments. As shown in Graph
9, the area has, over the past 30 years, consistently received fewer transfer payments per capita than the national average.
Further, when compared to its population peers, as Graph 10 demonstrates, Hampton Roads received significantly fewer transfer
payments per capita. For example, in 1999 the area received 77 percent of its population peer group average of per capita
transfer payments.
GRAPH 9
PRICE-ADJUSTED PER CAPITA TRANSFER PAYMENTS
HAMPTON ROADS AND THE U.S.
1969 - 1999
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GRAPH 10
PRICE-ADJUSTED PER CAPITA TRANSFER PAYMENTS
HAMPTON ROADS AND MSAs WITH 1 TO 2 MILLION PEOPLE
1969 - 1999
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ADDING UP THE THREE SOURCES OF NONLABOR PER CAPITA INCOME
Graph 11 depicts the sum of all of the nonlabor per capita income in Hampton Roads. It is the total of the income generated by
the ownership of assets, business income and transfer payments. Graph 11 compares Hampton Roads to the United States for
the year 1999. In 1999, Hampton Roads’ real, price-adjusted nonlabor per capita income was only 82.1 percent of that of the
rest of the country, or 17.9 percent below the national average. On the other hand, as we already have seen, Hampton Roads’
labor income, or the wages, salaries and fringe benefits discussed above, were 9.5 percent above the national average. Thus,
there is a 27 percent gap between per capita labor income and nonlabor income in Hampton Roads.

GRAPH 11
PRICE-ADJUSTED PER CAPITA NONLABOR INCOME
HAMPTON ROADS AND THE U.S.
1969 - 1999
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Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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What does this mean? First, ownership income (which is derived from the ownership of assets and the ownership of businesses)
tends to be associated with the upper end of a metropolitan area’s income distribution, while transfer payments are associated
with the lower end of the distribution. On the other hand, wage earner or labor income is apt to be representative of those in
the middle of a region’s income distribution. Graph 12 compares these per capita income sources in Hampton Roads.
Compared to other metropolitan areas, Hampton Roads’ income distribution is more concentrated in the middle-income categories as opposed to the upper- and lower-income extremes. This means the region has fewer very rich people and fewer
very poor people than the typical metropolitan area. Hampton Roads is “exceedingly average” insofar as its distribution of
income is concerned. But, there is also another interesting implication in Graph 12. Since wage and salary income goes
primarily to middle-income individuals, and Hampton Roads’ wage and salary income is more than 109 percent of the
national average, this means the standard of living of its middle class is higher than that of the rest of the country. That is,
the region’s middle class is larger than most and it is doing rather well, economically speaking. Once again, Hampton Roads
tends not to have the extreme differences in incomes one sees in the typical metropolitan area nationally. The region may not
have thought about itself in these terms, but Hampton Roads is a more egalitarian area than most others in the country.

GRAPH 12
HAMPTON ROADS LABOR AND NON-LABOR PRICE-ADJUSTED PER CAPITA INCOME AS A
PERCENT OF THE U.S.
1999
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Hampton Roads’ relative lack of ownership income and its lack of wealth (asset) concentration have interesting consequences
other than their effects on per capita income. For example, they help explain why the region has a limited number of high-end
retail establishments and why it does back flips when a retailer such as Nordstrom’s agrees to locate here. (Of course, it also
explains why it is so difficult to get them to come in the first place.) These data also help explain why fund-raisers may find the
region a bit tougher than wealthier areas to mine for donations. Hampton Roads simply doesn’t have the large number of upperincome residents one finds in Richmond and Northern Virginia. This also contributes to diminished political clout for the area,
especially in competition with Northern Virginia, as Hampton Roads has fewer large contributions to statewide political candidates and its own lobbyists are likely to be less well funded. Finally, the relative absence of high-income individuals, and a
regional lack of privately owned small to medium-sized, and highly profitable, businesses, are important reasons why major
league sports teams find the region less attractive. They anticipate they will be unable to sell a sufficient number of expensive
reserved-seating areas and sky boxes.
There is a potential good side to all of this, however. Hampton Roads has an appreciably smaller concentration of lower income
people, especially when compared to the largest American cities. This reflects both the nature of the jobs available here and an
apparently strong regional commitment to the work ethic. This commitment is reflected in the labor force participation characteristics of the region. In 1999, 73.3 percent of all people over the age of 16 in Hampton Roads actively participated in the
region’s work force. However, in the United States, during the same year, only 68.1 percent were in the labor force. Hence, a
significantly larger proportion of Hampton Roads’ adult citizens work than is the case in the rest of the country. One can put a
positive spin on this and interpret it as a statement about the work ethic of the citizenry. The possible negative spin to these data
is that one might simply conclude Hampton Roads has no choice because it takes more jobs for families here to generate the
same income as in the rest of the United States.

Final Words
Opinion surveys of Hampton Roads residents, including the one reported in the State of the Region, 2000, consistently indicate
Hampton Roads residents believe the region pays below-average wages and salaries. They believe this is why the area’s per
capita income is below the national average. However, the data presented here demonstrate this is not necessarily true. The primary reason why per capita income in Hampton Roads trails other regions is that this area doesn’t own as many incomeproducing assets, doesn’t earn as much business income and doesn’t receive as many transfer payments as individuals
living in other regions.
The data also reveal that Hampton Roads is a rather egalitarian place. It has fewer very high-income individuals and fewer very
low-income individuals than the typical metropolitan region in the United States.
Finally, the data presented here once again underline the key role of defense expenditures in the region’s economic welfare.
True, defense-related expenditures now account for only 28 percent of the region’s economy, as opposed to 42 percent a
decade ago. Nonetheless, regional prosperity continues to be tied closely to the ups and downs of Department of Defense
expenditures. The good news is these expenditures are going up, and this shot in the arm, by itself, probably will move real,
price-adjusted per capita income in Hampton Roads above the national average next year.
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MAJOR LEAGUE
SPORTS TEAMS

Major League Sports Teams:
A Pipe Dream?

A

hot topic of public discussion in recent years has revolved around the possibility of bringing a major league sports team to
Hampton Roads. Supporters believe a major league team would provide an economic boost, help unify the area, increase

pride in Hampton Roads and confer “big league” status on the region. Detractors argue that the economic evidence in favor of big
league sports is bogus and a major league team probably would fracture the area as the region’s cities debated where the team
would be located, and who would receive the benefits and bear the costs. Those opposed to the idea also downplay the psychological benefits of major league teams and consequently assert that precious public-investment dollars would better be used for
other purposes.
Regrettably, a considerable portion of the evidence concerning the economic impact of major league sports teams has been
contributed by parties who have a vested interest in the matter – those who construct stadiums, team owners who receive
a lion’s share of the benefits and the major leagues themselves. When analyzed rigorously, most of this evidence is fatally
flawed and falls by the wayside. This means the argument for spending public moneys to attract and retain major league sports
teams is largely based on pride factors and presumed psychological benefits. It is difficult to measure the value of increased city
and regional pride, but as it turns out, that is the primary rationale for spending public funds on major league sports teams. The
other reasons wash out on close analysis.
What follows is an evaluation of the economic evidence and a discussion of the psychological and other benefits that accrue
from major league teams. The economic arguments occasionally are a bit complex; however, the financial stakes for the region
are sufficiently large that even those residents of Hampton Roads without a taste for things economic will find it worthwhile to
take the time to understand the rudiments.

Setting The Stage
For many years, some individuals in Hampton Roads have expressed a desire to bring a major league professional sports franchise to the region. Hampton Roads does not host a team in any of the four major professional sports (baseball, basketball, football and hockey), and many residents and civic leaders have viewed this as a regional shortcoming. The Hampton Roads
Partnership, a group of business, political and educational leaders, has focused efforts on attracting a major league baseball
(MLB) franchise, though it is not averse to other possibilities. Norfolk Mayor Paul Fraim, while not opposed to MLB, believes a
National Basketball Association (NBA) franchise makes the most sense. Based on commonly accepted criteria, can Hampton
Roads support either an MLB or NBA team? If so, does the investment in professional sports make sense?

Hampton Roads Compared To Other Regions
Geographers and economists have developed something called Central Place Theory (CPT), which says the role of cities is that
of service centers, and the spacing of cities and their populations determines the range of activities the cities offer. We pay
attention to CPT because it does an excellent job explaining the location of sports franchises in the United States.
According to CPT, the “highest-order places” in the North American urban hierarchy belong to those cities with the greatest populations. CPT and population densities arguably explain the location of sports franchises in the United States through the 1980s.
Using 1990 census data, geography professors Jonathan Comer (Oklahoma State University) and Tracy Newsome (University of
South Florida) reported in 1998:
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“New York City represents the only ‘first-order place’ in the United States. It has the nation’s largest catchment,
or market area, in terms of population, and it also has the largest number of teams with nine… The six ‘secondorder’ places, Los Angeles, Chicago, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Boston, and Detroit, all host at least one
team in each of the four leagues, and the 17 ‘third-order’ places, ranging from Washington, D.C.-Baltimore as
the largest, to New Orleans as the smallest, have at least one team and usually two to four.”
The top three urban levels arguably have reached the saturation point with regard to professional sports. As a consequence,
leagues seeking to expand and teams seeking to relocate have considered “fourth-order” places such as Jacksonville, Raleigh,
Charlotte and Nashville. Diffusion of professional sports teams will likely continue. The salient question is this: What place does
Hampton Road occupy in the “demographic standings” among those Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) cited as contenders
for an MLB or NBA franchise? Table 1 provides information on populations for the “contending cities,” and selected cities that
are cited as small markets relative to other cities that host MLB.
TABLE 1
Populations of MSAs Cited as Candidates for MLB Franchises or
Selected MLB MSAs Categorized as Small Marketsa
City
Buffalo
Charlotte
Greensboro
Las Vegas
Orlando
Portland
San Bernardino
Washington
Norfolk
Kansas City
Milwaukee
Pittsburgh
Seattle
Tampa Bay
a

Populationb
1,151,490
1,382,548
1,167,651
1,320,563
1,502,837
1,820,007
3,116,675
4,661,308
1,550,455
1,737,234
1,459,602
2,345,139
2,311,563
2,254,405

U.S. Rankc
49
42
47
44
39
27
11
6
35
28
41
19
21
22

The cities identified in this table as the most suitable for MLB expansion were based on information compiled by Street
& Smith. Source: Street & Smith’s SportsBusiness Journal, February 28-March 5, 2000, p. 59.

b,c

Source: Regional Economic Information System. http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/reis/. The data are for 1998.

The information contained in Table 1 indicates that if population was the sole criterion, Hampton Roads currently occupies fourth
place in what might be termed the nine-member MLB “Aspirants League” – cities that don’t have teams, but want them. Of
course, factors other than population come into play. Each of the cities has deficiencies, as does Hampton Roads itself.
Washington, D.C., for example, is within a long home run of Baltimore, while Portland is less than 200 miles from Seattle. In
addition, Washington, D.C., has two strikes against it since it has failed to support MLB on two previous occasions.
Lurking in the background, however, is the possibility that significant financial disparities between the so-called “large market”
and “small market” clubs in MLB may lead to the elimination of teams and the leagues becoming smaller. Thus, rather than
moving into a period of net expansion, MLB may be moving into a period of net contraction, where the only way a city might
acquire a new team is via the movement of an existing franchise. Further, MLB may not be looking to expand into “small market”
regions such as Hampton Roads. It’s true that more people reside in Hampton Roads than in Milwaukee, but there is not any
other MLB MSA with fewer people than Hampton Roads. The Brewers will not be leaving Milwaukee any time soon since a
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new stadium, Miller Park, was opened in 2001, and the city also is home to MLB commissioner Bud Selig. MLB teams in
Minneapolis, Tampa Bay and Miami seem the most intent on relocating, but the owners’ threats to leave each of these communities may only be part of a periodic ritual relating to MBL teams extorting public dollars to finance new stadium construction or to
negotiate more lucrative contracts from cities and regions. The bottom line is this: While Hampton Roads looks good when compared to other cities in the “Aspirants League,” it would be a “small market” MLB franchise at a time when expansion prospects
seem minimal and several “small market” MLB franchises appear to be in trouble.
As noted above, Hampton Roads may also be interested in pursuing an NBA franchise. How does its population compare to
other cities that are generally identified as serious contenders for an NBA franchise? In Table 2, populations and population
ranks are recorded for those MSAs generally thought to be ripe for NBA expansion or relocation.
TABLE 2
Populations of MSAs Cited as Candidates for NBA Franchises or Selected NBA MSAs
Categorized as Small Marketsa
City
Memphis
Louisville
Grand Rapids
Rochester, N.Y.
New Orleans
San Diego
St. Louis
Kansas City
Hampton Roads
Milwaukee
Sacramento
San Antonio
Indianapolis
a

Populationb
1,092,414
998,858
1,038,717
1,080,798
1,306,429
2,766,123
2,561,646
1,737,234
1,550,455
1,459,602
1,554,237
1,540,113
1,518,828

U.S. Rankc
54
61
58
55
45
14
17
28
35
41
34
36
37

The cities identified in this table as the most suitable for MLB expansion were cited in: Street & Smith’s SportsBusiness

Journal, February 28-March 5, 2000, p. 59.
b,c

Source: Regional Economic Information System. http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/reis/. The data are for 1998.

Among those cities or regions that never have had an NBA franchise and are contending for one now (Grand Rapids, Hampton
Roads, Louisville, Memphis and Rochester), Hampton Roads leads the population standings. In fact, the population of the
Hampton Roads MSA exceeds that of Milwaukee, San Antonio and Indianapolis, and is nearly equal to that of Sacramento, all
of which are cities that currently host NBA franchises.
Recent statistics indicate professional sports require not only large populations, but also people with significant discretionary
income. In a recent issue of American Demographics, an analyst observed:
“…Today, baseball is a sport for the well-off. The likelihood of attending a baseball game increases steadily
with household income. Twenty-one percent of adults with household incomes of $75,000 (the upper limit for
the fourth quintile was $64,300 in 1992) or more attend baseball games making them 72 percent more likely
than the average to do so.
“Other major sports also have an upscale audience. Football, basketball and hockey all have above-average
attendance rates among those with household incomes of $40,000 or more.
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“Baseball’s customers are much more upscale than they were ten years ago. People with household incomes of
$50,000 or more were more likely in 1995 than in 1985 to attend baseball games.”
Table 3 provides information on per capita incomes for cities that are considered strong contenders for an MLB presence.
Hampton Roads does not fare well in the income rankings. In absolute terms, the region possesses per capita income greater
only than that of San Bernardino among those cities identified as potential MLB hosts. Hampton Roads trails small-market cities
that actually have teams by a minimum of 13.6 percent.

TABLE 3
Per Capita Incomes of MSAs Cited as Candidates for MLB Franchises and Current MLB MSAs
Categorized as Small Marketsa
City

Per Capita Incomeb

Buffalo
Charlotte
Greensboro
Las Vegas
Orlando
Portland
San Bernardino
Washington
Hampton Roads
Kansas City
Milwaukee
Pittsburgh
Seattle
Tampa Bay
a

$25,654
$28,784
$27,283
$27,780
$25,555
$29,430
$21,300
$36,043
$23,771
$28,473
$30,582
$28,149
$36,854
$27,224

Per Capita Income as a
Percentage of Per Capita
Income for the Top 318
MSAs in the United States
101.1%
113.4%
107.5%
109.5%
100.7%
116.0%
83.9%
142.0%
93.7%
112.2%
120.5%
110.9%
145.2%
107.3%

The cities identified in this table as the most suitable for MLB expansion were cited in: Street & Smith’s SportsBusiness

Journal, February 28-March 5, 2000, p. 59.
b

Source: Regional Economic Information System. http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/reis/. The data are for 1998.
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What about the NBA? The per capita income evidence here is similarly discouraging. Consider Table 4, which records per
capita income data for potential and current small-market cities.
Hampton Roads’ MSA does generate per capita income equivalent to San Antonio, a current NBA host city. However, as a
region, Hampton Roads does not compare favorably to all other potential host cities or current small-market clubs in terms
of per capita income.
TABLE 4
Per Capita Incomes of MSAs Cited as Candidates for NBA Franchises and
Current NBA MSAs Categorized as Small Marketsa
City

Memphis
Louisville
Grand Rapids
Rochester, N.Y.
New Orleans
San Diego
St. Louis
Kansas City
Hampton Roads
Milwaukee
Sacramento
San Antonio
Indianapolis
a

Per Capita Incomeb

$27,511
$27,749
$26,694
$27,390
$25,225
$27,657
$29,089
$28,473
$23,771
$30,582
$27,232
$23,800
$29,022

Per Capita Income as a Percentage
of Per Capita Income for the
Top 318 MSAs in the United States
108.4%
109.4%
105.2%
107.9%
99.4%
109.0%
114.6%
112.2%
93.7%
120.5%
107.3%
93.8%
114.4%

The cities identified in this table as the most suitable for MLB expansion were cited in: Street & Smith’s SportsBusiness
Journal, February 28-March 5, 2000, p. 59.

b

Source: Regional Economic Information System. http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/reis/. The data are for 1998.

Whether it is MLB or the NBA, then, Hampton Roads is less attractive because of its low regional per capita income. To some
extent, this reflects the reality that most Southern states still lag other parts of the country in terms of most measures of economic
activity. True, the gap between the South and other sections of the country has gradually been closing, but the opposite has
occurred in Hampton Roads for a considerable period of time. Consider this: While population in the United States grew about
13 percent between 1990 and 2000, and more than 14 percent in Virginia, it increased only 7.68 percent in Hampton
Roads. Income growth in the 1990s was similarly stagnant in Hampton Roads. Nationally, per capita income grew 4.29 percent in the 1990s, and 4.26 in Virginia, but only 3.69 percent in Hampton Roads. Professional sports leagues emphasize
market potential as much as current economic conditions in determining cities suitable for expansion or relocation. Growth trends
do not constitute a plus for Hampton Roads. The deceleration of Hampton Roads’ population and economic activity is a disadvantage for the region.
Additionally, whether a major league sports franchise makes sense for an area depends in part on how close that area is to
other areas that already host major league teams. For example, any consideration of a major league baseball franchise for the
Washington, D.C., region must take into account the presence of the Baltimore Orioles 45 miles away. Proximity to other franchises can be analyzed in terms of the driving distance to cities that currently host competitive franchises. Driving distance reflects
the impact of nearby franchise competition on both attendance and media attention. This reality is recognized through the
extraordinary franchise fees currently paid by league aspirants. How does Hampton Roads rate in terms of proximity to the other
professional sports franchises?
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TABLE 5
Driving Distances to Nearest Franchises for
Urban Areas Cited as Candidates for MLB Franchises
City

Driving Distance to
Nearest MLB Franchise
(City – Miles)

Buffalo
Charlotte
Greensboro
Las Vegas
Orlando
Portland
San Bernardino
Washington
Hampton Roads
Kansas City
Milwaukee
Pittsburgh
Seattle
Tampa Bay

Toronto – 105
Atlanta – 240
Atlanta – 331
Los Angeles – 272
Tampa Bay – 84
Seattle – 174
Anaheim – 48
Baltimore – 45
Baltimore – 242
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable

Driving Distance to
Nearest Professional
Sports Franchise
(City – Miles)
Buffalo (NFL) – 0
Charlotte (NBA) - 0
Charlotte (NBA) - 91
Los Angeles (MLB) -272
Tampa Bay (MLB) - 84
Portland (NBA) – 0
Anaheim (MLB) - 48
Washington (NBA) – 0
Washington (NBA) – 197
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable

Source: Rand McNally Road Atlas, United States and Canada, 1994.

The information in Table 5 indicates that the Hampton Roads MSA is located farther from any other MLB MSA than all of the
cities in the “Aspirants League” except Las Vegas and Greensboro. In considering the driving distance to an MSA that already
hosts a franchise in any one of the major sports leagues, only Las Vegas is farther. Thus, a major league sports franchise in
Hampton Roads likely would not be seriously disadvantaged by nearby major league sports competition.
Taking into account all of the information contained in Tables 1 through 5, it is apparent Hampton Roads clearly ranks
among the leading contenders for an MLB or NBA franchise. This assessment echoes the conclusions reached by Street &
Smith. Street & Smith devised a city-by-city rating of sports capacity based on total personal income for 172 MSAs and a
measure of total personal income necessary to support a franchise in MLB, the NBA, the National Football League (NFL), the
National Hockey League (NHL) and Major League Soccer (MLS). On a scale of 0 to 100, where a score of 100 indicated that
the MSA was capable of hosting a franchise in the professional sport, Hampton Roads scored 84, 100, 100, 100, and 100,
respectively, for MLB, NFL, NBA, NHL and MSL. The score of 84 for MLB ranked third among MSAs without an MLB team, and
was exceeded only by Grand Rapids, Mich. (90), and Orlando, Fla. (91). Of course, since all of these MLB scores are less
than 100, Street & Smith concludes that no city in North America (with the possible exception of Washington, D.C.) has the circumstances currently necessary to support an MLB team. MLB, then, has expanded just about as far as is economically feasible.
Washington, D.C.’s, proximity to Baltimore (45 miles) indicates that Baltimore would have to agree to a franchise in
Washington, since such a franchise would encroach on its media market.
Based on conventional criteria, then, Hampton Roads would appear to be a leading contender for a new major league sports
franchise of some kind. Unfortunately, the devil is in the details, and a closer examination of the region’s situation suggests several significant problems distinctive to the area.
Two issues in particular merit discussion. First, the geography of Hampton Roads is unique among the aspirants for an MLB franchise. Water is ubiquitous in the region and separates most cities and counties from each other. The question of the stadium
location takes on particular significance since some proportion of peak stadium traffic would have to use the bridges and tunnels

M A J O R

L E A G U E

S P O R T S

T E A M S

27

that connect the communities. Second, Hampton Roads includes several large communities that value their separate identities.
The communities tend toward political autonomy, and that may prove an impediment to the development of a fan base beyond
the community in which the stadium is located. If the communities are considered separately, then no single Hampton Roads
community ranks above the 70th position in the U.S. urban hierarchy.
Hampton Roads has a transportation system that by most measures already is stressed and hence would have difficulty supporting a typical major league franchise. In addition, as Hampton Roads develops economically, a greater number of cars will
be on the road. Projections for growth in the number of vehicles and miles traveled are sobering. The Hampton Roads Planning
District Commission has projected average annual growth rates over the period 1995 to 2015 of .79 percent for population,
1.74 percent for automobiles and 2.59 percent for vehicular miles traveled. These estimates do not include the additional stress
that a professional sports team would add, in some instances at peak travel times.
If a smallish, 40,000-seat MLB stadium were built somewhere in Hampton Roads, and if there is one car for every four seats in
the ballpark, then 10,000 additional cars would compete for space on the roads before and after games. The Hampton Roads
Planning District Commission has estimated that there will be 90,000 person-trips per day across the Hampton Roads BridgeTunnel in 2010. Suppose half of the stadium traffic flowed one way or the other. Then, traffic would increase by more than 5
percent across the critical bridges and tunnels connecting the Peninsula and the South Side. Traffic bottlenecks have proven irksome even for cities that host professional sports teams with a more accommodating geography. If the additional stadium
traffic could not be absorbed easily, then congestion on the roads would likely have adverse implications for attendance at
games and the viability of a professional sports franchise in the area.
The Hampton Roads Planning District Commission has estimated it would cost $3.7 billion alone to improve traffic in two corridors critical to major league sports: widening and improving Interstate 64 ($1.3 billion) and constructing a third crossing from
Newport News to Norfolk ($2.4 billion). Would these improvements accommodate the additional traffic on game day, and if
not, what would it cost to accommodate peak game-day traffic flows? Would the team identify the potential problem and
require more convenience for its fans? If so, what would it cost Hampton Roads to provide the infrastructure that professional
sports teams commonly demand of their host cities?
Hampton Roads includes six cities with populations in excess of 100,000 (Chesapeake, Hampton, Newport News, Norfolk,
Portsmouth and Virginia Beach). Nearly all are separated in some way by the waters of the Chesapeake Bay, or the Elizabeth,
James or York rivers. Charitably, one can observe that this has fostered separate identities, making the cities less united and less
contiguous than the miles separating them would suggest. The construction of a major sports facility requires cooperation, particularly as it relates to financing. If the area cities and counties already view themselves as autonomous, then it is difficult to envision how they would manage the political divisions that are inherently a part of large public projects. Stadium site selection is
contentious even in the most homogeneous communities. Would the good burghers of Chesapeake willingly support a stadium
constructed on the Peninsula? Would Virginia Beach’s citizens support a stadium located in Norfolk? Alas, past history is not
encouraging on this matter.
Public funding for stadium projects is often rationalized by noting that a ballpark serves as a catalyst for economic development.
Increased economic activity is arguably most apparent in the neighborhood in which the stadium is located. If citizens from
Hampton attend a game at a stadium in Norfolk, then Hampton is, de facto, taxed twice – first through increased taxes to fund
the project, and second through entertainment spending which is diverted from Hampton to Norfolk. Richard F. Kiefner, an area
businessman and noted sports fan, opined:
“No one city of this metro area could build a facility by itself, and this area historically has not been able to
act rationally. We have 15 municipalities and approximately 113 city council people, and each has an
agenda. We can’t get a cohesive, agreeable consensus, because what someone might perceive as excellent
for Norfolk doesn’t help Suffolk. If something happens in Hampton, a politician in Virginia Beach says, ‘So
what? Doesn’t affect me at all.’ ”
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The Major Costs Of A Major League Sports Franchise
Hosting a professional sports franchise requires significant financial resources, both to acquire a team and to sustain it. The primary costs include: (1) the franchise fee; (2) the playing facility; (3) start-up costs; (4) ancillary facility infrastructure; and (5)
opportunity costs (sacrificed public alternatives). The analysis in this section focuses on the acquisition costs for an MLB franchise,
though other major leagues are considered.

FRANCHISE FEES
Franchise fees have increased substantially since the latter 1980s. Several circumstances account for this trend: (1) significant
appreciation in equity markets (even taking into account recent stock market reverses); (2) the continuation of generous government subsidies for sports stadiums; and (3) large television contracts for the NFL and NBA. Graph 1 provides information on
franchise fees for the most recent expansions in the four major professional sports leagues.

GRAPH 1
FRANCHISE FEES ASSESSED NEW TEAMS FOR THE MOST RECENT EXPANSIONS IN THE
FOUR MAJOR PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES IN THE UNITED STATES
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The Arizona Diamondbacks and the Tampa Bay Devil Rays paid a $130 million franchise fee to begin play in MLB in 1998.
By way of contrast, the Florida Marlins and Colorado Rockies paid only $95 million in 1993. Using these two data points,
franchise fees in MLB are increasing by 42 percent every five years. If this trend continues, and MLB expands once again in
2005, the franchise fee would be approximately 59 percent greater than in 1998, or $207 million.
NBA franchise fees have increased even more rapidly than in MLB. The Vancouver Grizzlies and Toronto Raptors paid a $125
million franchise fee when they entered the NBA in 1995. The NBA approved expansion by four teams in 1987 (two teams
began play during the 1989-90 season and the other two during the 1990-91 season), and each paid a franchise fee of only
$32.5 million. Thus, over the period 1987 to 1995, franchise fees in the NBA increased 300 percent. The NBA has struggled
somewhat since the retirement of Michael Jordan, and another three-fold increase in franchise fees for a team to begin play in
2003 seems unlikely. A more realistic estimate of an NBA fee for the next expansion approximates $250 million.
The NFL has exhibited significant increases in franchise fees in the 1990s. In 1996, Jacksonville and Carolina each paid $167
million outright, but $200 million if their reduced share of television revenue is included. In 1999, Cleveland paid $530 million,
and Bob McNair will ante up $700 million for the new Houston franchise that will begin play in 2002.
The appreciation in franchise values in the NHL, although less spectacular, is nonetheless substantial. The franchise fee for NHL
expansion in 1993 was $50 million. To participate in NHL play for the 1998-99, 1999-2000, and 2000-01 seasons,
Nashville, Atlanta, Minneapolis-St. Paul and Columbus each paid $80 million. This represents a more modest 60 percent
increase.
The actual amount Hampton Roads would pay for a franchise in any of these leagues would depend on when the team commenced play, the number of other cities that bid for the same franchise, the health of the economy and market conditions in the
professional sports industry, particularly as they related to television ratings at the time of negotiations. Based on the history of
franchise fees and current market conditions, reasonable estimates are that in a future year, say 2005, the owners of a
Hampton Roads team would pay in the vicinity of $200 million to $250 million for either an NBA or MLB franchise, $700
million to $800 million for an NFL franchise and a “modest” $100 million for an NHL franchise.

START-UP COSTS
But, the costs don’t stop there. Start-up costs would likely equal another $60 million to $100 million, with the lower figure
applicable to basketball. Baseball requires a farm system and spring training facilities in either Florida or Arizona. Basketball
does not require a farm system since players are drafted out of college or high school, but does expend large sums of money on
scouting and promotion. Other start-up costs include personnel, offices and advertising.
It appears, then, that the cost of acquiring a major league team might be expected to approximate the sum of the franchise fee
and start-up costs for an expansion team. However, acquiring existing teams nearly always costs substantially more. The primary
reason is the bidding process that typically surrounds teams that are thinking about moving. Community pride tends to generate
a type of “auction fever,” and cities currently hosting a franchise ante up to keep that franchise, whether or not that action makes
economic sense. Teams thinking about moving always entertain offers from other communities, though sometimes such shopping
is part of a deliberate strategy to wring financial concessions from their current hosts, particularly as it relates to new stadium
construction. Even George Steinbrenner and the New York Yankees have not been above threatening to move their historic franchise if New York City does not provide it with significant concessions.

30

T H E

S T A T E

O F

T H E

R E G I O N

COST OF CONSTRUCTING A STADIUM
It is an understatement to observe that new stadiums cost lots of money. Recent history indicates that baseball parks are the most
expensive major league sports facilities to build. Graph 2 provides information on average facility construction costs for the four
major professional sports.
GRAPH 2
AVERAGE FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION COSTS FOR THE
FOUR MAJOR PROFESSIONAL SPORTS FROM 1990 TO 1997
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Between 1990 and 1997, new MLB stadiums cost an average of $269 million. Comparatively speaking, NBA arenas were a
bargain. The average cost incurred in constructing an arena for NBA basketball was $100 million less. Evidence from the
1990s also indicates that taxpayers shouldered 77 and 31 percent of the construction costs, respectively, for new MLB and
NBA facilities. If Hampton Roads had adopted an MLB team four years ago and if the averages identified here applied, taxpayers would have spent approximately $207 million to build a baseball stadium in 1997. In 2005, a $300 million to $400
million figure could be anticipated.
Even given the rosiest scenario, it is unlikely MLB could play in Hampton Roads prior to 2005, and by then a new stadium
would be even more expensive. Both Milwaukee and Seattle built retractable dome stadiums in the past two years, and Safeco
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Field in Seattle (2000) and Miller Park in Milwaukee (2001) cost $517.6 million and $399.6 million, respectively. A ballpark
without a dome, but with the amenities demanded by teams and corporate sponsors that pay for naming rights, would
cost in the neighborhood of $300 million. This translates to a $231 million contribution in public funds, if one uses the 77
percent average public contribution cited above. The financial dynamics are such in professional sports that teams insist on
state-of-the-art facilities because of their impact on revenue generation.
Before Hampton Roads would be awarded an expansion franchise or an established team that decided to relocate, it would
have to convince MLB that it would meet the rather high standards MLB has set with regard to revenue generation. It is highly
unlikely that Hampton Roads would be approved for inclusion in MLB with a plan for a “vanilla” stadium that could still be built
for less than $200 million. Bud Selig, MLB’s commissioner, is an advocate of comprehensive revenue sharing arrangements, and
it is highly unlikely that MLB would award franchises to teams that could not pull their financial weight. Consolidation (elimination
of teams) in MLB is being considered at this point precisely because some teams are thought of as “poor cousins” rather than
equal partners. Another concern is some teams that receive league subsidies would not spend these funds in a manner the
league would prefer – that is, acquiring better players – but would pocket the money.
Facility costs necessary for joining the NBA likely would be more modest. New arenas built in Atlanta (1999) and Miami
(2000) cost $213.5 million and $212 million, respectively. If the Atlanta and Miami facilities are representative of regional
construction costs, an arena in Hampton Roads suitable for the NBA in 2005 would cost approximately $250 million. If the
public sector in Hampton Roads funded 31 percent of the stadium construction costs, then the community would pay $77.5
million for the facility. (This figure is extremely conservative. The 31 percent public funding average in the 1990s has been
skewed by the Fleet Center in Boston, which was built with no public funding. More representative of the public contribution is
the Phillips Center in Atlanta in 1999. That facility was 81 percent publicly financed. For cities seeking an NBA franchise, the
public would likely shoulder a larger portion of the construction costs as part of the deal to secure the franchise.)
Another potential cost advantage for an NBA arena is that such a facility could accommodate hockey without compromising the
sight lines for either sport. The sight lines in baseball, on the other hand, are unique – a baseball stadium cannot accommodate
another spectator sport without compromising viewing. In fact, MLB has stated that no franchise will be awarded to a city that
does not have a “baseball only” stadium. The adoption of an NBA team, therefore, offers potential economies of scale, where
the facility is concerned, that is not currently possible in hosting an MLB team. This potential, however, has not always been
exploited. Different ownership groups in the NBA and NHL in the same city have been successful in convincing their host community to provide separate venues. Exclusive facilities, teams contend, allow them to generate revenues sufficient to sign the
players necessary to compete. It should be noted, however, that if all teams build state-of-the-art venues, then the financial advantage a new stadium provides is eliminated. What is true for an individual team is not true for the sum of teams.

RELATED FACILITY AND LOCATION COSTS
Many other things are necessary to make a stadium operational from the team’s point of view. In particular, roadways and
parking lots have to be modified or constructed, and the site has to be prepared. Site preparation can run into the tens of millions of dollars if there are environmental problems such as contaminated soil or water at or near the stadium’s surface. In addition, host communities often provide land at or below market value, or offer tax abatement, as part of a package to attract the
team. Based upon the experience of other cities, it is reasonable to assume the public “other infrastructure” subsidy would equal
$100 million for an MLB franchise and $50 million for an NBA team. (This estimate is, again, conservative, given the special
infrastructure needs imposed by the ubiquity of water in Hampton Roads. Phillips Arena in Atlanta incurred $62 million in infrastructure costs, which will be financed by a car rental tax.)

OPPORTUNITY COSTS: SACRIFICED REGIONAL ALTERNATIVES
Opportunity cost boils down to this question. What is the best alternative use of the public funds that might be spent on a major
league team? That is, what else could the region do with such funds and how valuable is the best “other” choice? If the rate of
return on the operation of the professional sports team exceeds that of the next best alternative, then the public subsidy necessary
to host a team does represent the best use of those funds. If not, the investment should not be made.
The rate of return on an investment in professional sports depends substantially on the economic growth induced by the teams.
The increase in economic activity a community reasonably can expect from a major league team is considered in the next part
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of this report. In any case, in principle, one must compare the productivity of an investment in a major league sports team with
investments a city or region might make in items ranging from K-12 schools, university research parks, medical facilities, parks
and recreation, increased police and law enforcement, and so forth.

SUMMARIZING THE COSTS
A summary of the costs both the private and public sectors in Hampton Roads reasonably could be expected to incur in
attracting either an NBA or MLB team is represented in Table 6. Costs are based on the preceding discussion.
TABLE 6
REASONABLE ESTIMATES OF THE PUBLIC SUBSIDIES NECESSARY
TO ATTRACT MLB OR NBA TEAMS TO HAMPTON ROADS
Statistic/Sector
Franchise Fee – MLB
Stadium Construction – MLB
“Other Infrastructure” – MLB
Start-up Costs – MLB
Total for MLB
Franchise Fee – NBA
Stadium Construction – NBA

Total ($ millions)
$200
$300
$100
$100
$700
$200
$250

“Other Infrastructure” – NBA
Start-up Costs – NBA
Total for NBA

$60
$50
$510

Public ($ millions)
$0
$230
$100
$0
$330
$0
$77.5
($202.5)a
$60
$0
$133.5
($262.5)a

Private ($ millions)
$200
$70
$0
$100
$370
$200
$172.5
($47.5)a
$0
$50
$388
($297.5)a

Sources: (1) 2000 National Sports Law Institute of Marquette University Law School, Appendix 2 to Sports Facility
Reports, Volume 1, Number 1. (2) Forbes Magazine
a

This figure assumes the public sector will assume 81 percent of the stadium construction costs, as was the case in the
construction of Phillips Arena in Atlanta in 1999.

As Table 6 indicates, Hampton Roads’ best bet is to attract an NBA team. A low estimate of the public contribution necessary to attract an NBA franchise is $133 million, though perhaps a more realistic estimate is almost twice that amount. By
contrast, an MLB team is likely to require a much greater infusion of public funds – approximately $330 million. Such a
consideration may be moot, since Hampton Roads does not appear to generate the per capita income necessary to support
an MLB team anyway. This means Hampton Roads is a risky location for MLB. Tampa Bay appears to have discovered that
harsh reality. A May 6, 2001, article in the Chicago Tribune assessed the situation in Tampa Bay:
“Ain’t no sunshine: Baseball is on life support in Florida. Both the Florida Marlins and Tampa Bay Devil Rays
are stuck with stadiums that may be their undoing.
“Owner John Henry brought much-needed enthusiasm when he bought the Marlins from Wayne Huizenga in
1999, but he has been frustrated in his efforts to get a stadium. The latest session of the Florida Legislature
adjourned Friday without a financing bill even reaching the floor. It was blocked by Senate President John
McKay, perhaps as a protest against all those tacky flags that were attached to car antennas during the 1997
World Series.
“Then there are the Devil Rays, who are last in the AL in attendance. They play at Tropicana Field, a quirky
dome that is near downtown St. Petersburg and far from the population center in the area.
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“ ‘We overestimated the strength of the market, frankly,’ said Bill Bunker, who was executive director of the
Pinellas Sports Authority when it sought a franchise. ‘We thought there were a lot more baseball fans in this
market than there are and we may have overestimated the financial abilities of the market.’ ”

COMMENTS ON MARKET SIZE AND FRANCHISE VIABILITY
Market size determines gate and local broadcast revenues in major league sports. MLB offers a good example of how financial
inequities may put small-market clubs at some peril. There is a positive correlation between team payrolls and team winning percentage. Between 1994 and 2000, each additional $2 million in team payroll equated to approximately one additional regular season win in MLB. Simply put, MLB shares less revenue among teams than does the NBA or NFL. Therefore,
small-market teams have a much tougher time surviving in MLB. This is another strike against MLB insofar as Hampton
Roads is concerned.
High payrolls are even more strongly related to post-season success. Since 1995, when MLB switched to its current playoff
format, teams in the highest quartile of payrolls have appeared in the playoffs 30 times, compared with 15 appearances by
teams in the second quartile, one appearance by a team in the third quartile and two appearances by teams in the bottom quartile. In terms of success in the playoffs, the gulf between the “haves” and the “have-nots” is even wider. Teams in the top quartile
have won 168 of the 190 playoff games played since 1995, with second-quartile teams winning another 20 of the 190
games. Of course, a high payroll is no guarantee of success: Witness such big-budget failures as the 2000 L.A. Dodgers,
which failed to make the playoffs despite having the second highest payroll in baseball, or the 1998 Baltimore Orioles, which
failed to even break .500 with MLB’s highest payroll.
Hampton Roads possesses a small-market demographic profile when compared to communities that currently host teams in MLB
or the NBA. Small-market franchises are financially vulnerable from the point of view of both the team and the community for at
least five reasons. First, teams flirting with the notion of relocating usually would be silly not to seek compensation for the additional risk they would assume by entering a small market. This forces small markets to provide larger public subsidies for constructing stadiums and/or more generous lease arrangements. It is highly unlikely that Nashville would have attracted NFL interest
in the absence of it offering an irresistible financial incentive.
Second, after the novelty effect of a new team erodes, team revenues tend to track competitiveness on the field. Small-market
clubs (consider Montreal in baseball) do not have the financial wherewithal to compete with the larger markets for playing talent
in this free-agency era, and that generally translates into reduced competitiveness and a further erosion of revenues as fan
interest wanes.
Third, owners tend to emulate each other and adopt the financial strategies of the most successful clubs. The spate of new stadium construction in the 1990s corroborates this behavior. The risk for a city or region is they will be asked to fund the renovation or construction of new playing facilities, whether or not they are needed. Forty-six facilities were constructed or renovated in
the four major professional sports leagues in North America between 1990 and 1998, and as of the end of 1999, an additional 49 facilities were either under construction or in the planning stages. In other words, more than 80 percent of the
venues for the four major professional sports leagues have been renovated or replaced since 1990. The shelf life of stadiums has been substantially reduced. The Miami Heat and the Charlotte Hornets of the NBA, for example, have clamored for
new arenas despite the fact their old facilities are only slightly more than 10 years old and have construction bonds still unpaid.
Miami (Dade County) has built a new stadium for the Heat, while the Hornets are threatening to leave Charlotte if the city does
not agree to replace the second largest arena in the NBA in terms of seating capacity.
Fourth, as pressure for greater revenue sharing mounts, the league will be less tolerant of clubs that will not or cannot pull their
financial weight. MLB commissioner Bud Selig has expressed concern publicly that some teams appear to have been permanently consigned to also-ran status. Coincidentally, as MLB discusses “contraction,” or the elimination of financially troubled franchises, all teams considered for dissolution are in cities that have ballparks that are considered economically obsolete. This
generates additional pressure for new publicly financed facilities. The cities include Montreal, Miami, Tampa Bay and
Minneapolis-St. Paul. When questioned about league contraction, Selig said:
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“The more I’ve analyzed the problems, the more I refuse to take any option off the table. Do I consider contraction a serious and viable option? I do. The economic problems are so pervasive that they are going to need a
myriad of solutions.”
Fifth, there is evidence some of the teams in the four major professional sports leagues are experiencing financial problems. Of
course, many of the claims of financial distress issued by league offices are suspect because they represent thinly veiled attempts
to convince cities that have balked at financing new ballparks to get on with it or suffer the consequences. MLB’s blue ribbon
panel on baseball economics, however, concluded that since 1994 MLB has lost collectively $1.4 billion, and only three MLB
teams (New York Yankees, Cleveland Indians and Colorado Rockies) were profitable over that time. While one might quibble
with these data, at least one MLB team may be in imminent danger. There have been persistent reports that the Tampa Bay Devil
Rays may not be able to make their payroll.
The NBA is also experiencing some financial difficulty. Television ratings for NBA broadcasts on both NBC and TNT for the
2000-01 season were down 31 percent from peaks reached in 1997-98. Over the same period, attendance at regular-season
games fell by 4.9 percent.
Hampton Roads and other communities seeking a professional sports presence must be mindful of the realities of the sports marketplace. Clearly, there are financial challenges and stresses that accompany inclusion in the big leagues, particularly for “small
markets.”
Those who support the use of public subsidies to attract major league sports have argued the public benefits induced by a major
league presence exceed the public costs. However, while such individuals typically have ignored some costs, they have in particular tended to exaggerate benefits. The next section analyzes the public benefits identified by sports boosters.

The Rationale For Public Subsidies For
Professional Sports Teams
ARE PROFESSIONAL SPORTS TEAMS “PUBLIC GOODS”?
Cities and regions subsidize professional sports most visibly through funding playing facilities, though less visibly by means of
police and security provision, and enduring crowding, congestion, trash and rowdy behavior, and so forth. Proponents of subsidies for sports infrastructure argue that such subsidies are a fiscally responsible strategy because they properly should be viewed
as public investments rather than expenses. Thus, they contend, Hampton Roads should view an expenditure on a major league
baseball park in the same fashion as investments in things such as the port, schools, airports and the like. Such items, it is
argued, generate benefits in excess of their costs and hence represent good investments of public funds.
This provokes an obvious question. If stadiums are such good investments, then why don’t private entrepreneurs put up the necessary funds in the same fashion they do for suburban developments or even dot.coms? The reason, say supporters, is private
investors cannot capture all of the benefits generated by large-ticket items such as stadiums. The problem, they say, is similar to
that for many other “public” goods such as public safety and education. While the party who pays for an item such as a stadium receives some of the benefits, numerous other individuals (hotel and motel owners, and restaurateurs are examples) also
enjoy some of the benefits even though they did not pay for the stadium.
Thus, supporters of public subsidies for stadiums contend there are benefits “external” to the stadium’s primary output that go to
those who haven’t made any investment. In the absence of public financial support, private entrepreneurs may decline to invest
their funds because some of the benefits frequently go to other individuals who have not invested. Sufficient benefits do exist to
justify major league teams, proponents argue, but these benefits are diffused over so many different individuals and groups that
no single person will find it worthwhile to make the huge investment required. For example, every resident of the Cincinnati metropolitan area, they believe, derives some identification and prestige benefits from the Reds and the Bengals because the presence of these teams defines Cincinnati as “a major league city.” Civic and regional pride have values, they contend, and this is
among the reasons why public investment in major league stadiums is merited.
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All of this is based upon the notion that professional sports are properly construed as “public” rather than private goods.
National defense expenditures are determined publicly since all citizens benefit from the same arsenal of military goods, whether
or not they pay taxes. The benefits of national defense go to all individuals, whether or not they know it or even want the protection. The optimal provision of pizzas, on the other hand, is determined privately since once a pizza is purchased and eaten, the
benefits derived from that pizza go only to the person who purchased and ate it. Are stadiums really “public” goods, or are they
“private” goods like pizzas? And, If they are, indeed, public goods, what is the balance between costs and benefits? Questions
relating to the external benefits professional sports impart and the extent to which they are public in character are at the
heart of the debate about professional sports subsidies. These issues are analyzed in succeeding sections.

WHO PAYS FOR STADIUM CONSTRUCTION?
The increase in the fraction of stadium construction costs borne by the teams on average in the 1990s creates the misleading
impression that overall, private investors are shouldering an increasing share of the financial responsibility for professional sports.
Encouraging this view are the data depicted in Graph 3, which shows the fraction of infrastructure costs borne by the private
and public sectors for the four major professional sports leagues.
GRAPH 3
THE FRACTION OF STATIUM CONSTRUCTION COSTS BORNE BY THE
PUBLIC SECTOR, 1900-1996
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It is true the public sector no longer provides as large a proportion of stadium construction costs as it did in the 1970s and
1980s. The reality, however, is that the absolute (not proportionate) dollars cities have committed to stadium construction terms
have never been higher than over the period 1996-2000. This is true even when price inflation is taken into account.
One reason construction costs have increased so rapidly is today’s stadiums are much more plush than they were even 20 years
ago. In MLB, new stadiums generally have fewer seats but generate more revenue because of the growing emphasis on luxury
seating and other amenities. However, this is only half the story because it does not take into account the other side of the picture – public-sector sharing of revenues. Most cities or regions that construct stadiums also share in the revenues generated by the
stadiums and the teams that play in them.

DO TEAMS SHARE REVENUES WITH CITIES AND REGIONS?
Times have changed in this arena. Prior to the 1990s, cities and teams shared significant proportions of the revenues generated
by stadiums and teams. Such is not the case today. Sports stadium leases have evolved such that teams take virtually all of
the significant revenue streams generated by a stadium, except for those they earmark for financing construction of the
stadium itself. Clearly, teams expect a new stadium will improve their financial condition, otherwise they would not clamor
for them. As a consequence, Hampton Roads should not expect to share revenues with teams. It is not the standard in professional sports today. Communities might expect teams to earmark certain revenue streams; for example, the funds generated
from naming rights might be earmarked to pay for the construction of a stadium. However, the quid pro quo will be complete
appropriation of all the other revenues by the team. Confidential NFL data made available to the public as a result of the lawsuit
Oakland Raiders owner Al Davis filed against the NFL revealed:
“The average per-team operating profit, arrived at by deducting expenses from revenue, jumped to $11.6 million
in 1999, up 68 percent from 1994. In 1999, the team generated an average of $45.3 million in local revenue, meaning primarily the dollars that can be wrung out of a stadium, an increase of 80 percent from 1994.”
Hence, even while cities and regions have begun to pay a lower proportion of the construction costs of new stadiums, increasingly they are being pushed out of a significant share of the revenue generated by these stadiums and the teams that play in
them. Most important, one of the largest sources of economic gain to a team is the increased value (price) of its franchise over
time. As noted above, the value of franchises has climbed dramatically in recent years. Today, the average value of a major
league baseball franchise is at least $200 million. If the construction of a new stadium is one of the reasons why a team’s value
increases, and the public has paid a majority of the construction costs of that stadium, then should the public share in the appreciated value of the franchise, if and when the owners sell it? Perhaps it should, but only rarely is that the case. The newly negotiated agreement the city of St. Louis and the State of Missouri have negotiated with the St. Louis Cardinals is an exception.
Generally, wily owners have convinced star-struck cities and regions to fork over public cash without receiving in return any of
the appreciation in the value of the franchise that nearly always results. Indeed, if and when they sell the team, they may realize
capital gains of $100 million or more, none of which is shared by the public.
The allure of a new, modern stadium to a team is the increased “local revenues,” over which teams have exclusive rights, and
the increased value of the major league franchise that results. Local revenues are defined as those receipts not subject to league
revenue-sharing arrangements and are the moneys teams keep for themselves. Examples include parking, concessions and the
like. These are revenues that have climbed significantly in recent years, but cities and regions typically have not shared in this
largesse.
The full exercise of the financial muscle provided by passionate demand for professional sports franchises has enabled teams to
exclude cities from sharing these local revenues. Cities and regions have wanted major league teams so badly that they have
negotiated agreements excluding the public from “local” revenues and a share of the appreciation in the value of the franchises.
The number of corporations and large organizations headquartered in a community largely determines the market price for luxury
seating. Corporations represent the most important consumers of luxury seating. The roster of corporations headquartered in
Hampton Roads to a substantial degree would determine the price for premium seats. Would the owners of a Hampton Roads
professional sports team receive sufficient revenue from luxury seating to enable them to compete with current MLB or NBA franchises? This seems doubtful because Hampton Roads is home to only two firms listed among the Fortune 500 and cannot claim
many large firms whose headquarters actually are in the region. Hampton Roads is a “branch region.” Its large banks are head-
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quartered elsewhere, for example, in Charlotte, and most of the region’s large corporations are controlled from sites elsewhere in
the United States or the world.
In any case, the evolution of stadium leases has restricted cities from sharing revenues that emanate directly from teams’ operations. This has occurred for several reasons, but the primary one is cities and regions clamoring for teams have become
pushovers for the teams they have attempted to attract. The contention, therefore, that public subsidies for professional sports represent prudent investments must be based on something other than a city’s share of direct revenues. Those revenues go elsewhere
and therefore do not play a big part in rigorous studies of the economic impact of professional sports teams.

INDIRECT EXPENDITURES
What about indirect revenues – from expenditures fans make at restaurants, bars and hotels in a professional sports city or
region? In most reputable studies of the feasibility of a professional sports franchise and its economic impact, the benefits
accruing to the city through indirect spending (including multiplier effects) represent the pillar upon which the rationale for
professional sports subsidies rests. In the broadest sense, indirect spending includes all additional spending beyond direct
spending that occurs in the community, for example, spending at a restaurant or bar in another neighborhood. Note the deliberate emphasis on the word “additional.” There is no economic gain to those in Hampton Roads if, because of a major league
team, its citizens stop spending money at, say, Patrick Henry Mall, and instead now spend it on a major league baseball team.
In the standard development models, local growth comes from increased export sales – net inflows of spending from outside the
area. These expenditures then have a multiplier effect as individuals spend and re-spend these dollars several times. For
example, the owners and employees of restaurants serving major league sports fans spend the money they receive from the fans.
Of course, it also is true that a major league team could convince local residents to spend their money in Hampton Roads rather
than elsewhere. This is what economists label “import substitution” and represents a valid additional source of economic stimulation for a city or region. If the $100 spent by a local resident at a professional sports event in Hampton Roads would have
been used to buying things from, say, New York City, then the presence of the local professional team would increase net local
spending.
The size of the multiplier following any net increase in area spending depends similarly on the locus of the re-spending. If all of
the new income generated by the sports team is re-spent on locally produced goods, then the multiplier will be substantial. If,
however, the highly paid athletes or executives maintain their residences outside the area, or if the concessionaires import their
T-shirts and beer from outside the region, then the multiplier will be small.
The impact of a professional sports team on the local economy depends, therefore, on the details of where each dollar is spent
– on imports, exports or local production. Precise data on this are not easy to obtain, and the common technique is to proceed
by making assumptions about the sources and uses of spending. Not surprisingly, those who measure the greatest impact of
professional sports teams on local economies assume that all the initial spending constitutes a net increase in local
spending. This means they assume: (1) individuals who patronize a major league team will not reduce their expenditures
on any other items in Hampton Roads; (2) those who live outside the region will spend new money on a major league
team in Hampton Roads; and (3) Hampton Roads residents will stop spending money in other regions and now spend that
money locally on the major league team. It seems obvious, however, that these propositions are not totally true, or even
close to it.
The discussion of whether people who patronize a major league team reduce their purchases of other things inside the city or region
in order to do so is grounded in economic fundamentals. Individuals have limited budgets in terms of time and money. More time
and money spent watching a professional sporting event necessarily means less time and money for other things. Consider the following nonsports example. Does the appearance of a new shopping venue such as Norfolk’s MacArthur Center have an effect on
sales at other shopping sites such as Patrick Henry Mall, Lynnhaven Mall or the Military Highway corridor? All one needs to do is to
add the total retail sales in the region, and adjust them for inflation, to see that the appearance of a new shopping venue such as
MacArthur Center does in fact impact other shopping areas. The effects sometimes are subtle and one may not see them unless one
looks at city or regional totals. A small, strip shopping center store may go out of business or perhaps a store narrows its choice of
merchandise because sales do not merit a larger selection. The point is, there is substitution present where regional expenditures are
considered, whether for retail shopping or for a major league team. It’s not all new money.
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Since the appropriateness of public subsidies is of primary interest, it is worth noting that substitutions also can occur in the
public sphere. If public moneys are spent on a professional sports team, will there be fewer dollars available for other public purposes, such as schools, roads and policing? Again, the answer almost surely is “yes.” As cities and regions relearn bitterly each
year at budget time, they can’t spend the same dollar in two places. Local elections frequently turn on spending priorities and
where public investments should best be made – “downtown” or in the neighborhoods. The point, then, is that to some extent the
public investments made in major league stadiums reduce public expenditures made in other arenas. The question is not whether
this is true, but to what degree it is true. Public financing does not emanate from a bottomless well.
It is true that high-visibility projects such as professional sports typically draw more popular support than many alternatives. If,
however, such support is based only on the perception of substantial economic development flowing from the project – bolstered
by the assumption-flawed impact studies – then this support is based on false premises. In fact, according to several studies, it
is plausible to assert that professional sports teams actually may be detrimental to area income growth. The types of jobs
created by professional sports activity are low-wage and seasonal: ticket-takers, ushers, vendors, restaurant and bar
workers, taxi drivers, etc. That is not to demean the importance of such jobs to a community, but there are long-term development implications that need to be considered. An area development strategy concentrating on these types of jobs could lead to
a situation where the region’s comparative advantage is based on a relative abundance of such workers. Compared to other
areas (with comparative advantage based on high-skilled and high-wage labor), future growth rates in the region investing in
sports may lag growth rates in regions whose developmental strategy concentrates jobs in low-wage sectors. This is especially
relevant for Hampton Roads, because the region’s per capita income is only 87 percent of the national average (98 percent if
cost-of-living differences are taken into account). Would Hampton Roads rather be like Austin, Texas, which has no major league
teams, but an abundance of high-income, high-skill jobs, or instead a sink for low-income, low-skill jobs?
Those advocating sports-based development envision a very different long-run outcome. They project that a city’s “major league”
image is an intangible that will attract new, unrelated businesses. This is the “St. Louis Argument,” though the decline of the city
of St. Louis over the past few decades does not encourage this view. Nonetheless, without question, civic and regional pride
do have value; cities and regions with such pride are more uplifting places to live and play. Still, it is not clear such things
are worth hundreds of millions of dollars that could be spent on other indisputably productive investments.
To summarize, advocates of subsidies for professional sports identify several possible benefits to justify the public investment in
sports infrastructure. They include: (1) direct benefits that accrue from spending that occurs in conjunction with the operation of
the team; (2) indirect economic benefits accruing to the community as a consequence of hosting the team that are external to the
team’s activities and not captured by the team; and (3) the psychological benefit the community derives from hosting a team.

INDIRECT BENEFITS
A persistent argument for public subsidies for professional sports states that the indirect benefits realized by society (including psychological benefits and pride) exceed the costs society incurs in subsidizing professional sports. What does the available empirical evidence have to say about the magnitude of such benefits? The evidence provided by analysts without an economic or
political stake in the outcome of subsidy debates is not encouraging about substantial indirect economic benefits imparted by
professional sports.
An evaluation of the indirect economic impact of major league sports must consider both the region-wide and neighborhood
impacts. Does the team contribute to the economic vitality of the metropolis; is there a region-wide contribution? Does the presence of the team enhance the economic activity in the neighborhood in which the stadium is located; is there a localized
impact? The question of neighborhood economic impact has become more important because suburban stadium sites are
increasingly being abandoned in favor of sites at the edge of or within central business districts (CBDs). Proponents of relocating
stadiums to CBDs claim that such a move can help transform deteriorating city cores.
To help understand indirect economic impact, imagine drawing rings with increasingly larger radiuses around the stadium. If a
major league team attracts fans outside the neighborhood in which the ballpark is located, that neighborhood is in effect
“exporting” professional sports and an inflow of funds results. The communities from which the fans are drawn, however, experience diminished economic activity since those communities are “importing” the sports activity, which results in a dollar outflow. If
the area analyzed includes nearly of all of the communities that are exporting and importing professional sports, no net dollar
inflows or outflows are recorded for that area’s economy. Metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) generally consist of more than
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one county. If fans are primarily drawn from the MSA, then we would expect little or no net spending changes within the MSA,
since the money spent at the professional sporting event is simply supplanting money that would be spent elsewhere in the MSA.
The primary methodological problem with promotional impact studies for professional sport is they ignore this “substitution” effect
and other leakages that may occur as a consequence of the national character of the professional sports industry. That is, the
overly optimistic promotional studies touted by the most rabid supporters of major league teams blithely ignore the reality
that most of the money fans spend on a major league team simply reduces their spending on other things within the
region. This makes a huge difference. To illustrate this, consider the information recorded in Table 7.

TABLE 7
Two Ways to Analyze the Economic Impact of Professional Sports for
a Hypothetical Game in New York City with 30,000 Fans Attending a Game
Assumptions

Overly Optimistic
Promotional Model:
Estimated Economic Impact

Proper Assessment
Model: Estimated
Economic Impact

Game attendance = 30,000
fans, 10 percent, or 3,000 of
whom come from outside
New York City

Includes spending
undertaken by 30,000 fans

Includes spending
undertaken by 1,500 fansa

Spending on concessions =
$10 per fan

$300,000
(30,000 x $10)

$15,000
(1,500 x $10)

Local value added in
producing concessions = .4

Fails to consider local
value added

$6,000
(.4 x $15,000)

Nonresident game attendees
buy $20 worth of gas in
NYC (25 percent of sales
represents local income)

$60,000
($20 x 3,000)

$7,500
(.25 x $20 x 1,500)

200 nonresident game
attendees stay overnight,
spending $100 each
(50 percent of sales
represents local income)

$20,000
(200 x $100)

$5,000
(100 x $100 x .5)

2

1.2b

Estimated economic impact
before multiplier

$360,000

$18,500

Estimated economic impact
to include multiplier

$720,000

$22,200

Multiplier

Source: This example is drawn from Roger G. Noll and Andrew Zimbalist, “Sports, Jobs, & Taxes: The Real
Connection,” in Sports, Jobs & Taxes, edited by Roger G. Noll and Andrew Zimbalist, (Washington, D.C.: The Brooking
Institution Press), 1997, pp. 495-496.
a

The assumption here is that 50 percent of the nonresident game attendees came to New York City for other reasons –
for example, to go to the Statue of Liberty, or Times Square, or whatever. For support for both the 10 percent nonresident game attendee figure and the 50 percent figure, see John L. Crompton, “Economic Impact Analysis of Sports
Facilities and Events: Eleven Sources of Misapplication,” Journal of Sports Management, vol. 9 (January 1995), pp.
27-29.

b
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As Table 7 indicates, ignoring the substitution effect accounts for most of the substantial disagreement on the estimated size of
indirect economic benefits generated by major league teams. One way to assess the reliability of promotional economic impact
studies is to compare their promises to an “after-the-fact” audit in communities where there have been changes in the professional
sports industry. Consider the following excerpts from empirical work performed by a variety of researchers with no ax to grind on
the impact professional sports has had on metropolitan economies.
In 1996, Robert A. Baade, Vail Professor of Economics at Lake Forest College, examined the impact of changes in professional
sports in all 48 cities in the United States that have experienced some change in their status within the four major professional
sports leagues over the period 1958 through 1987. In considering changes in the professional sports industry had on metropolitan real per capita personal income, Baade found: “The results of the empirical tests … were statistically insignificant for all but
a few cities.”
Baade’s conclusion that professional sports have no discernible impact on metropolitan real per capita personal income is
strong, but too kind, according to a 1998 study by Dennis Coates and Brad R. Humphreys, both of whom are on the economics faculty at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. Not only did these researchers not find a positive impact
on per capita income by professional sports, but they actually discovered that professional sports reduce per capita income
in cities and regions. In a 1999 Journal of Policy Analysis and Management article, they wrote:
“This paper investigates the relationship between professional sports franchises and venues and real per capita
personal income in 37 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the United States over the period 19691994.Our empirical framework accounts for the entry and departures of professional football, basketball and
baseball franchises, the construction of arenas and stadia, and other sports related factors over this time period.
In contrast to other existing studies, we find evidence that some professional sports franchises reduce the level
of per capita personal income in metropolitan areas and have no effect on the growth in per capita income,
casting doubt on the ability of a new sports franchise or facility to spur economic growth.”
In assessing the correlation between jobs and the professional sports industry, Baade found in 1996 that
“…sports teams and stadiums have an insignificant impact on jobs in the commercial sports industry.”
This last result is particularly significant in that one would expect changes in the professional sports industry to exert some measurable influence on jobs in the commercial sports sector, which is small, relative to a large, diverse metropolitan economy. To provide some context on the size of a professional sports team, Roger G. Noll, co-editor of the 1997 book Sports, Jobs & Taxes,
observed:
“By measures such as revenue, a sports team is a considerably smaller business than many less visible enterprises. To take but one example, a major university is not only larger than any sports team, but many exceed
the size of an entire league. Stanford University expects to generate revenues of approximately $1.5 billion in
fiscal 1997. In 1994 fifty universities each received mote than $75 million in research grants from the federal
government. The top ten universities together received approximately $2.8 billion in federal grants in 1994,
which was more than the combined revenues of the NFL and the National Hockey League, or the combined
revenues of the Major League Baseball and the National Basketball Association.”
Given the fact that Hampton Roads comprises several large cities, the issue of what a team would contribute to the metropolitan
economy is particularly important. Even if there were a measurable economic impact, these benefits would have to be allocated
among the cities in some fashion. One does not have to be a practiced politician to understand that those Hampton Roads cities
that did not host a team, but which helped defray the costs of attracting and maintaining a team, would not have agreed to
forgo being a host site without receiving some concrete, benefits in return. A reasonable measure of what a team actually would
contribute to the metropolitan economy, therefore, must be determined.
Two of the alleged success stories of major league sports are baseball’s Baltimore Orioles and their congenial ballpark, Camden
Yards. However, Bruce W. Hamilton and Peter Kahn, economics professors at Johns Hopkins University, have estimated the economic impact of Camden Yards on the Baltimore economy. In their chapter on “Baltimore’s Camden Yards Ballparks” (Sports,
Jobs & Taxes, 1997), they concluded:
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“Taking account of all the measurable benefits of the Camden Yards investment (that is, job creation and tax
imports), we estimate that baseball at Camden Yards generates approximately $3 million in annual economic
benefits to the Maryland economy, at an annual cost to the taxpayers of Maryland of approximately $14 million. The net annual cost is approximately $11 million, or about $14.70 a year per Baltimore metro household.”
Most individuals in Crab Town believe the Orioles (and the football Ravens) are the financial equivalent of Old Faithful – they
generate economic growth for the region on a predictable schedule. The truth is just the opposite – they diminish economic
growth on a regular schedule.
Thus, the critical question: If there is no evidence to support the supposition that professional sports have a positive effect on
regional economies, is there evidence that major league teams have a substantial economic impact on the neighborhoods in
which their stadiums are located? This may be a particularly important issue if the neighborhood is located in the urban core.
Legislatures have become sensitive to the demise of urban America and, as a consequence, initiatives designed to rejuvenate
downtowns have enjoyed some support at the state and federal levels. Arguably, revitalizing downtown areas (Newport News,
Portsmouth and Norfolk all have pursued this strategy) may generate benefits that spill beyond the urban core. If this is so, nonlocal public subsidies for downtown redevelopment may have merit. Before a stadium can be used to rejuvenate a downtown
area, however, it must be determined that it represents the best use of that land.
The local economic impact depends on the extent to which spending and re-spending occurs by those residing outside the environs where the sports event is held, or by local citizens who spend money on the games as opposed to spending discretionary
income outside their neighborhood. It is difficult to dispute the game-day impression that substantial economic activity does occur
in the neighborhood. The sense is that enthusiastic spendthrifts descend on a community. However, the important question is this:
Does the money stay in the neighborhood? Stadiums may well serve only as a conduit through which money is transmitted
from fans to nonresident players and owners. Thus, even at the local level, professional sports may not provide much of an
economic boost.
Robert Baade studied the economic impact of professional sports on Pioneer Square, the Seattle neighborhood in which the NFL
Seahawks and MLB Mariners play. Based on an analysis of the changing mix of commercial activity in the neighborhood, he
concluded:
“The evidence from Seattle is decidedly mixed. Clearly the stadium channels economic activity in the direction
of businesses that have a connection to sports. Stadium bars and restaurants and retail outlets selling sports
paraphernalia benefit. Many other businesses, particularly those that do not appeal to sports fans, lose business. This occurs as a consequence of peak use of shared community resources on event day; parking and
sidewalk space are the most obvious examples. Customers that ordinarily would patronize local businesses do
not on event day because the cost of doing so increases. Routine or normal business, therefore, is crowded out
on a scale that may well offset any neighborhood gains. Unless the excess demand for key local resources is
somehow mitigated, many other commercial activities in the neighborhood are destined to decline.”
Thus, there are reasons to believe that even at the neighborhood level professional sports fail to boost the economy. Whether the
team contributes meaningfully to the local economy depends on the nature of that economy and its ability to minimize the disruption caused by peak stadium traffic. This requires careful planning and a professional sports team willing to be a good citizen.
However, the political power most professional sports teams currently wield forces neighborhood businesses and residents to
shoulder a disproportionate share of the risks and inconvenience associated with the influx of fans on game day.
The costs to a region or city of hosting a professional sports team include more than the initial outlays for landing the team and
building a stadium. Most obviously, there is the additional police protection and clean-up costs in the stadium environs, which
mysteriously on occasion have been excluded from the cost-benefit analysis for hosting a team. But, there also are ongoing stadium costs that include operation and maintenance. Fearful of financial innovation that will render their stadium economically
obsolete, major league teams now include in their memoranda of understanding with cities clauses that guarantee stadium renovations to ensure their stadium will maintain a designated rank within the league in terms of revenue generation.
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PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER
In light of the insignificant or at best minimal economic benefits that accrue from major league teams, and costs that may
well be understated, are there grounds for Hampton Roads to pursue a professional sports team? The answer is, “Not if it
is being done for economic reasons.” Most major league teams are poor financial investments for cities and regions
(though not necessarily for the astute owner who is able to pry substantial subsidies from the public). Even a city such as
Baltimore would be better off to invest its funds in activities other than major league sports, if it is interested in a competitive rate
of return.
Of course, sport has substantial social and cultural significance in the United States and throughout the world. The Orioles and
the Ravens uplift the spirits of Baltimoreans and presumably infuse many of region’s residents with pride. Indeed, when all is said
and done, the primary benefits to Hampton Roads and any other community that is considering hosting a professional sports
team would be psychological in nature. A community establishes an identity, for better or worse, in part through the existence and performance of its sports teams. Sports help define a community’s place in the social hierarchy. A professional
sports team is something around which members of a community find common ground and coalesce. It provides a topic of
conversation around the coffee machine and the dinner table. These intangibles are worth something, though it is not
abundantly clear they are worth more than superior K-12 schools, or reduced crime, or whatever. And, as we have seen,
these intangibles do not lead to higher city or regional incomes.
We conclude this section with a simple thought that may be comforting to those who wish to bring a major league franchise to
the region. The Hampton Roads MSA has a population of approximately 1.55 million. In the analysis above, we estimated that
the public sector in Hampton Roads likely would contribute approximately $330 million to field an MLB team. Then, each citizen
(sports fan or not) would pay $212.90 to host an MLB team. If the team were to stay in Hampton Roads for 20 years, then
each citizen would pay only $21.29 per year to attract and retain the team in the region. It is plausible that many people
would be willing to support a professional sports team if they were informed it would cost them only $21.29 per year to do so.
It appears many people believe the pride and prestige associated with major league status are worth even more than that. Thus,
even though the net economic benefits from major league sports teams are minimal or zero, and most major league franchise
owners enrich themselves at the expense of the cities and regions hosting their teams, many citizens might nonetheless believe
major league sports are a good deal.

PROFESSIONAL ATHLETIC MONOPOLIES: A FINAL POINT
Professional sports leagues are unregulated cartels that function as monopolies. Monopolies, of course, exist in other sectors of
the economy (for example, public utilities, parking and public schools). Frequently, governments ordain or otherwise support
these monopolies. Governments do so either because the perceived benefits of allowing a monopoly to exist appear to outweigh the perceived costs, or because of political reasons.
An important reason why cities and regions get taken to the metaphoric economic cleaners so often by professional sports
teams is that the sports leagues exercise a great deal of monopoly power. Most citizens object to the exercise of monopoly
power by cartels such as OPEC, which raises the prices they pay for gasoline, and some complain when Microsoft makes it
difficult for them to purchase the computer software they prefer. Somehow, though, cities and regions seem to overcome
their anti-monopoly qualms when they deal with professional sports teams, with the net effect being they actually promote
public policies that facilitate the monopoly power of the leagues and teams. Needless to say, the leagues and team owners
are quite thankful for such attitudes. It’s a scenario that clearly favors the leagues and owners, but one that perhaps is not in
the best interests of Hampton Roads.
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THE PORT OF
HAMPTON ROADS

The Decline of Coal and the Rise of
Deep-Draft Ships: The Future of the Port

T

he Port of Hampton Roads is no small fry. It is, in fact, among the largest cargo ports in the United States. Based on the 1999
tonnage statistics of the American Association of Port Authorities, Hampton Roads, with 55.1 million short tons of cargo, ranked

10th in the country behind Long Beach, Calif. Further, in 1998, the latest year for which world tonnage data are available,
Hampton Roads ranked 33rd in the world, ahead of such major ports as London, Amsterdam and Genoa.
Despite its relative importance in the world’s transportation network and its huge importance to Hampton Roads, the Port,
as seen in Graph 1, has experienced a downward trend in total tonnage since reaching a peak in 1991. The cargo level
handled by the Port in 1999 was roughly similar to that of 1985. Judged strictly on the basis of tonnage, then, it would seem
that the Port is a contracting sector of the Hampton Roads economy and therefore a declining contributor to the economic development of the community. Just the opposite is true, however. When we measure growth in jobs and income due to the Port, a
very different picture appears. Port-related employment, which can be defined as the sum of those jobs associated with the
movement of cargo, plus jobs associated with firms using the Port, increased at an impressive rate, approaching 5 percent per
GRAPH 1
TOTAL CARGO TONNAGE SHIPPED THROUGH THE PORT OF HAMPTON ROADS
1983 - 1999
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year from 1988 to 2000. As displayed in Graph 2, although the number of Port-related jobs grew slowly from 1979 to 1988,
nearly 13,000 Port-related jobs were created in Hampton Roads from 1988 to 2000. Viewed in this light, the Port exerted a
dynamic, expansionary influence on the Hampton Roads economy over the past decade.
How do we explain the apparent contradiction between declining Port tonnage and rising Port-related employment? Will the
Port continue to grow in terms of employment? Is the Port an economic development tool for the larger community? Can government play a role in assisting Port development? Does the Port only affect the economies of those cities within Hampton Roads in
which Port facilities are located? The keys to answering these questions lie in understanding the changing cargo mix between
general and bulk cargo, the major cargo types arriving at the Port and in the basic economics of the shipping industry. That is
the focus of this chapter.

GRAPH 2
PORT-RELATED EMPLOYMENT IN HAMPTON ROADS
1979-2000

35,000

30,000

25,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

0
1979

1984

1988

1992

1995

2000

Source: Old Dominion University Forecasting Project

T H E

P O R T

O F

H A M P T O N

R O A D S

47

General Cargo
The Port handles two major types of cargo. One is general cargo, 95 percent of which arrives in containers, and the other is
bulk cargo, which arrives in the holds of ships. General cargo might include items ranging from television sets to clothing. The
major bulk cargo item is coal.

EMPLOYMENT AND TONNAGE
With the exception of a very small operation at Lambert’s Point, the facilities used for unloading container vessels in Hampton
Roads are owned by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and are located in Portsmouth, elsewhere in Norfolk and in Newport
News. According to 1999 data from the American Association of Port Authorities, Hampton Roads ranks 34th in the world in
container shipping and, as shown in Table 1, eighth in the United States behind Charleston, S.C.
TABLE 1
U.S. Port Ranking
Port

Long Beach
Los Angeles
New York / New Jersey
San Juan
Oakland
Seattle
Charleston
Hampton Roads
Tacoma
Houston
Savannah
Miami
Jacksonville
Port Everglades
Baltimore

Containers
(1,000's)
1999
4408
3829
2829
2085
1664
1490
1483
1307
1271
1001
793
778
772
716
498

General cargo tonnage arriving at the Port since 1978
is displayed in Graph 3. Unlike total Port tonnage,
which includes both general and bulk cargo, general
cargo tonnage has risen fairly steadily over time. Its
volume in 2000 was nearly six times that of 1979.
Over the same time span, the Old Dominion University
Economic Forecasting Project estimates that Hampton
Roads employment directly related to general cargo
facilities rose steadily from 10,600 jobs in 1979 to
27,500 jobs in 2000. In the case of general cargo,
both tonnage and employment have been steadily
increasing at the Port. Further, given general cargo’s
proportional dominance of the employment data and
rising cargo tonnage, general cargo has been the
source of overall employment growth in Port-related
jobs and is not the source of the decline in overall
tonnage.

This drop is due solely to declining bulk cargo shipments. The drop in bulk cargo, however, has had a minimal effect on overall Port-related employment, because
general cargo job creation has more than offset the
decline in year-to-year employment in bulk cargo movement. The reason for this is that general cargo is much
more labor-intensive than bulk cargo in both its movement and its ability to attract other industries to the
region. In 2000, general cargo, on average, created a job in Hampton Roads for every 435 tons of cargo shipped through the
Port, while roughly 9,000 tons of bulk cargo were required to create a job in Hampton Roads. It takes many hands to deal with
general cargo, but relatively few hands to deal with bulk cargo such as coal.
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GRAPH 3
HAMPTON ROADS GENERAL CARGO
1978 - 2000
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Given the significant growth in jobs connected to the Port’s general cargo traffic, it is worthwhile to examine more closely precisely where and how this is occurring. Employment related to the Port’s cargo operations can be subdivided into two categories: (1) jobs dedicated to cargo movement and (2) jobs resulting from firm location decisions. Cargo movement employment
is concentrated in occupations such as stevedores, tugboat crews, truck drivers and ship service workers. However, still other Port
employment results from firms that decide to locate or expand in Hampton Roads because of the direct access they obtain to
import and/or export cargo arriving/departing through the Port. Examples of this type of employment include import- and exportrelated jobs generated by firms such as Siemens, Canon, Lillian Vernon and Dollar Tree.
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General cargo tonnage has almost quadrupled over the past 20 years. Nonetheless, as Table 2 indicates, employment in general cargo movement has risen only about 22 percent, from 7,300 in 1979 to slightly less than 8,900 in 2000. A major

TABLE 2
Hampton Roads General Cargo Employment

Year

General Cargo
Movement Employment

Firm Location
Employment

1979
1984
1988
1992
1995
2000

7315
5570
6085
7434
7927
8877

3307
3399
6623
9295
11244
18677

Total General
Cargo Related
Employment
10622
8969
12708
16729
19171
27554

Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project

reason for the relatively slow employment growth relative to cargo tonnage is the increase in efficiency or productivity in the
movement of container cargo at the Port. Table 3 shows that stevedore productivity per hour tripled between 1980 and 2000.
This is a remarkable increase in labor productivity and reflects in particular the huge investments the Port and firms connected to the Port
TABLE 3
have made in equipment that makes each worker far more efficient
than before.
Stevedoring Productivity in Hampton Roads
Since employment in the movement of cargo has not produced large
gains over the past two decades, this means the lion’s share of Port
employment growth in Hampton Roads has come from firms that locate
or expand within the region because of their access to container facilities. As Table 2 illustrates, this kind of employment rose from about
3,300 in 1979 to just over 18,600 in 2000, roughly a six-fold
increase over the period. If the Port is a growth engine, then this is the
major source of that growth. The firms generating these jobs are
engaged primarily in light manufacturing and product distribution.

Year

Tons per Worker
per Hour
1.15
2.52
3.54

1980
1988
2000

Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project

Since 1995, product distribution and warehouse facilities for such firms as Wal-Mart, Sysco and Dollar Tree have been instrumental in the growth of import cargo tonnage. However, exports from Hampton Roads have grown as well. Table 4 shows that
in 1999 about 3.4 percent of the Gross Regional Product (GRP) was exported to other countries. Many people find this surprisingly low, because both Virginia as a state and the United States as a whole are more heavily involved in export activity. The
good news is that during the past decade, the growth in merchandise exports from Hampton Roads far outstripped that of
both Virginia and the United States. Thus, we have the anomaly that most individuals inside Hampton Roads think of the
region as being very heavily involved in export trade. The truth is somewhat different. Hampton Roads exports a smaller
proportion of its GRP than the typical region in the country, though its export traffic is expanding rapidly.
Although employment growth in the cargo movement firms has been relatively small, it is vitally important to the economic health
and future of the region because the slow growth reflects the rising efficiency in cargo movement in Hampton Roads. This rising
efficiency confers cost savings on shippers and is one of the reasons export traffic is growing so rapidly. The Port of Hampton
Roads is an efficient operation. The cost savings realized are central to the ability to attract both distribution and light manufacturing industries to the region. This is one of the reasons why the Port has assumed the role of the mid-Atlantic load center.
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TABLE 4
Merchandise Exports for Hampton Roads, Virginia and the U.S. (Selected Data)

Hampton Roads
Virginia
U.S.

Gross Product
1999
(Billions $)

Merchandise
Exports, 1999
(Billions $)

Exports as a Percent
of Gross Product

Percent Change
1993-99

41.70
246.80
9299.20

1.40
10.70
696.00

3.40%
4.30%
7.50%

105.30%
32.10%
49.60%

Hampton Roads export receiving countries: Canada, Mexico, France, Germany, UK, Brazil,
Netherlands, Japan, Australia, South Korea
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and the Old Dominion University Forecasting Project

THE MID-ATLANTIC LOAD CENTER
The relatively large general cargo tonnage increase at the Port has created a “marketing critical mass” and agglomeration
economies which have helped to make Hampton Roads the nation’s mid-Atlantic load center for container shipping lines. Load
center container ports are analogous to hub airports in that shipping lines designate a port to which cargo shipment is directed.
The effect is bi-directional. The concentration of cargo at the Port of Hampton Roads has allowed for more frequent and more
pre-scheduled vessel arrivals that serve to reduce shipping costs and uncertainty. And, the more cargo the Port handles, the more
efficient it has the opportunity to become.
In addition to the economic and marketing advantages created by the large general cargo flow through the Port, the accessibility of the Port has been critical to its development as a load center. The Port has excellent rail communications via Norfolk
Southern and CSX railroads with mid-Atlantic and midwestern shippers, and possesses economic road links to the interstate
highway system. But, most important, the Port of Hampton Roads is the deepest accessible natural port on the East Coast.
The channel depth into and out of the Hampton Roads harbor is naturally deep and, with appropriate dredging and care,
enables the Port to handle ships that other ports must reject unless they spend hundreds of millions of dollars to make
themselves accessible. The deep-water nature of the Port has been critical to its growth and will become even more important in the future as shipping lines attempt to take advantage of the economies of scale offered by larger and deeper draft
container vessels.
The evolution of the Port into the mid-Atlantic load center, over ports such as Baltimore and Charleston, has created its own challenges. The Port’s current container facilities are approaching their physical capacity. With the addition of the Phase I and Phase
II piers at Norfolk International Terminal, the existing Commonwealth-owned port facilities apparently will have reached their
maximum expansion capability. How this capacity challenge is met is one of the crucial issues for the future economic viability of
the Port of Hampton Roads. Port capacity is not a glamorous issue that appears on the radar screen of most of the region’s citizens, and it is of even less concern to Virginians as a whole, especially legislators who reside outside Hampton Roads.
Nonetheless, it is an issue that is critical to the regional economy.
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THE FUTURE OF THE MID-ATLANTIC LOAD CENTER
Although container traffic at all East Coast container ports is expected to increase in the future, the current leading load center
ports of New York/New Jersey, Charleston and Hampton Roads are expected to handle an increasing share of container traffic.
However, continued expansion of general cargo tonnage at the Port will depend on the following key issues:
• Growth of international trade
• Expansion of current facility capacity
• Channel and turning basin depths
• Rail and highway access to the Port.
With respect to the growth of international trade, waterborne container trade in the United States is expected to increase substantially over the next three years. The U.S. Industry & Trade Outlook 2000, published by the DRI-WEFA economic consulting
organization, anticipates growth of import and export container trade to rise by an average of 7 percent per year, and 5 percent per year, respectively, through 2004. A recently commissioned study by the Virginia Port Authority forecasts a container
cargo average growth of 4.3 percent per year over the next 30 years. If these predictions prove to be accurate, then container
traffic at the Port would quadruple over the next 30 years. This is not pie in the sky, for these estimates are consistent with a
number of other studies that project strong yearly growth in American and Hampton Roads container commerce over the foreseeable future. In short, the chances are good that, despite occasional cyclical downturns, the long-term international trade
market will remain strong. The question is: Will the region seize the initiative and take advantage of this burgeoning
market?
If the projected trade levels do come to pass, then the Port will begin to approach its physical limit to move containers
around 2010. Thus, to take advantage of the future international trade market and its potential to create jobs and income
in the region, the physical capacity of the Port will have to be increased substantially. Currently, the Virginia Port Authority
has plans to develop Craney Island into an entirely new container facility that would roughly double current and planned
capacity at the existing facilities. The timely development of the Craney Island facility is dependent upon citizen reactions, satisfying environmental requirements and (of course) Commonwealth financial support. One potential event that could significantly
ease the Port’s looming capacity problem is the near-term development of a privately funded container facility by Maersk
Sealand in Portsmouth. Eventually, the Maersk Sealand facility could expand the Port’s capacity by more than 75 percent. This
project also could enhance the company’s ability to better serve its regional customers, especially distribution warehouses.
Channel depth is a critical issue to the growth of container ports throughout the world. The reason is that shipping lines stand to
benefit from the significant unit cost reductions achievable from the scale economies created by larger and deeper draft container ships. The Port of Hampton Roads, with an inbound channel depth of 45 feet and an outbound depth of 50 feet, currently
is the deepest accessible port on the East Coast. Still, the Regina Maersk, the largest container ship ever to call at Hampton
Roads, draws 47.5 feet of water fully loaded and is, therefore, unable to enter the port at full capacity. Further, the number of
such large container ships worldwide is rising. For example, Orient Overseas Container Lines has placed an order for six ships
that are 20 percent larger than the Regina Maersk. And, the China Shipping Group has announced plans to build container
vessels 40 percent larger than the Regina Maersk! To accommodate this next generation of vessels, the Port will need deeper
channels. The Virginia General Assembly has allocated an initial $17.7 million for a 55-foot channel dredging project; however,
several hundred million dollars will be required to complete the dredging of the channel and the turning basin area. At this point,
it is unclear what the extent of the federal government’s financial participation will be in the project, although traditionally it has
exhibited at least some interest in channel depth because of the presence of Naval Base Norfolk. What is clear is that state and
local governments, along with the private sector, will have to provide significantly greater financial support to harbor dredging
than in the past if the Port is to take advantage of this basic economic force which drives shipping costs. Economies of scale are
driving shipyards to build much larger ships and it remains to be seen whether Hampton Roads will be one of the international
ports capable of serving such ships.
The question of intermodal transfer of ship cargoes to rail cars or trucks is complicated. The most successful ports boast cost-effective land transport, whether by rail or highway. Shippers who might utilize a port either to import or export are interested in the
total package price. This includes whatever rail or highway transportation is necessary. The overall intermodal price and quality
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combination is essential to the viability of the Port of Hampton Roads. About 75 percent of containers shipped through Hampton
Roads arrive via trucks. Highway congestion into Hampton Roads is increasing, especially at the “choke points” caused by
water barriers and tunnels, and the delays caused by this congestion add time, and subsequent cost, to container shipment. The
expected growth in container traffic obviously will contribute further to this congestion. Since most of the planned container
facility expansion will take place at Craney Island and at the new Maersk Sealand project site, both of which are on the south
side of the James River, significant improvements in highway access to port facilities will be necessary if the Peninsula is not to
become isolated. The proposed “third crossing” would assist in this regard. Further, turning either Route 58 or Route 10 into
access-limited four-lane highways connected to Interstate 95 would dramatically improve traffic flow into the southern part of
Hampton Roads. An important advantage of these routes south of the James River is they are not constrained by long bridge
crossings.
Recently, container traffic at the Port has been adversely affected by the difficulty of integrating Conrail into the operations of
Norfolk Southern and CSX. Scheduling problems with some midwestern shippers has caused the diversion of containers through
Canada to the port of Halifax. It appears that many of the merger problems have been overcome; however, the jury is still out
on this matter. Memories of the problems shippers have encountered over the past year or two may have latent effects that could
diminish future container shipments, especially from midwestern firms.
In summary, the future of the mid-Atlantic load center is particularly dependent on advanced planning and cooperation
between the private and public sectors. Such planning needs to be sharply focused on the Port’s infrastructure requirements
that include facility capacity expansion, channel deepening and highway access.

Bulk Cargo
Despite its much smaller impact on regional employment, bulk cargo still created an estimated 4,500 jobs in Hampton Roads in
2000. This was approximately 14 percent of all employment related to the Port. At the same time, bulk cargo represented an
estimated 78 percent of the Port’s tonnage. For the last 20 years, coal has accounted for more than 90 percent of the yearly
bulk cargo shipped through the Port, with petroleum, grain and cement constituting most of the remainder.
In 2000, Hampton Roads was the largest coal-exporting port in the United States, accounting for more than 40 percent of
total American coal exports. In fact, Hampton Roads is among the largest coal-exporting ports in the entire world. It is a
“natural” when it comes to coal exports. Hampton Roads holds three important advantages over all other American ports. First, it
is located close to the Pocahontas coalfields in western Virginia, southern West Virginia and eastern Kentucky. These fields contain some of the highest quality coal in the world which, until the advent of recent technological advances in steel production,
conferred near monopoly power on those producing it. Second, coal is shipped to the Port of Hampton Roads only by rail. The
rail lines that connect the Port with the Pocahontas fields run downhill, significantly reducing fuel costs, which are a major overland component of shipping costs. Third, Hampton Roads has the deepest channel on the East Coast. These are impressive
advantages. Still, many colliers calling at the Port cannot be fully loaded because the Hampton Roads shipping channels are not
deep enough for them to transit with a full load. Channel depth, then, is an important factor in the bulk cargo arena as well with
respect to container cargo.
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Coal shipments vary considerably from year to year, as Graph 4 indicates. Because of coal’s domination of Port tonnage data,
it is clear that variations in coal tonnage drive the level of and changes in the Port’s bulk cargo tonnage as well as its total cargo
tonnage. Nonetheless, as previously noted, bulk cargoes have not had strong effects upon regional employment. The decadelong decline in coal tonnage has been more than offset by the large increase in much more labor-intensive general cargo.
Still, given the number of regional jobs dependent on the movement of bulk cargo, it is legitimate to ask why coal tonnage
volumes in the Port vary so much from year to year.

GRAPH 4
HAMPTON ROADS TOTAL CARGO AND COAL TONNAGE
1983 - 1999
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VARIATIONS IN COAL SHIPMENTS: SELLING COAL IN THE UNITED STATES
Coal shipped through Hampton Roads either is exported, or is sent to other parts of the United States for consumption in electric
power plants. The New England states are particularly large domestic customers. As can be seen in Graph 5, the decline in
coal export tonnage moving through Hampton Roads since 1991 is almost solely due to a decline in the amount of coal being
mined. By contrast, the trend in domestic coal shipments has been consistently upward. Indeed, domestic coal shipments are
approximately five times larger than they were in 1979. Obviously, domestic coal business is not the reason why coal shipments
through Hampton Roads have declined so much since 1991.

GRAPH 5
EXPORT AND DOMESTIC COAL SHIPPED THROUGH HAMPTON ROADS
1978 - 2000
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THE VARIATION IN COAL SHIPMENTS: EXPORT COAL
Both metallurgical coal, which is used in steel production, and steam coal, which is used in the production of electricity, are
exported through Hampton Roads. As demonstrated in Graph 5, since reaching its peak in 1991, export coal tonnage has fluctuated from year to year, but has experienced a downward trend over the decade. This fluctuation in export coal tonnage is the
major reason behind the Port’s flagging total cargo tonnage during this period. And, this negative trend has had adverse effects
upon other Hampton Roads firms, notably Norfolk Southern, which traditionally has been heavily involved in bringing coal to the
Port of Hampton Roads. There is simply less business for Norfolk Southern than there used to be.
The economics of exporting coal actually tends to be somewhat complicated, primarily because of the many different heat-producing and purity grades of coal. It is not as simple a business as it might first seem. There are three major reasons for the
downward trend in coal exports Hampton Roads has experienced over the past 10 years. First, the continually rising strength of
the dollar, as measured against the Federal Reserve’s broad index of U.S. major trading partners, has been a major disadvantage to coal-exporting firms. Since 1991, the value of the dollar has risen by almost 74 percent. Since 1997, this dollar appreciation has been particularly pronounced with respect to Hampton Roads’ major coal export competitors in Indonesia, South
Africa, Poland, Australia and Columbia. For example, between 1997 and 2000 the dollar appreciated by 66 percent and 34
percent against the South African rand and the Australian dollar, respectively. Further, several of these countries, notably
Indonesia, have suffered from political upheavals and internal instability, and no longer purchase as much coal as in the past.
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Second, since 1997, the rapid spread of new steel-making technology, especially in Europe, which can utilize much lower
quality coal, has eroded the strong relative advantage of coal from the Pocahontas coal seam exported through the Port. The
substitution of lower quality (and lower priced) Australian coal for that shipped through Hampton Roads has also caused the
closing of a number of metallurgical coal mines in the Pocahontas fields.
Third, the recent adaptation of long-wall mining and other new production technology to the mining of Australian coal has significantly reduced its production costs and subsequently the relative price of Australian coal, even taking into account the depreciation of the Australian dollar relative to the American dollar. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, this large relative price
reduction has caused a reduction in the amount of coal shipped through Hampton Roads, as well as other American ports. In
particular, the Port’s former Japanese, Korean and Brazilian customers now purchase much more coal from Australia.
In the absence of major labor strikes, such as those experienced in South Africa and Poland in the early 1980s, or a steep
decline in the dollar’s value, it is seems unlikely that coal exports from the Port of Hampton Roads will attain levels experienced
in the early 1990s. To be sure, rising natural gas and oil prices will help coal exports at the Port in 2001, as will reductions in
coal inventories in the spot markets for coal. Unfortunately, however, these increases likely will be small compared to those experienced in the last 20 years. Further, the long-term view is not especially favorable. China’s commitment to increased coal
exports, the Kyoto protocol and the climate action plans of many European countries pose potentially serious challenges to
Hampton Roads coal exports. According to the Department of Energy, environmental plans adopted by European nations
“pointing toward a stabilization or reduction in carbon dioxide emissions by the year 2010, are relying partly on a reduction in
coal use to meet their goals. If implemented, they could negatively impact both current and future markets for U.S. steam coal
exports.”

The Impact of the Ports on Individual Cities in
Hampton Roads
Table 5 shows the cities in which people whose jobs are related to the Port work. Norfolk, with nearly 13,000 jobs, leads the
region’s cities in jobs related to the Port, followed by Newport News with close to 6,000 jobs.
Table 6 reports the cities in which people with jobs related to the Port reside. In addition, Table 6 displays the estimated taxes
and total payroll generated within each of the major Hampton Roads cities. Commuting workers obviously dramatically
rearrange the economic impact of the Port among the
TABLE 5
region’s cities as compared to that of the work site.
The majority of Port employees work in Norfolk, but
Port-Related Employment by City of Work Site
that is not necessarily where they live. To the surprise of some, Virginia Beach is the regional city that
City
Employment
leads in jobs, payroll and taxes generated by Port
Chesapeake
4150.73
activity in Hampton Roads. Newport News, similarly,
Hampton
352.88
is a major beneficiary. Another benefactor of Port
Norfolk
12969.11
activity without a large presence of on-site employment
Newport News
5886.79
is the City of Hampton. Hampton’s case is particularly
Portsmouth
2015.76
interesting since it does not have a large presence of
Virginia Beach
3277.39
on-site employment.
Subtotal
28652.65
An important lesson to be drawn from Tables 5 and 6
Other Cities
3401.31
is the recognition of the high degree of economic interTotal
32053.96
action between Hampton Roads cities insofar as the
Port is concerned. The Port affects all cities in the
Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
region. In fact, when one is considering any employer
in Hampton Roads, the fact that the employer is
located in a particular city does not mean that city will derive all the economic benefits generated by that employer. This clearly
applies to the Port, which is mostly located in Norfolk, but whose economic benefits are widely dispersed among the cities of
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TABLE 6
Port-Related Employment, Payroll and Taxes by City of Residence
City of Residence

Total Jobs

Chesapeake
Hampton
Norfolk
Newport News
Portsmouth
Virginia Beach
Subtotal
Other Cities
Total

4408.01
1736.06
3860.40
7056.36
1797.43
7810.50
26668.75
5385.21
32053.96

Total Payroll
(Millions $)
181.16
57.83
115.07
209.60
52.05
312.99
928.69
161.69
1090.38

Total Taxes
(Millions $)
10.86
3.42
6.96
12.63
3.07
18.77
55.70
9.68
65.38

Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project

Hampton Roads. Table 7 underscores this point. A most important implication of the data presented in Table 7 is that economic
development, as seen from the perspective of the Port, is a unifying regional issue. Employment brought to a particular city by
the Port benefits the entire region. Thus, when the City of Norfolk in particular seeks compensation from the Commonwealth
for the large amount of tax-free property within its boundaries (the Port being but one example), this is an issue all of the
cities in Hampton Roads should understand and support. Norfolk may have the most Port jobs, but it does not reap the
most economic benefits from the Port (Virginia Beach does). Yet, it is Norfolk and not Virginia Beach that finds itself unable to
reap significant tax benefits from the largely tax-exempt facilities of the Port of Hampton Roads.

TABLE 7
Distribution of Port-Related Employees by Work Site and City of Residence

Residence
Chesapeake
Hampton
Norfolk
Newport News
Portsmouth
Virginia Beach
Subtotal
Other Cities
Total

Chesapeake

Hampton

Norfolk

2139.68
16.52
351.70
16.52
393.00
935.89
3853.32
297.41
4150.73

2.36
198.27
7.08
74.35
1.18
9.44
292.69
60.19
352.88

1429.21
276.16
5892.69
264.36
604.26
3744.74
12211.43
757.68
12969.11

Work Site
Newport
News
81.43
1097.58
136.90
3206.58
71.99
141.62
4736.10
1150.69
5886.79

Portsmouth
421.33
68.45
329.27
97.96
572.39
299.77
1789.17
226.60
2015.76

Virginia
Beach
214.79
16.52
292.69
14.16
49.57
2583.44
3171.17
106.22
3277.39

Other
Cities
119.20
62.55
46.03
186.47
105.04
95.60
614.88
2786.43
3401.31

Total
4408.01
1736.06
7056.36
3860.40
1797.43
7810.50
26668.75
5385.21
32053.96

Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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Lessons
Among the most important things to consider when examining the future of the Port of Hampton Roads are:
• Total tonnage handled by the Port peaked in 1991 and has trended downward since then. However, for a variety of reasons,
the economic impact of the Port has increased significantly during the same time period.
• Total employment in Hampton Roads due to the Port increased about 5 percent per year during the 1990s. This employment
growth occurred primarily among firms doing import and export business and those that serve the Port.
• Container tonnage handled in the Port is expanding rapidly, while bulk tonnage (primarily coal) is declining. It does not seem
likely these trends are going to be reversed in the foreseeable future.
• The productivity of Port personnel, such as stevedores, has increased dramatically over the past two decades and is profoundly influenced by the quality of the equipment they utilize.
• Tremendous economies of scale are causing international shipbuilding firms to construct much larger, deep-draft ships. The
newest and largest of these ships cannot enter the Port of Hampton Roads, and hence dredging the Port to provide such ships
with clearance is a must. But, it will be very expensive.
• The competitiveness of the Port of Hampton Roads also depends critically upon the quality of intermodal transportation – railroads and highways. Improvements such as the “third crossing” are essential if the Port is to remain competitive.
• Not surprisingly, most Port employees work in the City of Norfolk. However, the City of Virginia Beach gains more economic
benefit from the Port than any other Hampton Roads city. Norfolk is second and Newport News is third.
• The Port is a regional asset that affects all of the cities and counties in the region.
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OPINIONS
IN BLACK
AND WHITE

Seeing Things Through Different Lenses:
The Opinions of Blacks and Whites
“

W

e’re the same, but we’re different.” This seeming oxymoron may best describe the situation in which African Americans
and other residents of Hampton Roads find themselves in 2001. For example, within Hampton Roads, African

Americans and White Americans are equally likely to have graduated from college and equally likely to work full time when
employed. However, White Americans earn more and are more satisfied with economic conditions. Both groups regard the
quality of their schools, crime and drugs as extremely important concerns. However, their attitudes are very different on the need
for affirmative action and on the quality of the performance of their police department.
This chapter focuses on African Americans in Hampton Roads – their economic, social and political circumstances, but especially
their attitudes. To make the analysis more meaningful, wherever possible, African Americans in Hampton Roads are contrasted
with Whites in the region. This generates the “We’re the same, but we’re different” description. African Americans in Hampton
Roads share many common attributes and attitudes with Whites, but these two groups are not identical. This is most visibly
true in their politics and their views on the issues of the day. This underscores why it is risky to talk about “what the public
thinks” about a particular issue in Hampton Roads. In fact, because the region’s population is so diverse, there are many
public opinions. The final result of an election or a poll may well be a single number or an average (for example, 34.8 percent
of the citizens of Hampton Roads believe African Americans and Whites have the same amount of political power). However,
such an average often disguises significant underlying differences in the attitudes of particular segments of the population. In the
case at hand, only 16.2 percent of African Americans believe the aforementioned statement regarding political power, while
54.3 percent of White Americans do. Further, it is wise to note there is considerable diversity among African Americans in
achievements and points of view. They are no more homogeneous as a group than most other “hyphenated” Americans.

Some Perspective
In 1968, The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders generated a report (the “Kerner Report”) that starkly contended,
“Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white – separate and unequal.” This conclusion was hotly debated
at the time, but continues to be cited, especially when significant economic and social differences between African Americans
and Whites are identified. For example, the unemployment rate of African Americans generally has remained twice as high as
that for other Americans. On the other hand, sometimes startling progress has been made in other arenas. An illustration is the
political participation of African Americans in state politics. In 1968, there were no African Americans in Virginia’s House of
Delegates or Senate. Today, there are 15. And, in 1989, Virginia elected its first African American governor, L. Douglas Wilder,
who generously referred to himself as a “Son of Virginia,” even though in reality he had been forced to leave the
Commonwealth decades before in order to earn his law degree.
The relevant point is this: As we survey and attempt to explain the attitudes of African Americans in Hampton Roads, it
would be irresponsible to ignore Virginia’s centuries-long history of segregation and the immense baggage created by
America’s sometimes torturously slow progress toward equal treatment of all its citizens. It would similarly be foolish to
deny the remarkable progress that has been made since the Kerner Report in 1968. These things influence what we see
and hear today and provide context. That said, our interest in this examination is to depict the status and attitudes of African
Americans in Hampton Roads today as they actually are. As a society, we will make more rapid progress toward “what ought
to be” when we know more precisely “what actually is.”
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The Basis For This Chapter
This chapter is based on an extensive public-opinion survey performed by Old Dominion University’s Institute for the Study of
Race and Ethnicity and the University’s Social Science Research Center. The findings reported here are based on telephone interviews with a random sample of 1,062 African American and White residents in Hampton Roads (African Americans, n = 543;
Whites, n = 519). If individuals were contacted who did not identify themselves as either African Americans or Whites, they
were not included in the survey. Thus, Asian Americans, Latinos and American Indians are not included unless they deliberately
chose to falsify their ethnic background. “African American” here is used synonymously with “Black American,” even though in
truth they are not completely synonymous.
Sixteen jurisdictions within Hampton Roads were surveyed: the counties of Accomack, Gloucester, Isle of Wight, James City,
Mathews, Northampton and York; and the cities of Chesapeake, Hampton, Newport News, Norfolk, Poquoson, Portsmouth,
Suffolk, Virginia Beach and Williamsburg. Quota sampling was employed to ensure an adequate sample size and appropriate
distribution of the sample across high- and low-minority census tracts. The African American population was over-sampled to
ensure a sample size that would enable within-group comparisons. Hampton Roads’ population was stratified by city, and
respondents were called with the aim of achieving the stipulated quota.
Survey participants were contacted between May 20 and June 15, 2001. The sampling results have a margin of error of plus
or minus 4.2 percentage points at a 95 percent confidence level. That is, if another sample of the same size were repeated
under the same conditions, 95 percent of the time the deviation from the results reported would be no more than 4.2 percentage
points in either direction.
The survey focused on the following questions:
How do African Americans perceive the quality of their lives (defined in political, economic and social terms) within the city or
county in which they reside in Hampton Roads?
How do African Americans in the region perceive themselves relative to the system of governance in their city or county, and to
what extent is there a sense of empowerment in economic as well as political terms?
Are there differences in the behavior and perceptions of African Americans and Whites regarding quality of life and political
participation?
At least two features of this study underscore its importance. First, this project apparently is the first of its magnitude to be
conducted in Hampton Roads. Its concentrated focus on issues pertaining to race, quality of life and political participation is
substantially different from previous studies of the region, none of which focused on differences in the perceptions of
African American and White residents in Hampton Roads. Further, the sample is large enough to make meaningful inferences regarding the dynamics of race, class and gender within the African American community.
Second, this project provides baseline data needed for ongoing research to monitor perceptions of the quality of life in
Hampton Roads. Data from the survey will facilitate in-depth, longitudinal studies of the implications of race and ethnicity for
quality of life and political participation. Future research might, for example, concentrate on the effects of class on African
American perceptions of quality of life, political participation, and attitudes regarding discrimination and equal opportunity.
Moreover, the methodology and the results of this descriptive study will provide an essential empirical context for future research.

Key Findings
On a range of issues, the proportion of African American and White respondents rating each issue as “very important” or
“important” was similar. This was the case with the following issues: jobs, schools, crime, drugs, taxation and environment.
However, there are some areas where the two groups diverged. For example, the largest differences in ratings of importance
assigned by African American and White respondents were on perceptions of (percentage difference is shown in parentheses):
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the validity of affirmative action (24); HIV/AIDS (19); police brutality (19); recreation facilities (14); welfare (12); and housing
(11).
With respect to perceptions of job opportunities, cost of living and earnings in wages, African American respondents were much
less likely than their White counterparts to rate the economic conditions in these categories as “very good” or “good.” And, of
the African American respondents, only 48.4 percent report owning their homes, compared with 70.7 percent for Whites.
Seventy-two percent of all respondents indicated that they own a personal computer. Of the African Americans surveyed, 64.3
percent indicated that they own a personal computer, compared with 80.8 percent of Whites.
Seventy-four percent of all respondents indicated that they use the Internet. Sixty-nine percent of the African Americans responded
this way, compared with 80 percent of the White respondents.
Even though the fact that the Million Man March of 1995 and the Million Woman March of 1996 did not grab the attention of
White America, 97 percent of African American respondents reported they agreed with the principle of the marches.
Of the national African American leaders, Jesse Jackson (21.9 percent), Colin Powell (7.9 percent) and Kweise Mfume (6.6 percent) are the three who the largest proportions of African Americans said best represented their views and opinions. However,
respondents’ choices regarding leadership showed the range of ideological diversity present among African Americans.
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People was identified by the largest proportion (20.8 percent) of
African American respondents as the organization that best represents their political views. The NAACP was followed by
churches (14 percent). Nearly 20 percent of the African American respondents reported that “none” of the organizations in their
city or county best represents their political views.
While 68 percent of the White respondents indicated the location of the airport is “very good” or “good,” only 50.3 percent of
African American respondents concurred. As far as airport services are concerned, the Black-White gap widens, with 35.2 percent of African Americans and 50.1 percent of Whites rating them “very good” or “good.”
Levels of satisfaction with public transportation were not high, with a bare majority (51.2 percent) reporting they were “very satisfied” or “satisfied.” Low satisfaction with public transportation was coupled with respondents’ strong endorsement of a light rail
system. Overall, 70.2 percent responded favorably to the idea of their city or county supporting light rail in Hampton Roads.
African American respondents (75.8 percent) were far more likely than Whites (26.7 percent) to cast their ballot in support of Al
Gore in the November 2000 presidential election. One percent of Black and White respondents reported that they cast their
ballots for Ralph Nader. Approximately 76 percent of all respondents indicated that they voted in this election.
With the exception of Newport News, in no major city in the region do African American levels of satisfaction with their city’s
police department equal or exceed levels of satisfaction among White respondents. By race, a more than 20 percentage-point
difference exists between the satisfaction levels reported in the cities of Chesapeake, Norfolk and Portsmouth.
Regarding discrimination, 25.3 percent of all respondents “strongly agree” or “agree” with the statement, “Discrimination against
Blacks is not a problem in my city or county.” However, of the African American respondents, 12.2 percent “strongly agree” or
“agree” with the statement, compared with 39.1 percent of Whites.
White respondents tend to perceive that African Americans have greater economic and political power than Blacks believe to
be true. For example, a smaller proportion of White respondents (40 percent) compared to Blacks (60 percent) believe that the
economic position of Blacks is worse than for Whites. Survey results reveal further that Black respondents (16.2 percent) were
substantially less likely than Whites (54.3 percent) to “strongly agree” or “agree” that, “Blacks and Whites have an equal
amount of power in my city or county.”
Does the federal government owe reparations to African Americans? Fifty percent of African American respondents “agreed,”
compared with 9.8 percent of Whites. Similarly, in response to the statement, “Black people are owed reparations by private
corporations,” 49.5 percent of African Americans “strongly agreed” or “agreed,” compared with 15 percent of White respondents.
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Who’s In The Survey Sample
A total of 1,062 African American and White residents in Hampton Roads (Blacks, n = 543; Whites, n = 519) were included
in the survey. Table 1 shows the distribution of African American and White respondents across the identified jurisdictions of
Hampton Roads for the study sample and the actual population. For analytical purposes, the African American population was
over-sampled. As illustrated in the table, the subsamples across jurisdictions closely match those in the actual population of
Hampton Roads.
TABLE 1
Race Distribution for Sample and Actual Population
Across Municipalities as Part of the Entire Hampton Roads Area
Municipality
Accomack County
Gloucester County
Isle of Wight County
James City County
Mathews County
Northampton County
York County
Chesapeake City
Hampton City
Newport News City
Norfolk City
Poquoson City
Portsmouth City
Suffolk City
Virginia Beach City
Williamsburg City
TOTAL

Study Sample
Percent of Blacks
Percent of Whites
1.50
2.30
0.60
2.10
1.50
1.90
0.70
3.10
0.00
0.40
0.70
1.00
1.30
3.70
15.80
12.50
13.10
9.20
16.20
11.20
21.0
14.80
0.00
0.20
9.00
6.70
5.70
4.00
12.50
26.6
0.40
0.20
100.0
100.0

Actual Population
Percent of Blacks
Percent of Whites
2.41
2.44
0.71
3.03
1.61
2.12
1.38
3.97
0.21
0.81
1.12
0.70
1.50
4.53
11.32
13.38
13.04
7.29
14.03
9.68
20.60
11.39
0.02
1.12
10.14
4.63
5.52
3.44
16.06
30.51
0.32
0.96
100.0
100.0

Source: The Social Science Research Center and The Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnicity at Old Dominion University 2001 Survey of Race,
Quality of Life and Political Participation in Hampton Roads. All subsequent tables and graphs are derived from “The Survey.”

Some Characteristics Of Those Surveyed
With respect to education, which is regarded as a key determinant of quality of life and political participation, African American
and White respondents are closely matched in terms of the proportions of these groups that hold a college degree (23.6 percent and 24.7 percent, respectively). About one in three of the African American (35.2 percent) and White (30.4 percent)
respondents said they have obtained “some college.” Among the Black respondents, 10.9 percent held graduate or professional
degrees, compared with 18.5 percent for Whites. Only 5.2 percent and 3.3 percent, respectively, of the African Americans
and Whites reported having less than a high school diploma.
Employment and occupation are also important factors influencing citizen well-being and the communities within which
they reside (see Table 2). Seventy-five percent of all African Americans reported being employed at some level as opposed
to almost 71.7 percent of the Whites. Of the respondents who said they are employed, 87.1 percent of African Americans
reported being employed on a full-time basis, compared with 86.3 percent of Whites. Of those who reported that they were
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unemployed, 42.1 percent and 53.4 percent, respectively, of the African Americans and Whites reported they were unemployed due to retirement. At the professional/managerial level, 29.5 percent of the African Americans surveyed reported
holding such positions, compared with 40.2 percent of White respondents. At the same time, African Americans hold a larger
proportion of the lower-level technician/managerial (24.1 percent) and clerical positions (17.1 percent) than Whites, who,
respectively, hold 14.3 percent and almost 10.8 percent of the positions in these occupational classes.

TABLE 2
Race and Profession
Profession
Percent of All Blacks in Sample
Professional/managerial
29.50
Lower-level technician/managerial
24.10
Clerical sales
17.10
Homemaker
0.50
Blue collar
11.00
Household service
6.30
Student, retired, other
1.20
Military
8.30
Refused to answer
2.00
TOTAL
100.0

Percent of Whites in Sample
40.20
14.30
10.80
1.60
11.90
4.90
6.50
9.20
0.80
100.0

Total Sample
34.60
19.50
14.10
1.00
11.40
5.60
3.70
8.70
1.40
100.0

INCOME
Concerning the range of individual income, 30.2 percent of the African American respondents reported earning less than
$25,000 annually, compared with 21.3 percent of Whites. The representation of the two groups was more comparable in the
$25,001 to $50,000 income range, with 46.6 percent of Blacks and 47.7 percent of Whites reporting individual incomes in
this range. In the $50,001 to $75,000 income range, 12.9 percent of African Americans and 16.7 percent of Whites
responded that this reflected their annual earnings. Relatively small proportions of African Americans (5.6 percent) and Whites
(8.4 percent) reported individual incomes in excess of $75,000 per year (see Table 3).

TABLE 3
Race and Income
Individual Income
Less than $25,000
$25,001 - $50,000
$50,001 - $75,000
$75,001 - $100,000
More than $100,000
Don’t know

66

Percent of All Blacks in Sample
30.20
46.60
12.90
3.90
1.70
1.00
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Percent of All Whites in Sample
21.30
47.70
16.70
6.20
2.20
0.80
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Total Sample
26.00
47.10
14.70
5.00
1.90
0.90
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GRAPH 1A
AFRICAN AMERICANS‘ RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS

60%
51.4%
50%

40%

28.7%

30%

20%

7.9%

10%
2.8%
0.0%

0.7%

1.8%

3.5%

2.0%

1.1%

0.0%

0%
Baptist

Catholic

Jewish

Muslim/Moslem

Jehovah's Witness

Buddhist

African Methodist

Methodist

None

Other

Refused to Answer

Episcopal

Source: The Survey

RELIGION
Regarding religion, African American respondents were affiliated as follows: Baptist (51.4 percent); Other, including especially
small and sometimes nondenominational churches (28.7 percent); None (7.9 percent); Methodist (3.5 percent); Catholic (2.8
percent); Jehovah’s Witness (1.8 percent); African Methodist Episcopal (1.1 percent); and Muslim/Moslem (.7 percent). Two
percent of the Black respondents refused to answer (see Graph 1A).
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GRAPH 1B
WHITES‘ RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS
40%
36.20%
35%

30%

25%

20%
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13.30%

15%
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10%
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0.40%

0.40%

0%
Baptist

Catholic

Jewish

Muslim/Moslem

Jehovah's Witness

Buddhist

African Methodist

Methodist

None

Other

Refused to Answer

Episcopal

Source: The Survey

Religious affiliation among White respondents was as follows: Other, including such denominations as Presbyterians, Lutherans,
Episcopalians and “nondenominationals” (36.2 percent); Baptist (17.1 percent); Catholic (17.7 percent); None (13.3 percent);
Methodist (9.6 percent); Jewish (2.7 percent); 0.4 percent each for Buddhist and African Methodist Episcopal; and Jehovah’s
Witness (.2 percent). It is apparent that the religious preferences of White Americans are more widely distributed than are those
of African Americans. Of the White respondents, 2.3 percent refused to answer (see Graphs 1A and 1B).

68

T H E

S T A T E

O F

T H E

R E G I O N

GRAPH 2A
AFRICAN AMERICANS‘ RELIGIOUS ATTENDANCE

Regular Attendance
47%
No Regular Attendance
53%

Source: The Survey

GRAPH 2B
WHITES‘ RELIGIOUS ATTENDANCE

No Regular Attendance
40%

Regular Attendance
60%

Source: The Survey

Fifty-three percent of African Americans reported attending a religious service every week, compared with 39.5 percent of the
White respondents. Religious practice apparently plays a larger and more influential role in the African American community than elsewhere in Hampton Roads. The traditionally dominating role of many African American church pastors in
guiding and influencing their flocks, and the key political roles many African American churches play in elections, are both
causes and effects of this. African Americans look to their churches for many things in addition to spiritual guidance, and
their higher rates of attendance reflect this.

MARITAL STATUS
Finally, most survey participants (51.9 percent) reported being married, with a higher proportion of Whites (59 percent) indicating they were married, compared with 45.1 percent of African Americans. Further, a particularly large proportion of Black
respondents (36.1 percent) reported they were single and never married. Only 23.9 percent of White respondents indicated the
same.
Economic factors may be the root of these differences. Objectively, a greater proportion of African Americans may not earn an
income they regard as sufficient to undertake marriage. And, as some analysts contend, it is possible that governmental economic (dis)incentives associated with marriage discourage some from taking this step.
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Quality Of Life And Economic Conditions
A principal focus of the survey was to assess individual perceptions of quality of life and economic conditions in Hampton
Roads. For purposes of comparison, some items were drawn from the 1996 survey “Black Political Attitudes in Atlanta.” The limitations of comparing Hampton Roads with the city of Atlanta are acknowledged; however, the results do not differ to a large
degree.
In this section are the results that show the level of importance assigned by respondents to a range of issues pertinent to quality
of life and general well-being.

HOUSING
Table 4 summarizes respondents’ ratings of the importance of issues that affect the general quality of life of citizens. Generally, a
high proportion of respondents rated all of the issues presented as “very important” or “important.” However, inspection of the
ratings of African American and White respondents reveals some important differences. For example, 97 percent of the African
American respondents rated housing as “very important” or “important” compared with 85.9 percent of the White respondents.
A very high proportion of the Black respondents (98 percent in the 1996 Atlanta survey) also indicated that housing was an
important issue. The greater importance attached to housing by African Americans perhaps reflects the much lower proportion of Blacks who are homeowners and the occasional hassles African Americans encounter when they attempt to obtain
financing for a home, or deal with a realtor or potential neighbors.

RECREATION FACILITIES AND WELFARE PROGRAMS
A significant difference existed in ratings of the importance of recreation facilities (a 13.3 percentage-point difference) assigned
by African Americans and Whites. Lacking nearby recreation, and concerned about issues of crime and drugs, many African
Americans may be especially sensitive to the availability of good parks, well-kept and supervised playgrounds, and gymnasium
facilities.

WELFARE PROGRAMS
African Americans regard welfare programs as of greater importance than do Whites, by a margin of 12.1 percent.
Stereotypes aside, it remains true that a larger proportion of African Americans utilize the welfare system than Whites and hence
one might expect their greater interest in it. Further, Whites may have a greater degree of comfort with, and disinterest in, a
social support system they only read about and do not expect to encounter.

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
It is in the realm of affirmative action, however, that respondents’ ratings reflected the greatest percentage-point difference
(24.2). This finding is indicative of the current ongoing debate among racial and ethnic groups (and sometimes along
gender lines) concerning the constitutionality of affirmative action. Despite the sizable difference in the ratings of Black and
White respondents on the importance of affirmative action, more than two out of three (69.4 percent) of the White respondents
indicated that affirmative action is “very important “ or “important.” However, 93.6 percent of African American respondents
identified affirmative action as “very important” or “important.”
Whites tend to be supportive of affirmative action policies that benefit all those deemed needy, regardless of race, and tend to
disapprove of affirmative action policies designed to benefit all African Americans, regardless of their circumstances. For
example, Whites tend to support college scholarship programs aimed at students with financial need, even when the majority of
recipients are African American. They tend not to favor similar programs that support only African American students, regardless
of financial need. This distinction is an important one and undoubtedly will be the focus of considerable debate in Hampton
Roads and nationally over the next few years.
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TABLE 4
Percentage of Respondents Rating Issues as Very Important or Important
Issues
Percent African American
Jobs
99.4
School
99.2
Crime
98.2
Drugs
97.1
Housing
97.0
HIV/AIDS
96.5
Taxation
96.1
Police Brutality
95.6
Teen Pregnancy
95.1
Environment
94.2
Affirmative Action
93.6
Welfare
92.1
Recreation Facilities
90.2

Percent White
96.5
98.7
97.7
95.9
85.9
76.9
92.1
76.3
86.5
93.7
69.4
80.0
76.9

Total
98.1
81.7
98.0
96.5
91.6
83.7
86.1
86.1
90.8
93.9
81.7
86.2
83.7

HIV/AIDS
A large difference (almost 20 percentage points) exists in the proportions of Black and White respondents rating the issue of
HIV/AIDS as “very important” or “important.” While 96.5 percent of African American respondents indicated that HIV/AIDS is
a “very important” or “important” issue, only 76.9 percent of the White respondents concurred. The figure for African Americans
is consistent with findings reported in the 1996 Atlanta study, which revealed that 98 percent of African American respondents
viewed HIV/AIDS as an issue of importance. HIV/IDS may be a stealthy issue in the White community, stereotypically consigned to gay and lesbian relationships, but this is not so in the African American community.

THE POLICE AND POLICE BEHAVIOR
Moreover, on the issue of police brutality in Hampton Roads, a difference of more than 19 percentage points exists
between the proportions of African Americans (95.6 percent) and Whites (76.3 percent) rating this issue as “important” or
“very important.” Consistent with findings for African Americans in Hampton Roads, the Atlanta study revealed that 96 percent
of the Black respondents viewed the issue of police brutality as important. Differences in the rating of police are more starkly
revealed when satisfaction levels are examined on the basis of the cities with the largest populations in Hampton Roads.
Evidence from other metropolitan areas suggests the typical White person does not have nearly as many negative encounters
(self defined) with police as do African Americans. To African Americans, the police are less often friends and helpers and more
often adversaries, particularly if phenomena such as “Driving While Black” are taken into consideration.
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Table 5 reports by race the proportion of survey respondents that indicated they are “very satisfied” or “satisfied” with the police
department in their city.
As Table 5 indicates, with the exception of Newport News, in no major city in the region did results show African American satisfaction with their city’s police department being equal to or in excess of the satisfaction levels of White respondents. By race,
more than 20 percentage-point differences exist between the satisfaction level reported in the cities of Chesapeake, Norfolk and
Portsmouth. Norfolk African Americans are the least satisfied with their police department, perhaps reflecting recent incidents
involving African Americans.

TABLE 5
Percent of Respondents Reporting That They Are “Very Satisfied”
or “Satisfied” With Their City’s Police Department
Issues
Norfolk
Portsmouth
Chesapeake
Virginia Beach
Suffolk
Newport News
Hampton
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Percent African American
57.9
61.2
65.1
69.1
70.9
71.6
77.4
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Percent White
85.7
88.6
91.3
83.3
85.7
62.0
89.6
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Total
69.1
72.6
76.8
78.7
76.9
76.7
82.3
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MUNICIPAL AND REGIONAL SERVICES
“Quality of life” encompasses an individual’s reasonable sense of comfort, social stability and expectations within the context of
his or her existence in a political world. For example, citizens expect city and county governments to provide certain basic services and to maintain infrastructure. Accordingly, Hampton Roads respondents were asked to either rate the quality or indicate the
extent of their satisfaction with a variety of local and regional services. Respondents were also asked to rate economic conditions in their local communities and the region.
Table 6 reports the percentages of respondents stating they are “very satisfied” or “satisfied” with various municipal services and
public infrastructure. The public housing category reflected the lowest percentage (40 percent) of respondents indicating they are
“very satisfied” or “satisfied.” Only 36 percent of African Americans expressed satisfaction with public housing, compared with
44.4 percent for Whites. Nearly all citizens, African American and White, are rather satisfied with their libraries and their sanitation/garbage collection services.
Once again, African Americans reported higher levels of dissatisfaction with their city and county police forces than did Whites.
Whites’ satisfaction with their police departments rivaled the high levels they reported for their libraries.
TABLE 6
Percentage of Respondents Reporting That They Are “Very Satisfied” or
“Satisfied” With City and County Services and Public Infrastructure
Service/Public Infrastructure
Libraries
Sanitation/Garbage Collection
Parks and Recreation
Post-secondary Education
Police Department
Sheriff’s Department
Health Department
Public Schools
Streets and Highways
Public Housing
Public Transportation
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Percent African American
86.2
84.5
76.1
71.1
67.9
67.1
62.8
61.0
59.9
36.0
54.5
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Percent White
87
86.3
83.6
76.1
85.9
78.8
63.8
55.4
61.5
44.4
47.8
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Total
1 86.7
85.4
79.8
73.6
76.7
72.8
63.3
58.3
60.6
40.0
51.2
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THE PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION QUESTION AND LIGHT RAIL
Levels of satisfaction with public transportation reported by all respondents (see Table 6) were relatively low, with only a bare
majority (51.2 percent) reporting they were “very satisfied” or “satisfied.” Other ratings include those for public housing and
public transportation, followed by streets and highways (60.6 percent), public schools (58.3 percent) and health department
(63.3 percent).
Citizen disquiet with public transportation in Hampton Roads was underlined by a surprisingly strong endorsement of a
local light rail system. Overall, 70.2 percent of those surveyed responded favorably. Of the African Americans surveyed,
76.1 percent responded favorably to the establishment of light rail, compared with 64 percent of Whites (see Graphs 3A and
3B). The words “surprisingly strong endorsement” are used here because elected officials, particularly in Virginia Beach, have
opposed light rail on the grounds that a majority of their citizens are not in favor of it. It must be that these individuals have been
listening to a vocal minority rather than to the large, and perhaps less demonstrative, majority of citizens who apparently favor
light rail.
The light rail finding evokes memories of last year’s State of the Region report, which found a small majority of Hampton Roads
citizens were in favor of a merger of cities within the region. Several elected officials reported being dumbfounded by that result,
as they had heard only from individuals who opposed merger. This year’s light rail finding underscores the importance of elected
officials casting their nets widely when they attempt to divine public opinion. Experience suggests some elected officials may be
overly sensitive to those who either are boisterous or have special interests at stake and perhaps back up that interest with a
check. Determining the will of the public is never an easy task; however, the substantial surveys undertaken the past two years as
a part of the State of the Region report indicate there is a degree of disconnect between the public and some elected officials.
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GRAPH 3A
AFRICAN AMERICANS‘ OPINIONS OF LIGHT RAIL TRANSPORTATION
Not in Favor of
Light Rail
24%

In Favor of Light Rail
76%
Source: The Survey

GRAPH 3B
WHITES‘ OPINION OF LIGHT RAIL TRANSPORTATION
Not in Favor of
Light Rail
36%

In Favor of Light Rail
64%
Source: The Survey
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AIRPORT LOCATION AND SERVICES
Table 7 shows the ratings of key regional facilities and economic conditions. While 68 percent of White respondents indicated
that airport location is “very good” or “good,” only 50.3 percent of African American respondents concurred. With respect to
airport services, the Black-White gap is even wider, with only 35.2 percent of African Americans and 50.1 percent of Whites
rating services “very good” or “good.”

WAGES, JOBS AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
Differences exist in the proportions of African Americans and Whites who rate job opportunities (29.4 percent and 55.1 percent, respectively), cost of living (27.5 percent vs. 44.9 percent) and earnings in wages (14.3 percent vs. 27.5 percent) as
“good” or “very good.” In general, perhaps because they are, on average, better off economically, Whites express more satisfaction with job opportunities in Hampton Roads and with their wages.
Even so, consistent with last year’s State of the Region report, a significant number of Hampton Roads residents are not thrilled
with their economic situation. This disenchantment probably reflects the region’s lower than average rates of population and
income growth. In fact, Hampton Roads trails Richmond, Northern Virginia and the entire Commonwealth in terms of most measures of economic health. In addition, it is worth noting that during the decade of the 1990s, Virginia trailed both the entire
United States and nine of 16 Southern states in terms of the growth of its real, inflation-adjusted gross state product. Neither
Hampton Roads nor Virginia has been a boom area. This directly affects economic welfare. Slow economic growth means
fewer available jobs and less rapidly growing wages. Hence, even though the cost of living in Hampton Roads is demonstrably
lower than it is in regions such as Northern Virginia, and Hampton Roads per capita income is 98 percent of the national
average when cost of living differences are considered, the typical Hampton Roads resident seems unimpressed. He/she is often
full of discontent insofar as economic conditions are concerned.
Sizable proportions of African Americans (73.3 percent) and Whites (78.6 percent) “strongly agree” or “agree” with the statement, “I enjoy my job.” The finding that a relatively high proportion of African American respondents (50.9 percent), in comparison with White respondents (29.3 percent), “disagree” or “disagree strongly” with the statement, “The money that I earn in my
job is sufficient for my needs,” corroborates the results presented in Table 7.

TABLE 7
Percentage of Respondents Rating Regional Infrastructure
and Economic Conditions as “Very Good” or “Good”
Infrastructure/Economic Conditions
Airport Location
Airport Services
Job Opportunities
Cost of Living
Earning in Wages
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Percent African American
50.3
35.2
29.4
27.5
14.3
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Percent White
68.0
50.1
55.1
44.9
27.5
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Total
59.0
42.4
42.0
35.9
20.8
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HOME OWNERSHIP
Homeownership, a hallmark of the American dream, has been a more elusive goal for African Americans than for Whites. Of
the African American respondents, only 48.4 percent reported owning their homes, compared with 70.7 percent of Whites (see
Graphs 4A and 4B). What is not clear is whether the causes of this large gap are due primarily to income and asset differences
between African Americans and Whites, or whether housing and financial markets retain some of the discriminatory characteristics they clearly exhibited in previous years. This is a subject worthy of additional exploration, given the size of the disparity
between the home ownership rates of the two groups.

GRAPH 4A
AFRICAN AMERICANS‘ HOME OWNERSHIP STATUS

Home Owner
48%
Non-Home Owner
52%

Source: The Survey

GRAPH 4B
WHITES‘ HOME OWNERSHIP STATUS

Non-Home Owner
29%

Home Owner
71%
Source: The Survey
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OVERALL LEVELS OF SATISFACTION WITH THEIR LIVES
The indicators of quality of life and economic conditions presented in Tables 5, 6 and 7 show a divergence in the economic
realities perceived by African Americans and Whites in Hampton Roads. The existence of race- and gender-based economic
and social inequality in America notwithstanding, when asked, “In general, how satisfied are you with your life as a
whole?”, the overwhelming majority (92.5 percent) of respondents reported they were “very satisfied” or “satisfied.” Of
the African American respondents, 89.2 percent reported they were “very satisfied” or “satisfied” with their lives, compared with 95.9 percent of Whites. Further, the relatively high proportion of respondents (83.8 percent) that indicated their
health is “good,” “very good” or “excellent,” indeed might be linked to the relatively high degree of satisfaction they have with
their lives.

TECHNOLOGY OPPORTUNITY AND THE DIGITAL DIVIDE
The recent surge in computer and Internet usage has not touched all segments of society equally. Racial and ethnic differences
exist in computer ownership and computer and Internet usage. Seventy-two percent of all respondents indicated they own a personal computer. Of all African Americans surveyed, 64.3 percent indicated they own a personal computer, compared with 80.8
percent of Whites.
Concerning Internet usage, 74 percent of all respondents said they use the Internet. Sixty-nine percent of the African Americans
responded this way, compared with 80 percent of Whites. While home (84.4 percent) is the principal place where respondents
use the Internet, African Americans are somewhat less likely (78.1 percent) than Whites (90.1 percent) to have such access.
National data suggest that observed differences between ethnic groups in terms of computer and Internet usage are based primarily upon income levels and technological readiness. That is, African Americans and Whites of comparable incomes, education levels and ages tend to exhibit similar rates of computer and Internet usage. Nonetheless, given the key role computers and
the Internet play in society, and ethnic differences in incomes and education, access will continue to be a critical policy question
at nearly all levels of society. It remains to be seen whether computer and Internet access will come to be regarded in the same
fashion as telephone access.

Ideology And Political Participation
The survey revealed interesting racial differences with respect to ideology and political participation. Survey results also uncovered some important revelations about the internal dynamics of the African American community. To assess ideology and political
participation, several questions were asked regarding party identification, political philosophy, and registration and voting. To
delve more deeply into the ideological terrain of African Americans, respondents in this group were asked questions regarding
their support of the principles of the Million Man March and the Million Woman March, and their agreement with the views of
national Black leaders and organizations.

LIBERAL, CONSERVATIVE OR MODERATE?
Respondents were asked the following question: “Politically speaking, do you consider yourself a liberal, moderate or a conservative?” While the proportion of African Americans who label themselves “liberal” is greater than it is for Whites (29.3 percent vs. 20.6 percent), Whites (36.8 percent) were somewhat more likely than Blacks (30 percent) to regard themselves as
“moderate.” In general, African Americans in Hampton Roads reside on the left side of the political spectrum and are politically more liberal than Whites.

PARTY IDENTIFICATION
Party identification is a key indicator of political ideology. In contrast to Whites (24.7 percent), a far greater proportion of
African Americans (65.7 percent) reported that they consider themselves to be Democrats. Identification with the Republican
Party among Whites (38.9 percent) dwarfed the 5.3 percent of African Americans who reported that they consider themselves
Republicans. Of course, it often has been observed that some African Americans are closet Republicans. They vote for
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Republican candidates, but do not wish to say so, as such a confession might subject them to ridicule. Witness several Virginia
elections during the 1990s in which Republican candidates garnered 15 to 20 percent of the African American vote. Thus,
“there may be more Republicans in the weeds,” as one commentator put it, but they are not likely to disclose that fact in a telephone survey.
The proportion of survey respondents who consider themselves Independent differs substantially between African Americans and
Whites in Hampton Roads. Of the Whites surveyed, 25.8 percent consider themselves to be Independent, compared with
only15.5 percent of African American respondents. The typical White person more often considers himself to “be in play” politically and takes the attitude that candidates must compete for his vote. African Americans, on the other hand, tend more often to
vote straight tickets, in this case Democratic, and are not seen by most candidates as being “swing votes.” Whether this is good
or bad for African Americans is a subject for debate. African American loyalty to the Democratic Party since the time of President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt has evolved into positions of clout and influence in the Democratic Party, both nationally and locally.
However, in a state such as Virginia, where Republicans have triumphed in nearly every recent election, this may have disadvantaged African Americans. In general, Blacks do not sit on the innermost councils of the Commonwealth’s political power brokers,
whose memberships are largely Republican and White. Query whether a more independent approach and a “you can’t take
our vote for granted” attitude on the part of African Americans would generate better results.

PRESIDENTIAL VOTING BEHAVIOR
Survey results revealed a wide chasm in the voting behavior of African Americans and Whites in the November 2000 presidential election. African Americans (75.8 percent) were far more likely than Whites (26.7 percent) to vote for Al Gore. Indeed,
given post-election polls, the 75.8 percent African American proportion seems a gross underestimate. President George W. Bush
apparently won only about 10 percent of the African American vote in Virginia. The survey may have elicited an after-the-fact “I
voted for the winner” reaction from some African Americans, or mirror an understandable reluctance on the part of respondents
to tell anyone how they voted. A paltry 1 percent of all respondents reported that they cast their ballot for Ralph Nader.

THE MILLION MAN AND MILLION WOMAN MARCHES
Agreement with the principles of the Million Man March and the Million Woman March was assessed. While these events did
not arouse much interest outside of the African American community, they espoused beliefs widely known and agreed to among
a large proportion of the African American population. Nationally, accounts of the level of participation in the marches ranged
from about 400,000 to almost 1.5 million. Significantly, virtual unanimity is reflected among African American respondents in
this study, with 97 percent reporting that they agreed with the principles of the Million Man March and the Million Woman
March.
The views of respondents toward the leaders that purportedly represent them at the national and local levels also were assessed.
This indicator of ideology is useful for discerning within-group differences. The following questions were asked:
Which national Black leader best represents your views and opinions?
Who do you believe is the most politically influential living Black person in America today?
The range of ideological diversity among African Americans in Hampton Roads is reflected in respondents’ identification of
the national Black leader who best represents their views and opinions. The large proportion of respondents who indicated
that they “don’t know” (33.7 percent) could indicate that there is no one currently expressing their views, in which case we may
be on the cusp of a majority change in African American opinion. Or, this result might represent a lack of knowledge about
African American political leadership. Still another possibility is African Americans simply think it doesn’t make any difference
whom their leaders are. A final possibility is the respondents were reluctant to identify their “heroes” to the interviewers.
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Table 8 records these responses. The top responses were the Rev. Jesse Jackson (21.9 percent); Secretary of State Colin Powell
(7.9 percent); NAACP leader Kweise Mfume (6.6 percent); Minister Louis Farrakhan (3.1 percent); the Rev. Martin Luther King III
(2.9 percent); the Rev. Al Sharpton (2.6 percent); U.S. Congresswoman Maxine Waters (1.3 percent). In addition to Powell,
other African Americans not aligned with the Democratic Party were identified as being representative of the views and opinions
of some African American respondents. These individuals included Supreme Court Judge Clarence Thomas (0.6 percent), presidential adviser Condoleezza Rice (0.4 percent) and U.S. Representative J.C. Watts (0.2 percent). These rather puny numbers
suggest the Republican Party has some distance to travel before a large proportion of African Americans visibly align themselves
with conservative African American leaders. African Americans may think conservatively on many issues, and secretly vote for
Republican candidates in an election, but most continue to be reluctant to identify themselves publicly with the Republican Party.
Among African American respondents, 25.4 percent and 22.3 percent, respectively, identified Jesse Jackson and Colin Powell
as the two most politically influential African Americans in the United States. A somewhat smaller proportion of Whites identified
Jackson (21.8 percent) as the most politically influential African American, but a substantially larger proportion endorsed Powell
(39.3 percent) as the most politically influential African American in America today. He may be, even though his influence probably is not as large among African Americans as it is among Whites. Sizable proportions of African American respondents identified Farrakhan (5.3 percent), Mfume (5 percent) and Sharpton (2.2 percent) as being most influential. Significant proportions of
White respondents also identified Farrakhan (5.3 percent) and Thomas (1.5 percent) as the most politically influential Black
leader in America. White Americans apparently believe Minister Farrakhan is more influential among African Americans than
African Americans themselves do.

TABLE 8
Black Leader Who Best Represents
African Americans’ Views
Political Leader

Percent of
Sample
3.1
21.9
2.9
0.0
6.6
7.9
0.2
0.4
0.0
2.6
1.3
0.2
0.6
16.8
33.7
1.8
100.00

Minister Louis Farrakhan
Rev. Jesse Jackson
Rev. Martin Luther King III
Rev. Joseph Lowery
Kweise Mfume
Sec. Colin Powell
Hugh Price
Condoleezza Rice
Randall Robinson
Rev. Al Sharpton
Rep. Maxine Waters
Rep. J.C. Watts
Justice Clarence Thomas
Other
Don’t know
Refused to answer
TOTAL
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THIS ORGANIZATION REPRESENTS MY POINT OF VIEW
Respondents were asked which national organization best represents their point of view. The National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People was identified by the largest proportion (20.8 percent) of African American respondents as the
one group that best represents their political views. The NAACP was followed by the “Church” (14 percent) and “other community-based organizations” (11 percent) as best representing the political views of respondents (see Table 9). While 19.9 percent
of the respondents reported that “none” of the organizations in their city or county best represents their political views, 30 percent indicated that they “don’t know” which organization best
TABLE 9
represents their views. It is possible that the large proportion
reporting “none” may be indicative of the occurrence of ideoOrganization that Best Represents African Americans’
logical realignment among African Americans. Alternatively,
Political Views
this may only represent a degree of boredom with things political. These findings may be important for the conduct of
Organization
Percent of
national, state and local political campaigns in Hampton
Sample
Roads.
NAACP
20.8
However, when asked, “What do you believe is the most polit- Urban League
1.3
ically influential Black organization in America today?”, 75.3
Church
14.0
percent of African American respondents identified the
Nation of Islam
0.7
NAACP. Interestingly, this finding contrasts with results showing
New Black Panther Party
0.4
that Kweisi Mfume, NAACP president and CEO, was viewed
Other community-based organizations
11.0
by only 5 percent of the African American respondents as the
Southern Christian Leadership Conferences
0.4
most politically influential Black person in America. Mfume, a
None
19.90
former U.S. congressman from Maryland, has only served in
Don’t
know
30.4
the position a few years and has not had enough time to build
Refused to answer
1.1
the reputation that previous incumbents of his position, such as
TOTAL
100.00
Roy Wilkins, did so skillfully over many years.

I’M A MEMBER OF THIS ORGANIZATION
African American respondents reported holding formal membership in the following organizations: Church (58.2 percent),
NAACP (16.6 percent) and Urban League (4.1 percent). The latter two membership percentages no doubt will come as news to
these organizations. The Urban League of Hampton Roads, as an example, in its best years has had only several hundred actual
members – not the 20,000 this survey result implies. Perhaps the empathy many African Americans have for such organizations
is mistakenly confused with membership. Nearly 12 percent reported holding membership in “other community-based organizations” (11.8 percent). It is notable also that 29.3 percent of those surveyed did not hold any formal organizational memberships.
This may be the African American variant of “bowling alone.”

VOTING BEHAVIOR AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Although arguably challenged in the November 2000 presidential election, one of the hallmarks of the American system of governance is the one person, one vote system. Among Hampton Roads respondents, an extraordinarily high proportion (90
percent) reported that they were registered to vote. Of the African Americans surveyed, 87.5 percent said they were registered, compared to 91.9 percent of Whites. Once again, these proportions are at variance with actual facts, for the actual
percentage of eligible Hampton Roads voters who are registered is much lower. Respondents may not wish to admit they are
not registered to vote, or that they do not vote, even though that is the truth. Among the respondents not currently registered,
44.1 percent of African Americans and 50 percent of Whites revealed that they had been registered to vote at some point in
the past.
Voting in elections and working for a political campaign provide strong indications of political participation. Approximately 76
percent of all survey respondents indicated that they had voted in the last presidential election. Seventy-one percent of African
Americans responded this way, compared with 81 percent of Whites. Both of these percentages exceed what actually was true.
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Regarding their participation in a political campaign, only 16.6 percent of African Americans reported having done so at some
point, compared with 25.4 percent of Whites.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE BLACK SITUATION
The disjunction between African American and White perceptions of the American social reality presents a significant barrier to
the public-policy effort to eradicate social inequality. It is commonly agreed that success in using political processes to eliminate
Black inequality would be more likely if a biracial consensus existed on the nature and cause of the Black predicament and, further, there were agreement on appropriate policies to do so. No such consensus exists, as the survey results demonstrate.
Table 10 shows the proportion of respondents who “strongly agree” or “agree” with several statements relating to African
Americans. As the table shows, 25.3 percent of all respondents “strongly agree” or “agree” with the statement,
“Discrimination against Blacks is not a problem in my city or county.” However, when analyzed by race, the results reveal
a significant gap between the perceptions of Blacks and Whites. Of the African American respondents, only 12.2 percent
“strongly agreed” or “agreed” with the statement, compared with 39.1 percent of Whites. This is an important difference,
for perceptions of the prevalence of discrimination against African Americans, women and others have obvious implications for
one’s support of affirmative action and other programs working to eradicate social inequalities.
The African American reparations movement has a long history dating back to the post-Reconstruction era. In recent years, the
movement appears to have gained additional attention and a bit of momentum. When a prominent White politician such as
Chicago’s Mayor Daley endorses a resolution supporting the idea that reparations should be paid to African Americans, then
one knows the topic has become discussable even though it is a political “dead letter” at this point.
Broadly speaking, African Americans and Whites perceive different realities with respect to economic achievement. For
example, 60 percent and 40 percent of African Americans and Whites, respectively, believe that the economic position of
TABLE 10
Perceptions of the African American Predicament: Percentage of Respondents Who Strongly Agree or Agree
Statement
Discrimination against Black people
is not a problem in my city/county.
Black people are owed reparations
by the government.
Black people are owed reparations
by private corporations.

Percent African American

Percent White

Total

12.2

39.1

25.3

50.0

9.8

30.4

49.5

15.0

32.7

Blacks is worse than that of Whites. Hence, while some Whites support the notion that reparations are owed by the government
and private corporations, there are far more African Americans in Hampton Roads who support this idea, presumably because
they attribute the lack of economic success of African Americans to slavery and historic discrimination. With respect to whether
reparations are owed by the government, 30.4 percent of all respondents “agreed” or “strongly agreed.” However, while 50
percent of African American respondents “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that the government owes reparations to African
Americans, only 9.8 percent of Whites concurred. The results concerning corporations parallel those for government. In response
to the statement, “Black people are owed reparations by private corporations,” 49.5 percent of African Americans “strongly
agreed” or “agreed,” compared with 15 percent of the White respondents. To place these numbers in context, the 1996 survey
of Black political attitudes in Atlanta revealed that 50 percent of the respondents agreed with the idea that the government owes
Black people reparations.

SENSE OF EMPOWERMENT
The sense of political empowerment citizens possess is a vital part of the fabric of the American political enterprise.
Empowerment boils down to the feeling that one’s opinions, presence and votes make a difference. Not only does empowerment affect individual political behavior, but it also has important implications for the stability of the political system and its
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capacity for conflict mediation or resolution. Citizens who feel a sense of empowerment are more likely, for example, to participate in the political process and to resolve differences and conflicts with others within the framework of the system. Table 11
summarizes the responses of survey participants to a number of statements addressing various dimensions of empowerment.
The differences between African Americans and Whites depicted in Table 11 are striking in that Whites believe African
Americans have more power and influence than African Americans believe they have. By way of illustration, survey results show
African Americans (16.2 percent) are substantially less likely than Whites (54.3 percent) to “strongly agree” or “agree” with the
statement, “Blacks and Whites have an equal amount of power in my city/county.” Similar proportions of African Americans
(24.1 percent) and Whites (54.5 percent) either “strongly agreed” or “agreed” with the statement, “Government leaders in my
city/county are especially sensitive to the needs of Blacks.”

TABLE 11
Percentage of Respondents Strongly Agreeing or Agreeing
With Statements Regarding Race and Sense of Empowerment
Statement
Black elected officials in my city/
county sell out to Whites.
Blacks and Whites have an equal amount
of power in my city/county.
Government leaders are especially
sensitive to the needs of Black people.
Black elected officials in my city/county
do not have power to change things for
Black people.
My city/county government is run for
the benefit of all the people.
People like me don’t have a lot to
say about what government does.
Local government is run largely by a
few big interests.
Black politicians represent the interests
of White citizens.
Black elected officials can change things
for Black people if they want to.

Percent African American

Percent White

Total

26.9

*

*

16.2

54.3

34.8

24.1

54.5

39.0

38.5

25.0

27.0

45.8

70.7

58.0

46.6

41.4

44.0

69.8

53.3

61.8

*

62.4

*

63.5

72.0

66.7

* Only the group responding to the survey item is reflected in the results.

These general attitudes always are portrayed by respondents who “strongly agreed” or “agreed” that, “Black elected officials in
my city/county do not have the power to change things for Blacks in my city or county.” Of the African American respondents,
38.5 percent “strongly agreed” or “agreed” with this statement, compared with 25 percent of Whites. On the other hand, large
proportions of the African American sample (63.5 percent) and the White sample (72 percent) “strongly agreed” or “agreed”
with the view, “Blacks elected to office in my city/county can change things for Black people if they want to.” Against that, however, about one in four African American respondents (26.9 percent) believed that, “The Black elected officials in my city/county
sell out to the White power structure.” By contrast, the 1996 Atlanta survey revealed that 58 percent of the African American
respondents believed that Black elected officials sell out to the White power structure.
It is worth noting that Atlanta has elected African American political leaders (for example, the mayor) for a longer period of time
than any city or county in Hampton Roads. Perhaps African Americans in Atlanta have suffered from some disillusionment over
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the behavior of their elected African American leaders, or the leaders have found it difficult to accomplish their agendas and
remain in power without the support of the White power structure. Still another hypothesis is that Hampton Roads is a region of
several small and medium-sized cities and semi-rural counties. Arguably, the governments in these jurisdictions could be smaller,
less bureaucratic and more responsive than is the case in big-city Atlanta. In any event, African Americans in Hampton Roads
are considerably more hopeful, and much less cynical, about their leaders and those leaders’ ability to change things, than their
counterparts in Atlanta.
Nearly 70 percent of African Americans are also more likely to “strongly agree” or “agree” than Whites (53.3 percent) with the
statement, “I believe that my local government is largely run by a few big interests looking out for themselves.” White respondents (70.7 percent) were more likely than their Black counterparts (45.8 percent) to concur with the statement, “I believe that
the government in my city/county is run for the benefit of all the people.” Sixty-five percent and 24 percent of respondents,
respectively, in the 1996 Atlanta survey concurred with these statements. Once again, African Americans in Hampton Roads (as
well as Whites) are more inclined to believe government operates for their benefit than is true of the Atlanta citizenry.

CONCLUSIONS AND A FEW RECOMMENDATIONS
What have we learned? On many issues, African American and White residents of Hampton Roads see things the same.
Foremost are issues such as schools, crime and jobs. Both groups are quite impressed with the provision of several public services, for example, libraries and less glamorous tasks such as garbage removal.
But, on a range of other issues, African Americans and Whites see things quite differently. African Americans are considerably less likely than Whites to believe problems of discrimination continue to be important for African Americans and more
likely to be dissatisfied with their economic condition. Consequently, African Americans are much more supportive of affirmative action principles, and almost five times as many Blacks as Whites believe government and corporations should pay
financial reparations to African Americans. To some extent, these findings reflect the reality that African Americans earn lower
incomes than Whites in Hampton Roads and are less likely to own their own homes. African Americans are also much more
likely than Whites to regard HIV/AIDS as an important problem. And, religion appears to play a larger role in the lives of
Hampton Roads’ African Americans than its does in the lives of Whites, at least as measured by their frequency of church attendance and the influence the church has in their lives.
Relative to Whites, African Americans typically are much less satisfied with their police departments. The gap between the two
groups is especially large in Norfolk, but virtually nonexistent in Newport News. Whether the different perceptions African
Americans have of their police departments are based upon real or imagined differences in treatment, there is no doubt many
African Americans feel these differences intensely.
Among public services, public housing is given low grades by both African Americans and Whites. Regional transportation also
receives its share of criticism. Public officials would do well to heed what was perhaps the survey’s most surprising result –
namely, that approximately 70 percent of the citizens of Hampton Roads support the development of a light rail system for the
region. This strong endorsement does not square well with the opposition of some elected officials to such a development. These
officials often cite public opinion as the basis for their opposition.
Both African Americans and Whites in Hampton Roads are less cynical about their elected officials and their governments than
the citizens of Atlanta, which we have used as a comparison. Many African Americans believe their elected officials and their
governments can improve the lives of the typical African American. This is an agreeable and fortuitous finding for the region.
Not surprisingly, we found that African American churches have maintained their traditionally strong roles in the Black community.
African Americans continue to utilize their churches for many purposes, in addition to religious nourishment. Consequently,
African American pastors are influential molders of public opinion and oftentimes function as political leaders. Those who seek to
understand African Americans must first understand Black churches.
Among African American leaders nationally, the Rev. Jesse Jackson continues to hold great influence. Where predominantly
African American organizations are concerned, the NAACP is the most influential. However, almost one of every three African
Americans indicated either they did not know or, alternatively, that none of these individuals or organizations best represented
their views. It is possible this “I don’t know or don’t care” response represents nothing more than a degree of anomie or
boredom; it also is possible that we find ourselves on the cusp of major shifts in African American opinion.
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The relatively low level of home ownership among African Americans (48.4 percent vs. 70.7 percent for Whites) suggests the
need for a close examination of all aspects of housing markets in Hampton Roads. Are so many African Americans not homeowners because of income and asset deficiencies, or are there procedural and discriminatory barriers to their home ownership?
Given the importance of home ownership to community stability, this is a topic that should not be ignored.
This survey confirmed the strong support of African Americans for the Democratic Party. There is much dispute whether this causes
African Americans to have more clout and political influence, or instead to “sell their votes for cheap and be taken for granted.”
Whites, on the other hand, while definitely leaning toward Republicanism, seem much less committed to party politics. A much
larger proportion of Whites regard themselves as political independents. Many political observers believe this is the best strategy
because it forces candidates to court Whites in Hampton Roads in every election. Whatever the truth here, the differences outlined between African Americans and Whites in the political arena were among the strongest found in any area of the survey.
Finally, these survey results for Hampton Roads are consistent with those reported for the Atlanta region in 1996 and for
the nation as a whole in the July 11, 2001, edition of The Washington Post. Once local issues are taken into account,
African Americans in Hampton Roads live in much the same worlds as their counterparts in Atlanta and nationally. The
Post concluded, “Whether out of hostility, indifference or simple lack of knowledge, large numbers of White Americans
incorrectly believe Blacks are as well off as Whites in terms of their jobs, incomes schooling and health care.” Yet, reality is
otherwise.
Whites in Hampton Roads tend to overemphasize the progress African Americans have made economically, politically and
socially. Believing African Americans to live and operate in circumstances roughly equivalent to those of Whites, the typical
White person concludes that “a level playing field” (that is, an absence of affirmative action and preferences) is the best societal
policy. This is particularly true for policies that apply to all African Americans, regardless of their status. Whites tend to be more
supportive of preferences that focus on specific individuals who exhibit need, whatever their race, rather than policies that assist
all African Americans, regardless of their circumstances. This view of the world has gained more currency in recent years and
may in fact prevail on the U.S. Supreme Court. If so, we shall have many more opportunities to debate its relevance.

Notes Of Appreciation
Special thanks are due Old Dominion University’s Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnicity, directed by Michael L. Clemons,
and Old Dominion’s Social Science Research Center, directed by Jeffrey Y. Harlow. The institute and the center carried out the
public-opinion survey that was the basis for this chapter. Drs. Clemons and Harlow were instrumental in analyzing the data from
the survey and in delineating what the results mean.
We also express our thanks to the Center for Political Studies and Analysis at Clark Atlanta University in Atlanta, Ga., for generously providing Drs. Clemons and Harlow with unfettered access to its survey instrument and a summary of item results from its
1996 Survey of Black Political Attitudes in Atlanta. The Atlanta study included 1,112 cases and collected data on 123 variables.
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POPULATION
AND POLITICS

Population And Politics: Virginia
Legislative Redistricting And The
Decline Of Political Power

T

he salient fact about this year’s Virginia legislative redistricting, insofar as Hampton Roads is concerned, is it confirmed the recent
decline in the political power of the region. For a variety of reasons, including lower than average regional population growth

and the retirement or defeat of senior regional legislators, Hampton Roads’ political power has been on the wane. The region will
move from a situation in which 27 legislators had their districts wholly or partially in Hampton Roads to one next year when only
23 legislators will claim some portion of Hampton Roads in their district. One can sugarcoat this result in various ways, but it is
undeniable that the region’s political clout in the legislative halls of Richmond has declined significantly since the mid-1990s.

The Redistricting Process
Hampton Roads’ representation in the General Assembly has been affected over the years by changing population trends and
shifting political winds. While redistricting under current judicial standards is primarily about equalization of legislative districts
based on population, experiences of the Hampton Roads region show that politics continues to influence the drawing of district
lines.
The Virginia constitution requires that the General Assembly reapportion the Commonwealth every 10 years into electoral districts
that “shall be composed of contiguous and compact territory and shall be so constituted as to give, as nearly as practicable,
representation in proportion to the population of the district.” A number of court decisions have made it clear that the principle of
“one man-one vote” is to be followed and that only a de minimis deviation in population equality is to be permitted.
Since the constitutionally established upper limits on the number of members of the House of Delegates (100) and the Senate
(40) were reached long ago, redistricting in recent decades has consisted of moving district boundaries to reflect shifts in population. State legislative district boundaries are drawn to meet court-imposed standards of equal population and of access of
minorities to the political system. In contrast to historical custom, district lines now are drawn irrespective of local jurisdictional
boundaries.
The General Assembly approved new state legislative district lines in April 2001. Redistricting took place through the normal legislative process, although a special session was convened specifically for that purpose. Bills describing the new legislative districts were drafted by special subcommittees of the House and Senate Privileges and Elections Committees. Public hearings were
held around the state, and the bills were heard in committee and on the floor in each house. Amendments were adopted to correct technical problems and to reflect changes desired by the majority party. Each house accepted the other’s work, and the bills
were signed by the governor. Maps of the old districts and the newly drawn ones are shown in Figures 1 and 2 for the House
of Delegates and Figures 3 and 4 for the Senate.
The redistricting plan received approval from the U.S. Department of Justice in early June 2001, as required under the Voting
Rights Act, but is the subject of a lawsuit challenging its constitutionality. Only minor changes, if any, are likely to result from
these reviews.
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FIGURE 1
The Old 1990 House of Delegates Districts in Hampton Roads

FIGURE 2
The New 2001 House of Delegates Districts in Hampton Roads
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FIGURE 3
The Old 1990 Senate Districts in Hampton Roads
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FIGURE 4
The New 2001 Senate Districts in Hampton Roads
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FIGURE 5

Virginia's Population Growth 1990-2000
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FIGURE 6
A Closer Look at Population Growth in Hampton Roads

Population changes drive legislative redistricting. Figure 5 depicts population growth in Virginia between 1990 and 2000. It is
apparent that except for several university towns and a few larger cities such as Lynchburg and Chesapeake, significant population growth in the Commonwealth occurred primarily in Richmond and Northern Virginia. As Figure 6 demonstrates, within
Hampton Roads, James City County recorded an impressive rate of growth in population. Suffolk, along with Accomack, Isle of
Wight and York counties, also recorded healthy growth rates. Norfolk, Portsmouth and Franklin lost population during the
decade. Williamsburg, Newport News, Hampton and Virginia Beach grew during the decade, but at less than the
Commonwealth average. Table 1 provides specifics. The region’s population continues to be sensitive to U.S. Department of
Defense spending.
Taking everything into account, population growth in Hampton Roads was modest. Table 2 demonstrates that Hampton Roads
grew about half as fast as the Richmond metropolitan area and only about a quarter as fast as Northern Virginia.
Hampton Roads usually has been considered part of the “golden crescent” of economic growth and prosperity, running
from Northern Virginia down the I-95 corridor to Richmond and east to Hampton Roads. However, measured by population changes in the past decade in the three metropolitan statistical areas that are in the crescent, Hampton Roads did not
share the golden gleam of growth of the other regions. Figure 7 demonstrates this fact visually. Since the Reagan defense
buildup of the 1980s, Hampton Roads’ population growth has trailed that of Richmond and Northern Virginia by substantial margins.
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TABLE 1
Population Changes Inside Hampton Roads, 1900-2000
Locality
Cities
Chesapeake
Franklin
Hampton
Newport News
Norfolk
Poquoson
Portsmouth
Suffolk
Virginia Beach
Williamsburg
Counties
Accomack
Isle of Wight
Northampton
Surry
York
Totals
State
Virginia

94

1990 Population

2000 Population

1990-2000 Change

Percentage Change

151,982
8,392
133,773
171,477
261,250
11,005
103,910
52,143
393,089
11,600

199,184
8,346
146,437
180,150
234,403
11,566
100,565
63,677
425,257
11,998

47,202
-46
12,664
8,673
-26,847
561
-3,345
11,534
32,168
398

31.06%
-0.55%
9.47%
5.06%
-10.28%
5.10%
-3.22%
22.12%
8.18%
3.43%

31,703
25,053
13,061
6,145
42,434
1,417,017

38,305
29,728
13,093
6,829
56,297
1,525,835

6,602
4,675
32
684
13,863
108,818

20.82%
18.66%
0.25%
11.13%
32.67%
7.68%

6,189,197

7,078,515

889,318

14.37%
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FIGURE 7

TABLE 2
MSA Population Growth, 1990-2000
Metropolitan
Statistical Areas
Norfolk
Richmond
Northern Virginia

1990
Population
1,430,974
865,640
1,732,437

2000
Population
1,551,351
996,512
2,167,757

1990-2000
Change
120,377
130,872
435,320

Percentage
Change
8.41%
15.12%
25.13%

Source: U.S. Bureau of Census
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The Mechanics Of The Redistricting Process
Population losses and the slow growth of the region impacted the number of people living in each legislative district. According
to the 2000 Census numbers, House of Delegate districts in whole or in part in Hampton Roads showed the highest regional
deviations in the state for under-population from the reapportionment standard population of 70,785 people per district. The
same was true of Senate districts, deviating from the ideal population of 176,963; the greatest amount of deviation for underpopulation was in Hampton Roads.
TABLE 3
Legislative Districts in Whole or in Part in Hampton Roads - 2000
(Before Redistricting)

Delegate Districts
(Ideal District Population 70,785)
District
21
64
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
100

Population

Deviation

67,070
71,068
65,717
74,724
67,258
91,663
71,380
51,524
63,697
64,139
67,380
79,958
64,196
45,130
49,877
57,734
55,887
58,008
64,799
60,313
74,347
64,567
61,021
78,182
80,843
72,329
68,247

-3,715
283
-5,068
3,939
-3,527
20,878
595
-19,261
-7,088
-6,646
-3,405
9,173
-6,589
-25,655
-20,908
-13,051
-14,898
-12,777
-5,986
-10,472
3,562
-6,218
-9,764
7,397
10,058
1,544
-2,538
-120,137

Percent
Deviation
-5.2
0.4
-7.2
5.6
-5.0
29.5
0.8
-27.2
-10.0
-9.4
-4.8
13.0
-9.3
-36.2
-29.5
-18.4
-21.0
-19.1
-8.5
-14.8
5.0
-8.8
-13.8
10.4
14.2
2.2
-3.6

Senate Districts
(Ideal District Population 176,963)
District

Population

Deviation

1
2
3
5
6
7
8
13
14
15
18

189,763
149,888
181,082
143,643
136,556
152,111
167,639
176,293
220,607
170,373
159,437

12,800
-27,075
4,119
-33,320
-40,407
-24,852
-9,324
-670
43,644
-6,590
-17,526
-99,201

Percent
Deviation
7.2
-15.3
2.3
-18.8
-22.8
-14.0
-5.3
-0.4
24.7
-3.7
-9.9

Source: Division of Legislative Services, Virginia General Assembly

96

T H E

S T A T E

O F

T H E

R E G I O N

While the under-population of the districts in Hampton Roads relates to the lack of population growth in the region, the extent of
the deviation also can be attributed to the fact that the legislative districts drawn in Hampton Roads in 1991 showed the
greatest negative deviation from the ideal size of the district for any region of the state (see Appendix A). In other words, the
legislative districts drawn in 1991 had as few people in them as the legislators felt was possible to meet the court standard. In fact, in 1991, Hampton Roads legislators were able to delay the full negative impact of the region's slow population growth by clever redrawing of districts. The end product was a large number of districts that were "under-populated"
as much as the courts would allow – 5 percent less population than the state average.
In contrast, in 2001 there was a deliberate attempt to stay within a 2 percent deviation of the ideal standard statewide. The
change in approach to redistricting between 1991 and 2001 cost Hampton Roads some legislative representation.
As Table 4 indicates, had the House of Delegate districts in Hampton Roads been drawn in 1991 with no deviation from the
ideal standard, Hampton Roads would have qualified for 22.9 delegates. Since almost all the districts were drawn permitting a
4 percent deviation of under-population, Hampton Roads ended up with 23.41 delegates, or an approximate one-half position
in additional representation. In 2001, however, Hampton Roads districts were drawn very close to the ideal population, or even
were “slightly over-populated” (higher than the standard), which resulted in 21.38 districts (see Table 4). Had all districts been
drawn exactly to the ideal standard, Hampton Roads would have had 21.56 seats (“.56 of a district” reflects the reality that
one or more legislative districts within Hampton Roads overlap into areas outside of Hampton Roads).
The net loss for the region in 2001 was 2.03 delegates (23.41 minus 21.38). However, if the 2001 districts had not been
over-populated slightly, the net loss would have been 1.85 (23.41 minus 21.56). Had the same population deviations from the
ideal been followed in 2001 that were followed in 1991, the net loss would have been 1.35 (23.41 minus 22.06).
TABLE 4
The Tale of the Population Numbers

House District Population Standard
Hampton Roads Regional Population
House Districts With No Deviation
House Districts Legislated*
Difference

1991
61, 874
1,417,017
22.9
23.41
0.51

2001
70,785
1,525,825
21.56
21.38
-0.18

*For House districts legislated, that part of a district partially in Hampton Roads is counted as a fractional part of the
population in Hampton Roads.

Of course, legislators do not come in fractional parts. If one assumes that a legislator who has some piece of his or her district in
Hampton Roads has an interest in representing the region as much as someone whose district is fully within the region, the contrast between what happened in 1991 and 2001 is even greater. As a result of the 1991 redistricting, 27 delegates had
their districts wholly or partially within Hampton Roads. With the 2001 redistricting, that number has dropped to 23, a loss
in representation of four delegates! There is no way one can sugarcoat this outcome, for it represents a very substantial
loss in regional political power. When, in addition, one takes into account the ending of the legislative careers of prominent
and powerful Hampton Roads legislators such as Thomas Moss, Alan Diamonstein, Stanley Walker and Hunter Andrews,
the combined effect represents a blow to the political power of Hampton Roads of huge magnitude. There has been a
curious, though perhaps understandable, lack of recognition of this fact by the Hampton Roads citizenry, the regional power
structure and the media. Yet, the impact of these changes upon the political power and clout of Hampton Roads has been
tremendous.
While political power has many sources, the primary roots of regional legislative power in Virginia are: (1) the number of legislators a region sends to Richmond; (2) the seniority of those legislators; (3) whether they are in the majority party; and (4) the
availability of funds to support political activity. With respect to No. 1, the decline in Hampton Roads representatives (wholly or
partially within Hampton Roads) from 27 to 23 speaks for itself. This constitutes almost a 15 percent decline in the number of
delegates.
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As far as No. 2 is concerned, legislative affairs in both the House of Delegates and the Senate are highly sensitive to the seniority of individual legislators. Seniority is the primary driver of membership on choice committees, especially the “money committees” (Appropriations and Finance in the House of Delegates and Finance in the Senate) and on other key panels such as
General Laws, and Corporations, Insurance and Banking in the House of Delegates, and Commerce and Labor, Courts of
Justice, and Rules in the Senate. The most senior legislators nearly always occupy seats on these powerful committees and it is
they who hold leadership positions. They typically are appointed as budget conferees when the House of Delegates and the
Senate work to resolve their differences (if they do!) and “divide up the pie” at the end of a legislative session. The bottom line
is Hampton Roads’ legislative seniority has declined precipitously in recent years and, as an example, the region did not
have a legislator on the final budget conference committee in the 2001 legislative session. Hampton Roads legislators were
forced to look over the shoulders of other legislators and importune, entice and threaten them in an attempt to achieve regional
goals. This is a dramatic change from the situation just a few years ago when Delegate Moss was Speaker of the House,
Delegate Diamonstein was a powerful member of the Appropriations Committee as well as a final budget conferee, Sen.
Walker was President Pro-Tem of the Senate and a final budget conferee, and Sen. Andrews chaired the Senate Finance
Committee and was a final budget conferee.
With respect to No. 3, it is nearly always true that legislators in the party in power are able to exercise more power than legislators in the minority party because they control the agenda, have greater party representation on committees and usually attract
much larger financial contributions from individuals, corporations, unions and pressure groups. For well more than a century, the
Democratic Party dominated Virginia politics and hence Hampton Roads’ predominantly Democratic representation was advantageous. In 2001, though, the wheel has turned and Republicans control nearly everything in sight. However, the region’s core
city (Norfolk) has but one Republican House member and one Republican Senate member, and both are relatively junior. Further,
the sitting governor, James Gilmore, unfortunately has not been well attuned to Hampton Roads and hence the increasingly
Republican cast of the region’s legislative representation has not paid off in the manner one might have anticipated.
Also, cities such as Portsmouth and Hampton are represented primarily by Democrats. Cities such as Virginia Beach and
Portsmouth and the northern end of the Peninsula are represented by Republicans, but on the whole they have not served
in the General Assembly for long periods of time and thus do not yet exercise the obvious power that the MossDiamonstein-Walker-Andrews quartet enjoyed in the days of yore. If these Republicans continue to be re-elected and accumulate seniority, and Republicans continue to be the majority party, then the long-term outlook for political power in
Hampton Roads will be brighter.
The fourth factor noted above, the availability of funds to support political activity, reflects economic power. Many large private
business entities exercise considerable influence and have the potential, directly or indirectly, to provide valuable funds to support
political activities. In this regard, Hampton Roads is disadvantaged relative to Richmond and Northern Virginia. Even broadly
defined, Hampton Roads contains only two Fortune 500 headquarters, while Richmond and Northern Virginia together account
for 10 times as many. Further, per capita income in Hampton Roads trails Richmond by almost 10 percent and Northern Virginia
by nearly 20 percent. Simply put, even after accounting for cost-of-living differentials, there is less discretionary money available
in Hampton Roads to support political candidates and causes.
Consequently, for most of this decade, Hampton Roads’ political power will be, at least comparatively speaking, at a low ebb.
Once again, this reflects a larger than recognized decline in the number of legislators from Hampton Roads, as well as a significant reduction in the seniority of Hampton Roads’ legislators, the political affiliations of these legislators, and in raw economic
power.
The loss of representation for the region was felt most dramatically in House Districts 86 and 88, both of which were in the City
of Norfolk during the 1990s. With the 2001 redistricting, however, House District 86 is now in western Fairfax and eastern
Loudoun counties, and House District 88 is now in Spotsylvania and Stafford counties. Figure 8 shows this.
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FIGURE 8

Some Context On The Politics Of Redistricting
For most of the past century, Virginia apportioned legislative seats based on a combination of factors that included population,
but always with an emphasis on keeping local units of government (cities and counties) intact. And, as has always been the
case, protection of incumbents and the power of the majority party were primary considerations. Up until the 1950s, Virginia’s
legislative districts were considered reasonably apportioned in comparison to other states. Even then, however, the districts
would not have been able to pass the stringent court standards of today. As a general rule, legislative districts in most states
deviated substantially from population, though the Commonwealth was fairer than most.
The 1960 Census saw Virginia’s population increase by a strong 19.5 percent, but growth was not uniform across the state.
Cities and suburbs grew much more rapidly than did the rural areas. As a result, the House legislative districts varied in population from 20,071 to 142,597, and Senate district population ranged from 51,637 to 285,194. In one analysis that assumed
that a fairly apportioned district would have a value of 1.00, the seven most heavily populated counties and cities of the state
had a value of .73, while the most sparsely populated areas were over-represented with a value of 1.24. The City of Hampton
had a vote value of .47 and Princess Anne County (which consolidated with Virginia Beach City in 1963) and Virginia Beach
had a value of .47.
The challenge faced after the 1960 Census by the overwhelmingly dominant Byrd Machine and the Democratic Party was to
protect incumbents – many of whom were from districts in the rural parts of the state – but still somehow respond to urban and
suburban demands for a fair redistricting. The General Assembly made a stab at doing so, but the product of its efforts in the
redistricting of 1962 was not well received.
Four legislators from Arlington and Fairfax counties filed suit on April 9, 1962, and were joined on May 25 by four plaintiffs
from the City of Norfolk, challenging the redistricting plan. The suit charged that the redistricting, “by failing to give representation commensurate with the population of their areas, devalued their votes and deprived them of equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment.”
On November 28, 1962, a three-judge panel declared the redistricting plan invalid. The state appealed the case to the
Supreme Court. On June 15, 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the redistricting failed to meet population standards for
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both houses of the General Assembly. Thus, Virginia and the Hampton Roads area, via the Supreme Court decision, played a
part in setting the judicial standards for redistricting that continue to today.
The General Assembly in 1992 still was controlled by the Democratic Party and still faced the similarly difficult task of attempting
to protect incumbents (many of whom represented primarily rural districts and some of whom were Republicans) and the majority
status of the Democrats. However, historical trends did not favor the Democrats, for their majorities in both houses of the General
Assembly were clearly eroding over time. In 1967, Democrats had 85 members in the House of Delegates; the balance was
14 Republicans and one Independent. In the Senate there were 34 Democrats and six Republicans. By 1991, the numbers had
changed to 58 Democrats, 41 Republicans and one Independent in the House, and to 22 Democrats and 18 Republicans in
the Senate (see Appendix B). The Democrats were desperate to maintain power by stopping the steady erosion of their numbers
in both houses of the General Assembly. At the same time, there was recognition that this would be quite difficult, both because
of the rising Republican tide and the strict judicial standards for redistricting that would have to be met.
Hampton Roads was a key region for the Democrats’ 1991 attempt to hold to power. With the high minority African
American population in many of the Hampton Roads communities and the tendency of those communities to vote
Democratic, the Democrats (as has been shown previously) drew the Hampton Roads legislative districts with the greatest
possible deviation of under-population. While the short-term strategy saved the region some impact of the loss of population, it did not prevent the Republicans from continuing to gain strength.
By 2001, Republicans controlled the House and Senate and the process for redistricting. The Republicans drew the Hampton
Roads districts as close to the ideal size as possible in order to limit Democratic strength. It was no coincidence that District 88
eliminated in Norfolk was the legislative district of Delegate Tom Moss, former Democratic Speaker of the House of Delegates.

Final Words
While it is undeniable that the legislative power of Hampton Roads has been reduced significantly in recent years, this is hardly
an “end of the world” scenario. The region still claims 23 legislators of a total of 140. Twenty-three legislators, if they are
united by an attractive agenda and are highly motivated, still can accomplish an enormous amount of good. This number
dwarfs southwestern Virginia’s representation, for example, and is larger than that of Richmond.
What has been lacking in the Hampton Roads delegation in recent years has been unity of purpose. While there is a Hampton
Roads legislative caucus, its meetings usually are poorly attended – more lobbyists are present than legislators, and it is worth
noting that there are separate legislative caucuses for the Peninsula, the Southside and many individual Hampton Roads cities. In
addition, the Legislative Black Caucus claims some portion of the loyalty of more than one-quarter of the region’s legislators.
Membership in these other caucuses does not preclude legislators from uniting behind a common Hampton Roads agenda.
Indeed, it always has been the case that legislators from disparate parts of the Commonwealth have united behind common
interests, for example, the revenue plight of the cities, or K-12 education. Yet, few would dispute the judgment that other regions
(Northern Virginia and Richmond in particular) generally have exhibited more unity of purpose in the General Assembly than
Hampton Roads. The payoff has been observable on several issues, such as the distribution of transportation funding, but also in
other areas, including higher education funding.
What we end up with, then, is yet another situation where the logical regional conclusion is: “We need to get our act
together.” Yes, Hampton Roads’ legislative clout has declined, but there is plenty left. A unified, determined regional legislative delegation remains capable of achieving an impressive number of goals for Hampton Roads.
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APPENDIX A
Delegate Districts In Hampton Roads
1991 and 2001 Redistricting
Delegate
Districts
21
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
100
Pt. Districts
64
75
93
96
97
98
100

Delegates

Deviation

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Population
1991
64,446
59,638
63,561
59,374
59,208
59,024
59,127
60,094
64,535
59,895
63,558
59,175
58,851
58,836
60,016
58,936
59,449
59,009
60,509
59,150
59,969

Delegates
2001
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Population

2,572
-2,236
1,687
-2,500
-2,666
-2,850
-2,747
-1,780
2,661
-1,979
1,684
-2,699
-3,023
-3,038
-1,850
-2,938
-2,425
-2,865
-1,365
-2,724
-1,905

Percent
Deviation
4
-4
2.73
-4.04
-4.31
-4.61
-4.44
-2.88
4.3
-3.2
2.72
-4.36
-4.89
-4.91
-3
-4.75
-3.92
-4.63
-2.21
-4.4
-3.08

0.57
0.11
0.51
0.18
0.28
0.76
23.41

Percent

72,156
71,549
70,087
70,798
72,106
70,554
71,175
72,134
71,766
72,090
72,039

Deviation
Deviation
1,371
764
-698
13
1,321
-231
390
1,349
981
1,305
1,254

1

72,174

1,389

2

1
1
1
1

71,874
71,872
71,410
70,106

1,089
1,087
625
-679

1.5
1.5
0.9
-1

1
1
1

71,484
70,646
72,110

699
-139
1,325

1
-0.2
1.9

36,329
6,748

1,060
-319

3
-4.69

0.7
0.12
0.96
0.6

48,749
8,152
68,153
42,651

-588
102
-145
494

-1.2
-1.2
-0.2
1.2

31,847
11,530
17,365
44,764

480
208
165
-2,326

1.52
2.76
0.95
-4.95

1.9
1
-1
0
1.9
-0.3
0.6
1.9
1.4
1.8
1.8

21.38

Note: For districts partially in Hampton Roads, a percentage of a delegate has been assigned to the region equal to the Hampton Roads population in the districts.
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APPENDIX B
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REGIONALISM AND
THE DILLON RULE

Regionalism And The Dillon Rule:
An Interpretive Essay

T

he laws, practices and traditions of Virginia dominate the governmental context of Hampton Roads. World War I is a good
era to begin reflection on the historical events that have shaped the modern relationship between local and state governments.

It is also the time when the region began to emerge.
In the early 1920s everyone was enduring hard times. The waters of the port had frozen solid in the winter of 1917-18, a most
unusual event for “the world’s finest natural harbor,” and by the following winter the Commonwealth was recovering from an
influenza outbreak. Warwick County, now part of Newport News, was the hardest hit by the epidemic that broke out on Friday
the 13th (March) at Fort Lee, near Petersburg.
Virginia’s governments were also burdened. The state’s education, health and prison institutions were in disarray and were being
criticized as under-funded, and the road system was considered so impassable in 1921 that the Automobile Club of America
urged motorists to bypass the state. The state treasury was running a deficit. Thus, it was not surprising when Virginians elected a
38-year-old “reformer” as governor in 1925 with his self-described “program of progress.”
By 1930 he had convinced the General Assembly to approve a plan to simplify and overhaul Virginia’s tax structures, establish
the “short ballot,” and streamline state government by reducing 100 agencies to 12 departments. Historian Virginius Dabney
described new state appropriations for roads, education and mental hospitals as “unprecedentedly large.”
Interestingly, the governor went outside Virginia to a New York City consulting group (New York Bureau of Municipal Research)
for advice and development of the reorganization plan. Then he turned to a 38-member Citizens’ Committee on Consolidation
and Simplification in State and County Governments to advocate its merits.
Part of the package ceded to localities “property” as their main tax source and identified “income” as the state’s sole domain.
The reforms cost the state dollars ($4 million annually) and jobs (one state commissioner in each of 99 counties).
The youthful governor successfully fought for a 1 1-2-cent gasoline tax “to get Virginia out of the mud.” He publicly confronted
the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. and the nation’s oil companies when they raised rates and gasoline prices.
The governor was visible with each cause. In one case he rode on a bus to 56 different towns, a 1,000-mile circuit, to stump
for state constitutional changes. His central message touted the state as a whole. He held “regional” meetings with county and
state officials selling his road program, urged an “end to sectionalism in Virginia” and was the first governor to mount a statefunded national advertising program for tourist and economic development.
Who was this reformist governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia? An individual not often associated with reform – Harry Flood
Byrd Sr. It was a historic display of leadership.
Byrd’s notions of strong state government were enabled in part by the thinking of a non-Virginian. John Dillon, an Iowa
lawyer who later became a state and federal judge, then a law professor at Columbia University, wrote a treatise on
municipal corporations in 1872 that advanced the legal doctrine that states are supreme and the source of all municipal
power. That doctrine – called the Dillon Rule – has been bedrock in Virginia.
Part of Dillon’s treatise reads:
“It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the
following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly
implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the
declared objects and purposes of the corporation – not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts against the corporation and
the power is denied.”
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Both Dillon and Byrd expressed concern about the politics and management of cities. Dillon said the people managing cities
were not “best fitted by their intelligence, business experience, capacity and moral character.” City management was “too often
both unwise and extravagant.” Dillon believed in noblesse oblige and thought the “best fitted” could more likely be attracted to
state government. Byrd favored state dominance for political reasons. He wanted progressive government through rural control of
the courthouse, public purse and tax rates.
Hampton Roads itself is an interesting case study of survival within the Virginia context of strong state control. By 1900, its
history included a notable series of up and down events. Lord Dunmore’s burning of Norfolk on Jan. 1, 1776, and Jefferson’s
Embargo Acts of 1807, jointly depressed the region’s ports and effectively prevented them from developing in tandem with the
preeminent East Coast ports, New York, Philadelphia and Boston, in the early years of the Republic. Plus, there were epidemics
of yellow fever in 1795 and 1855. The latter took more than 2,000 lives in three months. Occupations by federal troops during
the Civil War had devastated the economy and its supporting social infrastructure. In the 1870s and 1880s, Virginia’s political
preference for canal technology over railroads thwarted Hampton Roads during the railroads’ period of peak expansion. Thus,
to use a contemporary aphorism, if it wasn’t one thing, it was another. The net effect, however, was to slow the development of
the region’s ports until the 20th century.
World War I changed all of this. Its impact was most visible in the establishment of huge military and ship facilities, and over a
period of time, the Norfolk Navy Base was to become the largest in the world. The state’s largest city, Norfolk, nearly doubled
its population between 1910 and 1920, to 117,000 people. According to the local Association of Commerce, the region was
“a circle drawn with a radius of 30 miles from downtown Norfolk’s new federal building.” Within that circle Portsmouth’s population was 45,000; Newport News, 34,500; South Norfolk, 7,800; Hampton, 6,300; Princess Anne County (including Virginia
Beach), 16,200; and Norfolk County, 30,000.
The war efforts wrought a new form of local government that was concerned, like Bryd, with “economy and efficiency” and
addressing infrastructure problems of housing, roads and utilities. The concept of the city as a large public business developed,
and Norfolk voters approved the city manager form of government. Charles Ashburner, the first city manager, was very interested
in the development of everything from city streets, schools and parks to public buildings and police and fire departments, as well
as general beautification.
In 1922, Norfolk approved $5 million to build a grain elevator, which was followed by construction of a city market, one of the
first notable results of the extension of suffrage to women. The City of Norfolk also acquired the local army base from the federal
government in an effort to become part of the national port system of terminals.
Annexation was the way cities expanded boundaries under Virginia law and it usually occurred as suburbs became dense and
wanted city services. As an example, in 1923, Norfolk annexed 30 square miles and 30,000 people in the areas of Ocean
View, Campostella and Larchmont. The Association of Commerce described Norfolk as a city of “magnificent distances”:
“Here and there streets are opened, new houses appear, small suburbs are begun and grow slowly in numbers
and importance. If the growth of the last 70 years should be duplicated through the next 70 years, Norfolk will
become one continuous community from the tip of Willoughby to the extreme southern boundary of South
Norfolk, and the suburbs will extend from Cape Henry to Churchland.”
It’s been 70 years since that vision was painted and, as we know, that’s not how things actually developed. Rather than one
large city, the region is characterized by many cities and counties, each with its own government. However, the preceding
bit of history provokes several questions:
• What is the picture of Hampton Roads governmentally in 2001?
• Does the notion of “region” count for anything?
• What impact does the Dillon Rule have today?
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The Picture Of Government In Hampton Roads In 2001
The governmental picture in Hampton Roads is complex in many ways. There are nearly 100 governmental units within the
region. These include six counties, 10 cities, 15 dependent school systems, and more than 60 additional governmental units or
districts such as the Hampton Roads Sewer Sanitation District and the Southeastern Virginia Public Service Authority. Many of the
localities have retained the names they had many years ago (for example, Hampton and Norfolk), while others have acquired
new names (Chesapeake). Some have new boundary lines because of consolidations in the 1950s and 1960s, including those
involving Newport News, Hampton, Virginia Beach, Chesapeake and Suffolk.
Every community has success stories about which it can boast. As examples, Virginia Beach has been cited nationally for financial management and technology; Williamsburg is considered a “national treasure”; Hampton was featured on national television for its “healthy communities” model; and Norfolk was named one of America’s “most livable” cities.
But the words “city,” “county” and “town” are not easy to understand in Virginia any longer because of social and political
changes that have occurred since Gov. Byrd’s time. One continues to see the words sprinkled throughout Virginia’s laws but they
are words that have distinctions often with no differences, or worse, differences with no distinctions. It starts with Virginia’s independent-city system – one that is different from those in any of the other 49 states. Most states divide responsibilities and services
between the two scales of government – county and city. But not Virginia.
Virginia has an “either/or” designation for people living in a specific location. You live either in a city or a county, but not both.
However, not all the cities are the same. There are 40 cities and 40 different city charters. For instance, Norfolk has a so-called
“strong” charter that includes several important provisions about borrowing and referenda that are different from Virginia Beach
and Chesapeake’s “weak charters.”
While counties are independent of cities, they are not identical to cities by any means, and there are 95 of them. Some counties, like Fairfax, are based upon special state laws, which grant so-called city powers, as well as some powers that most cities
don’t have. But, generally, counties are lumped into three or four categories, which make them similar in many respects, but different in others (for example, their ability to tax and pass laws).
Yet, perhaps the most complicated feature of Virginia local government is its “towns.” There are 188 towns, each with a
separate charter. But towns, unlike cities, are parts of counties (similar to other states with cities and counties). Since each
town charter can be different, this means towns can be very different. There are 11 towns in Hampton Roads. Those
Virginians who live in a town (Smithfield is an example) have their local government functions divided between their town
government and their county government. Are you a bit confused? Many other citizens are as well.

The Notion Of The Region Of Hampton Roads
Words from Ben Harper’s song “Homeless Child” serve as backdrop for thinking about region in Virginia:
“Nowhere here
to call my home
no one near
to call my own
all that’s left
is for me to roam
somebody please
help me hang on.”
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Most people agree that the geographic area from approximately Williamsburg to parts of eastern North Carolina is economically linked. Social, political and other links are less obvious and more debated. While regions have become the dominant and
most meaningful structure today for organizing economic performance and are essential in solving many of our problems,
Virginia public policy barely addresses “region” and offers few tools to encourage regional efforts. To cite one example, the
Virginia Area Development Act of 1968, which provided the enabling authority for planning districts, such as the Hampton
Roads Regional Planning District Commission (HRPDC), does not mention the words regional or cooperation! Sadly, in some
ways the concept of region is a fiction not recognized by the Commonwealth of Virginia. Contrast this to the explicit recognition of, and reliance upon, city-regions such as Indianapolis and Portland.
Cities, counties and towns remain Virginia’s primary structures for local government. Thus, exactly because there are no regional
officials, we blame local government officials for not cooperating better – or more – but the truth is, Virginia is not organized for
regional progress or performance. When the focus of the Dillon Rule is added to the state’s policies of property taxation and
independent status, Virginia has trapped localities, their residents and, ultimately, the entire state, in a zero-sum game.
It’s hard to over-emphasize this next point. When local elected officials swear the oath of office, they accept a serious fiduciary
responsibility to protect their individual municipal corporations. In practical terms this usually means: Does my community benefit
immediately and can I show it beyond doubt? No public official under the Virginia system, elected or appointed, takes an
oath to support a region. Their elections and their livelihoods depend upon cities, counties and towns.
Another reality concerns the number of elected officials who must agree for regional issues to move forward. Between cities and
counties (not counting towns) there are 110 elected officials in Hampton Roads. The range of representation is dramatic – from
a few thousand to more than 200,000. The mayor of Virginia Beach represents more than 400,000 people. Given the nature
of the system – voluntary participation – an elected official who represents a few thousand people can match or exceed the
voice of one who represents many more.
Given Virginia’s preference for cooperation rather than coercion as the de facto organizing principle for regional policy, this
means just one jurisdiction, either a county or city, can veto regional efforts. One local business leader calls voluntary regionalism “dancing with your sisters.”
These thoughts are preamble to measuring and understanding regional economic progress in Hampton Roads.
Again, Harper’s words:
“There is no night
and there is no day
it is all
one shade of gray
some will pass
and some will stay
is this the end
or just one more day.“
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The Dillon Rule
What is most remarkable about the Dillon Rule is even though it is not mentioned once in Virginia law or policy, a fact interesting
in itself, it nonetheless has been used as the standard for interpretation by state and local courts for more than 100 years. Some
Dillon Rule-inspired rulings have been strict – as when the Supreme Court of Virginia in 1985 found that Arlington County could
not lease property the county owned for economic development purposes. Other rulings have been broader, as when the State
Supreme Court let stand in 1988 a Virginia Beach ordinance that required handgun permits.
Though lacking the express words of policy, Virginia remains one of few Dillon Rule states. The doctrine has withstood
change, in a changing world, like few other public traditions. Indeed, it hovers over all of the Commonwealth’s governmental activities. It is not surprising, then, that nearly every city of any size employs one or more full-time lobbyists to represent it in Richmond during the sessions of the General Assembly. The reason is simple. Because of the Dillon Rule, the
action is in Richmond, not in Arlington, Lynchburg or Newport News.
There are practical consequences to Dillon’s norm of uncertainty. While few local attorneys argue that Dillon is impossible, one
city attorney says the problem is “you need a lawyer all the time and government isn’t working when you need an attorney that
often.” Another attorney says, “Often the way around Dillon in a particular case is complicated and convoluted, and that isn’t
good.”
It’s also not clear when a court will apply the Dillon Rule to overturn a local government decision. Not tallied or known are decisions avoided by local governments because of the uncertainty and/or the time and money it takes to withstand possible challenges. Also damaging is the mindset associated with the “negative presumption” of Dillon – that localities can’t do things. It
handicaps local or regional thinking about public-private solutions that require speed, decision-making at the lowest levels and
collaboration. The involvement of lawyers, or petitioning the General Assembly, soaks up time and resources, and is of little
value. This past year, 119 local bills in the General Assembly were introduced involving the Dillon Rule. It is estimated that
these bills occupied 550 hours of various committees, subcommittees and floor time. About half the bills finally passed. This
is quite an achievement for a rule that is not explicitly mentioned in state statutes!
But, it doesn’t stop there. Each session, there are bills legislators regularly introduce to take away authority from localities. House
Bill 1969, involving local control of firearms, introduced Jan. 10, 2001, has Dillon overtones: “... no locality shall adopt any
ordinance, resolution, motion, administrative rule or regulation governing the purchase, possession, transfer, ownership, carrying
or transporting of firearms, ammunition, or components or combination thereof other than those expressly authorized by statute.”
Virginia’s Internet bill tracking service discloses that there were 61 separate actions involving HB 1969 before it “failed to pass”
the House on Feb. 24. Prior to its death, it passed both houses, went to a conference committee and passed the Senate, again,
before stalling in the House on parliamentary procedure.
Local threats by legislators occur, as well. Several years ago when Virginia Beach City Council was giving serious consideration
to raising real estate taxes to fund school board budget requests, two state legislators from Virginia Beach threatened to “cap”
the city’s tax by introducing legislation. Meanwhile, away from the eyes of the General Assembly, stories are legend about one
county or city doing something that another Virginia locality was told (or had assumed) it could not do.
The primary argument in support of the Dillon Rule is that it promotes uniformity of law and practice. This is said to be an essential element of building an attractive climate for business (businesses don’t want to deal with scores of different legal, regulatory
and taxation schemes). Further, Dillon Rule supporters (and there are many, especially among legislators whose power is amplified by its existence) assert that it reduces undesirable competition between cities, counties and towns that otherwise might offer
widely diverging “deals” to businesses that might be considering relocation. There is, however, an unstated third reason that ultimately may be more important than the other two. It is that the existence of a Dillon Rule world makes state legislators very
important people – individuals who must be courted and supported financially if their support is to be won.
Whatever spin one puts on the effects of the Dillon Rule, it is undeniable that it has dominated the government in the
Commonwealth and in Hampton Roads just as Gov. Byrd and Judge Dillon intended. Even so, do the historic choices of the
1920s adequately address the challenges we face today? This seems doubtful. Most observers without vested interests believe
reforms in state-local relations and in the tax structure, supplemented by a new “program of progress,” are needed.
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The Report Of The Commission On State And
Local Tax Structure
The imbalance in the fiscal relations between the state and its local governments was documented, again, recently in the Report
of the Commission on Virginia’s State and Local Tax Structure for the 21st Century, chaired by Thomas R. Morris, and released in
December 2000. Among its findings:
• The growth in property values (upon which most local government revenues depend) has languished when compared to the
robust annual individual and business incomes taxes collected by the state.
• More than $60 billion in property values have been declared exempt from taxation and taken off the local government books
as a result of state decisions.
• Major shifts have occurred in Virginia’s economy, primarily in the growth in the provision of services, especially those related
to information technology. For the most part, these services are not included in the tax base.
• The growth in interstate sales via catalogues and e-commerce also tends to escape taxation.
• The General Assembly and governors over the years have constricted the sales tax base through a multitude of exemptions.
• The elimination of the car tax by the state politically froze a major local revenue source for localities that was growing and
producing 16 percent of their revenues in 1998.
To the escalating revenue imbalance between the state and local governments in Hampton Roads must be added the negative
impact of the region’s economic slowdown. For nine straight years, and 13 of the last 15 years, Hampton Roads’ average
wage has slipped. According to the Department of Commerce, the region’s average wage is 84.6 percent of the national
average. By comparison, Northern Virginia is 136.7 percent of the national average and the Richmond regional average is
101.6 percent. Hampton Roads’ average is also lower than the average wage in the Roanoke and Charlottesville areas. Of
course, cost-of-living differentials erase much (though not all) of the difference between Hampton Roads and other regions, especially Northern Virginia. And, as demonstrated in an accompanying chapter, the key determinant of wages and incomes in
Hampton Roads is the level of military spending in the region. It now is smaller, in absolute dollars, than it was in 1985. Little
wonder, then, that Hampton Roads has not been a boom region.
The region’s picture is not bright when the financial strength of individual localities is measured and compared with other
localities in the rest of the state. Two more regional cities – Newport News (No. 8) and Franklin (No. 10) – recently moved
into the state’s “top 10” mostly fiscally stressed category, according to the Virginia Commission of Local Government.
Norfolk remains the most fiscally stressed community in the Commonwealth, and Portsmouth moved from No. 5 to No. 3.
Hampton fell from No. 15 to No. 12 in one year. Five localities – Virginia Beach, Suffolk, James City County, Southampton
County and Isle of Wight County – improved slightly, but three – Virginia Beach, Suffolk and Southampton County – remain classified as above average stress.
Property tax exemptions continue to be a special problem for Hampton Roads. More than $20 billion of property in Hampton
Roads is tax-exempt. Seven communities – Newport News, Franklin, Hampton, Williamsburg, York County, Norfolk and
Portsmouth – have 20 percent or more of their properties exempted. The two most fiscally stressed cities – Norfolk and
Portsmouth – are 47 and 56 percent tax-exempt, respectively. Given the role property plays for localities, Norfolk and
Portsmouth are forced to fend for themselves with one arm and one leg tied behind their backs.
Newport News joins their plight in another bizarre consequence of public policy as it relates to the Port of Hampton Roads. The
port produces many jobs, but not all of these jobs are located on the waterfront. Yet, because of two additional Virginia policies: (1) counting income at residence rather than where the work occurs; and (2) granting tax exemption to the state’s port facilities, Newport News (as well as the other cities) loses the market value of its state port facilities. Further, Newport News loses the
value of the income generated within its city limits, which impacts the distribution of various state resources. The result? Newport
News is on the top 10 list of the state’s most fiscally stressed cities. This is punishment beyond reason. It is worth noting that the
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state does not care which city income is generated when it levies the state income tax. It cares not which pier in which city generated the income it taxes.

The Economic Consequences
Disparity among neighbors injures the entire region’s ability to compete economically with other regions. Often, disparity occurs
naturally, unavoidably. Virginia, however, has set in motion a series of actions that has artificially disadvantaged localities, weakening the area’s productive capacities. To use regulatory terminology, its impact is arbitrary and capricious.
Statistics generated by the Hampton Roads Partnership often compare Hampton Roads to the Charlotte and Raleigh regions. In
1980, the nominal per capita incomes of the three were close to each other, with Hampton Roads slightly ahead of Charlotte
and Raleigh ($9,522, $9,190 and $9,506, respectively). Twenty years later, in 2000, Hampton Roads trailed both North
Carolina regions significantly ($23,771, $28,784 and $30,394, respectively). Analysts offer numerous reasons: loss of federal
jobs here, the absence of a national-class research university and issues of inferiority. The most important reason, however, is the
dependence of Hampton Roads upon Department of Defense spending. In 1990, 42 percent of the economy of Hampton
Roads was dependent upon military spending. As military expenditures declined in the late 1980s and 1990s, this had a very
negative impact upon the region. Income growth slowed and there was a net outflow of people from the region.
The recent federal census offers new evidence of change in the region that catches most people by surprise. When birth
and death rates are taken into account, the region lost population. Hampton Roads is one of three Virginia regions with net
out-migration. The other two regions are highly rural.
The population slowdown tarnishes the marketing image of Hampton Roads. Sometimes popular notions such as the region
attracting a major league sports franchise (which is explored in another chapter) seem almost ludicrous when juxtaposed with net
out-migration and stagnant income growth.
Because growth is a key assumption of Virginia’s philosophy of governance, there is deeper damage. The current array of taxes,
fees and incentives allowed localities biases the revenue system for growth. Property taxes during construction, along with development fees and connection charges, create windfall revenues for communities when houses and other properties are being
built. It’s when people fill those houses in numbers that require schools and other services that costs outstrip annual property tax
collections. The situation is compounded in older communities when physical, social and economic infrastructure ages and needs
renewal or expansion, which is more expensive.
In an oversimplified way, the reason cities become so interested in shopping centers, convention centers, and eating or amusement centers is because they develop revenues beyond their costs and can subsidize the maintenance costs of residential populations. Could it be that Virginia governmental structure and policies have made its citizens “guests of the state” in their own
homes?

A Possible Regional “New Program Of Progress”
What might a “new program of progress” look like?
Interviews with business, government and community leaders suggest a blend of optimism and pessimism about the region’s
future. There is some optimism because parts of a unified regional agenda are evolving, and larger portions of the public are
acknowledging the need for regional actions. More specifically, this agenda includes:
• Creation of a regional transportation authority
• Transportation projects like a third crossing and rapid transit
• Work force development
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• K-12 education coordination among school systems
• City-state relationship improvement
• Reform of the tax structure.
Generally, people are pleased with the work of the Hampton Roads Partnership (HRP), a five-year-old agency which has
on its board of directors the mayors and chairs of the 16 cities and counties, plus numerous chief executive officers from
the military, education, and private and community sectors. The partnership has worked hard to define and publish a
strategic plan for the region. Education, work force, transportation and technology transfer have been priority subjects.
HRP has also been benchmarking Hampton Roads against other progressive regions.
However, pessimism exists about those business leaders and elected officials who are not at the table. Recent governors of the
Commonwealth have shown little or no interest in issues that affect cities, counties or regions, other than to curb local taxing
authorities at a time when the state’s coffers have been at historic highs and local governments have struggled. Even symbolic
actions, such as meeting with the Hampton Roads mayors and chairs, haven’t occurred, despite invitations.
As for the General Assembly, one experienced lobbyist commented that “it’s getting worse” in addressing governance problems.
She says cities, counties and towns are described by many legislators as “just another special-interest group.” And, it should be
noted, this class of special-interest groups does not contribute funds to their re-election campaigns!
Local elected officials sometimes complain that they are not involved in the “regional meetings” attended by the mayors and
chairs. This causes personal jealousies that stall or prevent discussions by governing bodies. One manager realistically noted that
“it is risky” for city managers to put regional matters on council dockets.
It is also rare for neighboring city councils or boards of supervisors to meet with each other. As examples, Virginia Beach has
met twice with one neighboring jurisdiction (Chesapeake) in the past 10 years. Norfolk has met once in the last 15 years with a
neighbor (Portsmouth). The records are better on the Peninsula.
Perhaps the most difficult dimension involves citizens. Relatively few citizens show active interest in regional issues, which is itself
a problem, and there is little or no citizen representation built into existing regional organizations.
If Hampton Roads is to find new understanding and knowledge big enough and friendly enough to address issues that have
gone unaddressed for so long, it will be helpful for the region to set out principles to guide its choices of options. These might
include:
• A desire for the region to function in a fashion that is open, self-organized, integrated (perhaps messy), adaptive and collaborative
• A commitment to build on assets – which are both tangible (e.g., roads, water) and intangible (sense of community and sense
of place)
• Transparency and lots of “sunshine” – an absence of secret deals
• Clear rules of engagement that respect people and institutions.

The Governor And The General Assembly
With these principles as a foundation, the agenda could be addressed to four main categories of participants: the governor,
General Assembly, local elected officials and citizens.
In preparing for his work, whichever of the “Marks” is elected governor, he will find good material from blue-ribbon citizen
groups already on the bookshelf. The commission that studied Virginia’s constitution in 1969 urged relaxation of the Dillon Rule.
The Governor’s Commission on the Future of Virginia in 1984 suggested the state should redo the boundaries of local jurisdictions. And, the recent Morris Commission urged tax reform.

R E G I O N A L I S M

A N D

T H E

D I L L O N

R U L E

113

What is needed is a gubernatorial action plan and the personal energy and commitment to ensure its success. Elements of such
a plan could include:
• Seeking expert advice
• Establishing a Citizens’ Commission on Governance and Tax Reform
• Hosting and presenting a plan of action to a state summit
• Revising, focusing and selling a plan of action
• Holding regular “regional” meetings.
The General Assembly may have the most difficult job. With the two houses still closely divided in political loyalties, this is
a historic opportunity for bipartisan leadership. A detailed business review of how the General Assembly does its work is
in order. The analysis could be done within the overall governance study suggested above, or the General Assembly could
establish a separate study, perhaps by a national firm.
However, legislators should design an approach that can be a model for the rest of us in how to solve problems for the future
that have been particularly intractable in the past. That would take uncommon leadership and give Virginia national notice.
Such an analysis should:
• Study and overhaul the decision-making processes
• Acknowledge regional performance is a “state problem”
• De-politicize governance discussions and institutions (e.g., cities, counties, Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission)
Local elected officials are important to regional performance. While mayors and chairs can represent localities in special ways,
regional progress will take heavy lifting by all officials.
Local elected officials must:
• Come to understand the notion that regions have become the most meaningful economic units in modern America
• Support regional approaches to problems
• Meet regularly with neighboring cities, counties and towns
• Set regular time on their own agendas for regional analysis and actions.

What Citizens Can Do
Citizenship was not a principal feature of either Gov. Byrd or John Dillon’s model of governance. The governor was trying to
install a political management system around troubled bureaucracies and Judge Dillon was reacting to local governments that
were being bought off or sidetracked by railroad barons. Both pushed citizenship into the background and vested central power
in the state, resisting the principle that local government should get its power from its own citizens. That principle is followed in
most other states.
Citizenship in Virginia has made its way back into the public-purpose realm with creative involvement in diverse ways, ranging
from community policing to Habitat for Humanity to teenage mentoring. However, the future may not work for all of us as well as
it can if we do not broaden citizenship to include a significant regional dimension. Citizens can:
• Come to understand the notion that regions have become the most meaningful economic units in modern America
• Support regional approaches to problems
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• Allocate time (e.g., Internet, television) to learn about the region and important regional issues
• Refuse to support elected officials and candidates who do not support regional approaches to problems.

Final Thoughts
The preceding agenda may strike some as both naïve and overreaching. Yet, consider the recent book Tipping Point, by
Malcolm Gladwell. Gladwell talks about major social changes (“social epidemics”) and how they occur. As he documents, frequently they are led by the efforts of a small number of individuals, many of whom were not famous beforehand. However, these
were individuals who were distinguished by their energy, commitment and connections to other individuals and groups. They
were “word of mouth” communicators who were influential not necessarily because of their wealth or elected status, but rather
because of the central role they played in their social and community circles. They are the people who have produced successful
campaigns for better schools, safer streets, mass transit, environmental cleanups and new college campuses. The point here is
not the specific content of their passions, but instead their advocacy, energy and commitment. They were “connectors” who were
inspired to tell their story.
Gladwell says he wrote the book in hope of making better sense of a world that doesn’t always make sense. It is hopeful – but
not unreasonable – to think that a few men and women can make the difference. Can there be a “tipping point” for Hampton
Roads? What the region needs now is exceptional interest and knowledge followed by passion and energy.
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BANKING
CHANGES

When The Banks Left Town:
The Impact Of Banking Changes
On Hampton Roads

O

ver the past two decades, but especially during the 1990s, banks headquartered in other states, usually North Carolina,
acquired the largest freestanding, independent commercial banks headquartered in Hampton Roads. Organizations such as

Bank of America, Sun Trust, First Union and Wachovia now dominate the banking scene in the region, rather than Sovran, Crestar
and others that either were headquartered in Hampton Roads or in Virginia.
So what? What effect has this wave of mergers and displacement of ownership had upon Hampton Roads? There are two
effects – one clear and demonstrable, and the other more arguable. The effect clearly supported by the evidence is an
absolute decline in banking employment in Virginia, accompanied by very modest increases in banking employment in
Hampton Roads, but dramatically below what has been the case in North Carolina. Further, relatively speaking, banking
wages and salaries have fallen in Virginia and Hampton Roads.
The effect that is arguable relates to a possible decline in the quality of banking services in Virginia and Hampton Roads
because of the mergers and ownership displacement. In fact, the reverse may be true.

Data On Commercial Banking In Virginia And
Hampton Roads
The primary source for information on the deposits of commercial banks, as well as the number of banks and offices (branches),
is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC), which reports such data on June 30 each year.
An important measure of commercial banking size and the general prosperity of banking organizations is the volume of their
deposits. Graph 1 displays the total deposits of commercial banking institutions by location of their headquarters, either in
Virginia or North Carolina. It is evident that deposits of commercial banks headquartered in North Carolina began to increase
in 1994, and that growth has accelerated since 1996. This is in sharp contrast to the situation of banks headquartered in
Virginia, where total deposits have either been stagnant or declining since 1994. However, it is worth noting that this was not
always the pattern. Historical data on deposits, beginning in 1934 and ending in 1990, are displayed in Graph 2. One can
see that during most of this period, the total deposits of Virginia and North Carolina banks were about the same, and in many
years Virginia’s deposits were slightly larger.
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GRAPH 1
TOTAL DEPOSITS OF COMMERCIAL BANKING INSTITUTIONS
BY LOCATION OF HEADQUARTERS
1991-1999
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GRAPH 2
TOTAL DEPOSITS OF COMMERCIAL BANKING INSTITUTIONS
BY LOCATION OF HEADQUARTERS
1934 - 1990
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An examination of the average deposits of the banks headquartered in North Carolina and Virginia, represented in Graphs 3, 4
and 5, reveals a dramatically opposite finding. Even since the late 1930s, average deposits of banks in North Carolina have
been higher than their counterparts in Virginia. The differences in these deposits have been growing ever since, a trend that has
been magnified since the middle 1990s.
The finding of larger total deposits and smaller average deposits in Virginia banks, when compared with those of North
Carolina (at least until 1990), can be explained by the fact that the number of banking institutions in Virginia has always been
greater than in North Carolina. In 1934, Virginia had 320 banking institutions, compared with 237 in North Carolina. Even
though the number of banking institutions has declined over time, both in Virginia and North Carolina, Virginia still had more
banking institutions than did its neighbor to the south. By 1990, Virginia had 178 banking institutions, compared with only 78
in North Carolina. The existence of larger, though fewer, banking institutions in North Carolina as compared to Virginia since
the late 1930s can be traced to the differences in banking laws and regulations in these two states.

Some History Of Banking Regulations
Until passage of the McFadden Act in 1927, branching of national banks was prohibited. The McFadden Act permitted establishment of new branches by member banks of the Federal Reserve System only within their head-office city. Further, these banks
were required to conform to the branching regulations in the state of their location. Essentially, this act put national banks and
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GRAPH 3
AVERAGE DEPOSITS PER COMMERCIAL BANKING INSTITUTION
BY LOCATION OF HEADQUARTERS
1934 - 1960
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state banks on equal footing by effectively prohibiting banks from branching out across state lines. The National Banking Act of
1933 made national banks subject to the same location restrictions imposed on state banks by state legislation.
Virginia banking legislation from 1928 through 1961 authorized additional de novo (new) branches only in the parent-bank city,
town or county. The legislation also permitted mergers, or purchases, in the same or adjoining county as the parent bank. Up
until 1962, only one state banking organization, the Bank of Virginia, participated in statewide branching, and it was allowed
to do so due to a grandfather clause in the legislation.
Bank holding companies, however, were not regulated under the Virginia Banking Code. A holding company could acquire a
bank as an affiliate and avoid state branching restrictions. The affiliate remained a separate unit of the holding company under
federal laws and under the supervision of the Federal Reserve System. The First Virginia Corp. (1949), a bank holding company
in Arlington, and Financial General (1925), a holding company in Washington, D.C., operated affiliates in several communities
in Northern Virginia. Nonetheless, Virginia remained primarily a unit banking state until 1962.
This is in sharp contrast to banking practices in North Carolina and Maryland, where statewide branching has been permitted
since the 1930s. Banks in North Carolina wishing to expand had a distinct advantage over their counterparts in Virginia, at
least until 1962, as the latter faced more restrictive legislation when it came to expansion.
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GRAPH 4
AVERAGE DEPOSITS PER COMMERCIAL BANKING INSTITUTION
BY LOCATION OF HEADQUARTERS
1961 - 1990
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In the early 1960s, banks in North Carolina, Maryland and the District of Columbia were larger than banks in Virginia. For
example, in 1962, the biggest bank in Virginia could offer a credit line of only $1.55 million. Richmond had four of the six
largest banks in the state, yet all four combined could offer a single entity no more than $4.95 million. By contrast, in any of 15
North Carolina cities, an industry could obtain $5 million in loans or a credit line from a single bank.
The 1962 Virginia legislation, the Buck-Holland Bill, opened a new era for banking in the Commonwealth. Virginia bankers
were now permitted to expand by merger or purchase by a holding company, or by a combination of the two methods in
any county, city or town within the state. However, merger or purchase were the only ways to accomplish rapid growth,
for the same act prohibited establishment of additional de novo branches outside the area of the parent bank.
Under the 1962 legislation, holding companies had obtained a distinct advantage in branching. This legislation restricted de
novo branches to the immediate area of an existing bank, while mergers were authorized on a statewide basis. As a result of
this, a bank merging into another community could not branch de novo in the area of the bank with which it merged. By contrast, a holding company could acquire a bank as an affiliate and the affiliate, which remained a separate bank, could continue
to branch de novo in its community.
The regulations restricting branching promoted the development of bank holding companies. They allowed these companies to
circumvent restrictive branching regulations, because the holding company could own a controlling interest in several banks even
if branching was not permitted. A bank holding company also could engage in other activities related to banking, such as the
provision of investment advice, data processing and transmission services, leasing, credit card services and servicing of loans in
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GRAPH 5
AVERAGE DEPOSITS PER COMMERCIAL BANKING INSTITUTION
BY LOCATION OF HEADQUARTERS
1991 - 1999
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other states. Further, the holding company could also issue commercial paper, allowing the bank to tap into other nondeposit
sources of funds.
The disparity in branching opportunities under the Buck-Holland Bill was eliminated by a change to the Virginia Banking Code in
1978. Now, merged banks as well as banks affiliated with holding companies were permitted to open new branches. This
change in legislation also provided an impetus for the creation of single-bank holding companies. The single-bank holding company formation enabled the banking organization to consolidate its operations and improve operating efficiency and management control.
Thus, at least until 1978, because of restricted branching opportunities, banking institutions in Virginia remained relatively small.
Even though holding companies were allowed to acquire additional banks as affiliates, the affiliates remained separate banks.
An affiliate was permitted to branch de novo only in its community, and therefore remained relatively small in size. In contrast,
banking institutions in North Carolina, which had been able to branch out statewide since the 1930s, continued to grow larger
and larger, as measured by their deposits. As a result, the disparity in size among banks in Virginia and North Carolina continued to widen.
Another advantage of bank holding companies was that many states allowed bank holding companies headquartered in other
states to purchase banks in their states. In 1975, Maine enacted the first interstate banking legislation that allowed out-of-state
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bank holding companies to purchase banks in that state. In 1982, Massachusetts enacted a regional compact with other New
England states to allow interstate banking. In addition, starting in 1982, bank holding companies were permitted to purchase
out-of-state banks that were failing. For example, bank holding companies headquartered in New York, Ohio, North Carolina,
Michigan and California gained entry into Texas by purchasing failing institutions in that state.
In 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that interstate acquisitions by holding companies were legal. In Northeast Bancorp vs.
Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159 (1985), the Supreme Court upheld the right of a state to authorize acquisitions of banks
within its boundaries by bank holding companies headquartered in another state with which it had reciprocal legislative arrangements. Virginia joined with 12 southeastern states, Maryland and District of Columbia to permit such acquisitions within their
compact. The 12 southeastern states were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia and West Virginia. As a result, three Virginia banks, United Virginia, Signet and
Sovran, began expanding beyond Virginia’s borders for the first time. Out-of-state banks located in this “compact” region were
also in a position to expand their activities in Virginia. By the early 1990s, all states allowed some form of interstate banking.
The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 extended the regional compacts to the entire nation
and overturned the McFadden Act and the Douglas Amendment’s prohibition of interstate banking. Not only did this act allow
bank holding companies to acquire banks in any other state, notwithstanding any state laws to the contrary, but it also allowed
bank holding companies to merge the banks they owned into one bank with branches in different states.
Although interstate banking was accomplished previously by the out-of-state purchase of banks by bank holding companies, up
until 1994 interstate branching was virtually nonexistent because very few states had enacted interstate branching legislation.
Now, nationwide banks are beginning to emerge. The merger of Bank of America and NationsBank in 1998 created the first
bank with branches on both coasts.

The Impact Of The 1994 Act On Bank Deposits In
Virginia And North Carolina
An examination of deposits of commercial banking offices, including branches and head offices, reveals significant
increases in deposits from 1994 to 2000 for both Virginia and North Carolina. However, these deposits increased at a
much faster rate in North Carolina than in Virginia. In 1994, deposits of commercial banking offices located in North
Carolina, as displayed in Graph 6, were $60.19 billion compared with $57.55 billion in Virginia, a difference of only 4.6
percent. By 2000, deposits in North Carolina exceeded those in Virginia by 41.8 percent, and while deposits in Virginia
increased to $76.06 billion, those in North Carolina climbed to $107.82 billion.
The significant increase in deposits in North Carolina since 1997 is primarily due to the fact that large accounts typically get
reported by the head office regardless of the location of the office where the actual deposits are made. For example, in 1998
NationsBank, based in Charlotte, merged with Bank of America, headquartered in San Francisco, but the headquarters of the
new merged bank moved to Charlotte. This led to an increase in deposits reported by the main office in Charlotte from $.70 billion in 1997 to $13.88 billion in 1998, and later to $22.42 billion in 2000. The acquisition of banks in many other states by
North Carolina banks, through holding companies since the late 1980s, had prepared these companies to take full advantage
of interstate branching possibilities provided by the 1994 act. This act led to the emergence of the so-called “super-regional”
banks based in North Carolina. Large deposits of headquarters of their bank holding companies located in other states and previously accounted in those states now began to be reported in North Carolina.
Graph 7 shows the distribution of deposits of commercial banking offices by location of their headquarters. In Virginia, deposits
of commercial banking offices headquartered in Virginia actually declined from $57.55 billion in 1994 to $34.75 billion in
2000. In North Carolina, on the other hand, deposits increased from $60.19 billion to $106.44 billion during the same
period. Banking offices headquartered in Virginia accounted for 100 percent of all Virginia deposits in 1994, but this percentage declined to 45.68 percent in 2000. That is, in the space of six years, more than half of all banking deposits in
Virginia were acquired by out-of-state banks.
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GRAPH 6
TOTAL DEPOSITS OF COMMERCIAL BANKING OFFICES
1994 - 2000
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Comparable figures for North Carolina for the same years are 100 percent and 98.71 percent, respectively. Hence, banks
headquartered in that state control nearly all banking deposits in North Carolina. The interstate branching possibilities provided
by the 1994 act and the fact that several major North Carolina Bank holding companies had already acquired banks in other
states, including Virginia, were responsible for the sharp decrease in the deposits of commercial bank offices headquartered in
Virginia.
This does not necessarily imply that the availability of banking services in Virginia declined from 1994 to 2000. During this
period, as described above, total deposits of banking offices in Virginia increased from $57.55 billion to $76.06 billion, or by
one-third. Moreover, the number of banking offices in Virginia increased from 2,067 in 1994 to 2,278 in 2000, or roughly by
10 percent. The number of banking offices in North Carolina increased from 2,281 to 2,290 for the same period. The number
of banking facilities in Virginia is now comparable to that of North Carolina.
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GRAPH 7
TOTAL DEPOSITS OF COMMERCIAL BANKING OFFICES HEADQUARTERED IN STATE
1994 - 2000
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Bank Deposits In Hampton Roads, 1981 To 2000
Total deposits in Hampton Roads, exclusive of Currituck County in North Carolina, are displayed in Graph 8. They increased
from $3.13 billion in 1981 to $10.35 billion in 2000, or more than 330 percent in 20 years. The number of banking offices
for the same period also increased from 288 to 373. Of particular interest are the declines in deposits from 1991 to 1993, but
a substantial increase in deposits from 1998 to 1999.
These deposits declined from $8.98 billion in 1991 to $8.22 billion in 1992 and declined further to $7.52 billion in 1993
before reversing this trend the following year. The primary reason for this decline was the acquisition of C&S/Sovran Bank,
headquartered in Norfolk and Atlanta, by North Carolina National Bank. The new merged bank was called NationsBank and
its headquarters were located in Charlotte; the Virginia banking operations became known as NationsBank of Virginia N.A.
Thus, large deposits, which used to be reported out of the Norfolk office were being reported out of the Richmond office until
September 1995 and out of the Charlotte office thereafter.
Total deposits increased from $8.94 billion in 1998 to $10.33 billion in 1999, a jump of $1.37 billion in only one year. Most
of this can be attributed to the acquisition of two thrift institutions, First Coastal Bank and Life Savings Bank, by Centura Bank
and Branch Banking and Trust Co. of Virginia, respectively. The deposits of these two thrift institutions in 1999 were $1.11 billion. Finally, total deposits in 2000 would have increased by another $480 million if CENIT Bank, a thrift institution, had not
acquired Cenit Bank, a commercial bank, in 2000. These deposits will appear again for Hampton Roads in 2002 after
SouthTrust, an Alabama-based bank, completes its acquisition of CENIT in late 2001.
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GRAPH 8
DEPOSITS OF COMMERCIAL BANKING INSTITUTIONS IN HAMPTON ROADS
BY LOCATION OF OFFICES AND HEADQUARTERS
1981 - 2000
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Although interstate banking was accomplished previously by the out-of-state purchase of banks by bank holding companies, up
until 1994 interstate branching was virtually nonexistent. Graph 8 also shows deposits of banking institutions headquartered in
Virginia. It appears from this graph that out-of-state banks started to enter the Hampton Roads market only after 1995. Prior to
1996, deposits of banks headquartered in Virginia were identical to their total deposits. The deposits of banks headquartered in
Virginia began to decline beginning in 1996. Banking institutions headquartered in Virginia accounted for 81.4 percent of total
deposits in 1996, and their share fell to 40.8 percent in 2000.
However, out-of-state bank holding companies began to enter Virginia in the mid-1980s and Hampton Roads in the 1990s. For
example, NationsBank of Virginia was formed in 1992 and its parent organization was in Charlotte. Likewise, even though First
Union’s subsidiary in Virginia was formed in 1984, it entered Hampton Roads in 1994 and Branch Banking and Trust Co. of
Virginia came into existence in 1997. Graph 9 shows total banking deposits in Hampton Roads as well as deposits of parent
organizations based in Virginia. Deposits of these institutions began to decline after 1991. In 1992, their share of total
deposits in Hampton Roads was 69.8 percent, a share that had declined to 25.2 percent by 2000.
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GRAPH 9
DEPOSITS OF COMMERCIAL BANKING INSTITUTIONS IN HAMPTON ROADS
BY LOCATION OF OFFICES AND PARENT ORGANIZATION
1981 - 2000
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So What? What Difference Has It Made?
What have we found thus far? The total deposits of banking offices located in Hampton Roads and the Commonwealth of
Virginia, as well as the number of banking offices available to Virginia residents, have increased substantially since the 1980s.
However, at least since 1992, deposits of banking organizations based in Virginia have declined significantly in Hampton
Roads. Further, deposits of commercial banks headquartered in Virginia have declined both in Hampton Roads and the state
since 1996. What difference has this made? We now will examine banking employment, banking wages and banking service
to find the answer.

BANKING EMPLOYMENT, WAGES AND SALARIES
Data on banking industry employment and wages (available only for 1990 to 1999) indicate that total employment in banking
institutions in Hampton Roads increased from 6,766 in 1990 to 7,139 in 1999, or 5.51 percent. However, banking employment in Virginia during the same period actually declined from 39,401 to 38,329, or 2.72 percent. Interestingly, during the
same time period, banking employment in North Carolina increased by 48.79 percent – from 34,628 in 1990 to 55,106 in
1999. Nationally, during the same time period, banking employment declined by 6.28 percent.
What does this tell us? First, the declines in banking employment in Virginia and nationally reflect the wave of banking mergers
that apparently created economies of scale in banking operations (especially those depending on information technology) such
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that fewer banking employees were needed to handle even larger amounts of banking business. Second, Hampton Roads did
not do badly in this situation, at least in terms of employment, though a possible reason banking employment did not decline in
Hampton Roads is its banks were undersized and relatively less efficient than those elsewhere. Some observers view this good
employment news as bad news, indicative of inefficient bank sizes. Third, North Carolina conquered all of these trends and
experienced a solid gain in banking employment.
Given that banking employment was stagnant or falling in Virginia and Hampton Roads during the 1990s, what was happening
to the wages and salaries paid to banking employees? Graph 10 displays average annual wages and salaries in the banking
industry from 1990 to 1999 for Hampton Roads, Virginia, North Carolina and the United States. Wages and salaries in
banking grew in all four areas during this period. However, one can see that the rate of growth in wages varied substantially
among the areas. For example, banking wages and salaries increased by roughly 53 percent in Hampton Roads and Virginia
during this period. For the entire country, however, the wages and salaries increased by 62.5 percent, and in North Carolina
by an astounding 82.3 percent. It is apparent in Graph 10 that average banking wages and salaries in North Carolina first
began to exceed U.S. average wages for the first time in 1997, and the differences have accelerated since then. Of course,
this was coincident with the wave of banking mergers and consolidations that made Charlotte one of the most important
banking centers in the United States.

GRAPH 10
AVERAGE ANNUAL WAGES
IN COMMERCIAL BANKING ESTABLISHMENTS
1990 - 1999
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The impact upon the Commonwealth and Hampton Roads has been large, and negative. In 1990, annual banking wages and
salaries at commercial banking institutions in Virginia were 12 percent lower than those nationally. By 1999, Virginia trailed the
rest of the country by 17.4 percent. In Hampton Roads, banking wages and salaries fell from 82.9 percent of the U.S. average
to 78.2 percent for the same time period. By contrast, banking wages and salaries in North Carolina increased from 92.9 percent of the national average to 104.2 percent of the national average in 1999.
Thus, during the 1990s, banking has not been a growth leader in Virginia or Hampton Roads. Rather than accumulating
attractive banking jobs paying relatively high salaries, Virginia and Hampton Roads have trailed the nation, and especially
their neighbor, North Carolina. If there is a winner in the wave of banking mergers and consolidations that has occurred
nationally, it is the Tar Heel State. North Carolina has utilized commercial banking as a growth industry and has made
substantial gains in this arena compared to the nation, Virginia and Hampton Roads. Most of the gains can be attributed to
the development and growth of the so-called “super-regional” banks based in North Carolina. However, it must be noted
that the banks in North Carolina had been larger in size, not just in the 1990s, but ever since 1930s. Through the acquisition
of banks in many other states since late 1980s, these institutions already were larger and hence were well prepared to take full
advantage of interstate branching possibilities provided by the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of
1994.

BANKING SERVICES
Banking service, as defined here, refers not only to whether banking employees are courteous and facilities easy to use, but also
to the range of products offered and the competitiveness of the prices of these products. The large, national, banks now located
in Hampton Roads presumably offer a wider range of banking products (accounts, trust, loans, brokerage, etc.) than their smaller
predecessors in Hampton Roads did. The large national banks also offer a wider variety of investment opportunities and trust
services than most smaller banks do and presumably have access to larger pools of capital. Thus, they can offer larger loans
and arguably can be more competitive in terms of interest rates. Whether they actually do offer more attractive interest rates, of
course, is an empirical question, and one to which the answer is not clear. There is mixed evidence nationally concerning the
interest rates large banks offer on loans and savings vs. the rates offered by smaller banks.
What does seem relatively more clear, however, is that the Commonwealth and Hampton Roads suffered for many decades from
banking policies that discouraged branching and diminished the size of individual banks. Consequently, banks in Virginia and
Hampton Roads were unable to offer the range of products that banks in other states could offer. It is not abundantly clear that
this had a negative effect on economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s, though it hardly could have been positive.
Consequently, Virginia and Hampton Roads fell prey to larger, acquisition-minded banks in other states that could tell stockholders their shares would be worth more after merger, and assure customers that the range of products available to them would
improve at the same time. While some of the customers of the newly merged national banks have taken their business to smaller,
regional and local banks – and there always will be a niche for such banks – the concentration of banking deposits, even at the
retail consumer level, remains at these large, national banks, and deposits continue to increase. There is no groundswell of bank
customers leaving the national banks that no longer are headquartered in Hampton Roads. Hence, few individuals are willing to
argue that the former banking structure of Virginia and Hampton Roads was more efficient because the market appears to be
delivering opposite signals. The national banks may not always offer the personalized service of the community banks, but more
and more customers now do their banking via ATMs and over the Internet, and therefore personalized service is less of a concern to them.

Summary
Deposits of banking offices located in Hampton Roads and the Commonwealth of Virginia (whether or not they are headquartered here) have increased substantially since the 1980s. Further, banking facilities available to Virginia residents, as measured
by the number of banking offices, have also increased over time. But, deposits of banking organizations based in Virginia have
declined significantly both in Hampton Roads and Virginia. The result has been a very modest growth in employment for
Hampton Roads and a slight decline in employment for the state. In addition, increases in wages have been much slower in
Hampton Roads or Virginia when compared with North Carolina.
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It appears that the era of very large, regional banks headquartered in Virginia is over. Both Hampton Roads and the
Commonwealth of Virginia are likely to have super-regional banks headquartered outside of Virginia while at the same
time have several community banks serving the needs of Virginia residents. The major negative impact of this arrangement
is upon banking employment and banking wages and salaries, both of which have stagnated when compared to North
Carolina. Some individuals believe public-policy choices make little difference in their lives. However, the information presented
here is visible evidence that this is not so. Virginia chose a specific path in banking many decades ago, and now is paying the
price.
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K-12 PRIVATE
SCHOOLS

A Look At The Alternative: Private
And Independent K-12 Schools

P

rivate and independent K-12 schools are a vital and major component of American education, both in Hampton Roads and
throughout the nation. Of the more than 115,000 schools in the United States, 27,223 (or approximately 24 percent) are “pri-

vate” (a label often used as a shorthand for private and independent). Of the nation’s approximately 53 million students, 6 million
(about 11 percent) attend private schools. According to the Projections of Education Statistics to 2010 released by the National
Center for Education Statistics in August 2000, total K-12 enrollment is expected to increase to 53.5 million in 2005 and then
start a slow movement downward. Assuming that future private-school enrollment patterns will mirror those of public schools, this
suggests private-elementary enrollment has just about reached its peak. Secondary enrollment, however, is projected to jump 8 percent between 2000 and 2006.
Hampton Roads is home to 167 private secondary schools that complement public schools in the region by providing a
wide variety of K-12 educational opportunities. In addition to the students in these schools, a growing number of students
are being schooled at home.
The data reported here are based on the Private School Universe Study, produced by the U.S. Department of Education,
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), and a survey of 63 schools in the region that are members of the Virginia
Council for Private Education (VCPE). The VCPE is an amalgamation of 13 separate associations, with each association representing a distinctive type of private school; one example would be church-affiliated schools. All VCPE members must be nonprofit
and have a racially nondiscriminatory membership policy. While there are certainly excellent schools that are not members,
VCPE is the only organization that has recognition from the Virginia Board of Education and it supervises the critical task of overseeing the accreditation of private elementary and secondary schools in Virginia.

The Schools
The term “private school” is often used to describe all nonpublic schools, and the two terms can be used interchangeably.
Within these broader categories are parochial/religious schools (Catholic and other religious schools); independent schools
(those that are independently governed and receive no funding from churches or other organizations); and schools affiliated with
other organizations. Most private schools are nonprofit organizations, but some are proprietary, or “for profit.” Schools are further differentiated by program, with most offering traditional programs, but some provide special-emphasis programs, such as
Montessori, and others emphasize particular facilities such as special-education accommodations.
According to the NCES Private School Universe Study, of the 27,223 private elementary and secondary schools in the United
States in the fall of 1999, 22 percent were nonsectarian, 30 percent were Catholic and 48 percent were other religious
schools (Baptist, Lutheran and the like). The South, reflecting its history of racial segregation, is the region with the most private
schools – 30 percent of the total.
In Virginia, 606 private schools were reported in the NCES study, representing 24 percent of the Commonwealth’s 2,540
schools. In Hampton Roads, however, private schools represent 30 percent of the total. The following table compares numbers
of public and private schools in Hampton Roads, enrollment by city/county and numbers of students educated at home.
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TABLE 1
Public and Private Schools and Enrollment in Hampton Roads

Chesapeake
Franklin
Gloucester
Hampton
Isle of Wight
Mathews
Newport News
Norfolk
Poquoson
Portsmouth
Southampton
Suffolk
Surry
Virginia Beach
Williamsburg/
James City County
York
Total

Number
of Public
Schools
44
3
10
47
8
3
44
61
4
29
7
18
3
83

Number
of Private
Schools
17
2
2
19
2
na
27
31
1
10
1
2
na
40

Total
Schools

Enrollment
in Private
Schools K-12
2,842
179
201
2,069
631
0
3,727
5,146
12
1,384
355
1,076
0
5,492

HomeEducated
Students K-12*
490
31
103
267
139
4
203
318
27
138
37
150
28
665

Total
Students

61
5
12
66
10
3
71
92
5
39
8
20
3
123

Enrollment
in Public
Schools K-12
36,436
7,023
6,576
23,293
4,873
1,292
30,646
35,586
2,483
16,187
2,791
11,304
1,187
77,221

10
19
393

7
6
167

17
25
560

8,091
11,618
276,607

1,144
314
24,572

134
124
2,858

9,369
12,056
304,037

39,768
7,233
6,880
25,629
5,643
1,296
34,576
41,050
2,522
17,709
3,183
12,530
1,215
83,378

Source: NCES Private School Universe Survey, 1999; NCES Public School Universe Study, 1999: Virginia Department of Education Report of Fall
Membership, 1999; Virginia Home Education Association Fall 2000 Virginia Home Education Statistics; and, 2001 Survey of VCPE Schools in Hampton
Roads. All data are for 1999 except the data for home-educated students, which are from 2000.

The Students
In 1999, approximately 5.2 million students were enrolled in private schools in the United States, representing 10 percent of the
total elementary, middle and secondary school students. Nationally, more students were enrolled in Catholic schools (49 percent) than in other religious schools (36 percent). Sixteen percent of the students enrolled in private schools attended nonsectarian schools. Thirty-one percent of all private-school students were in the South.
In Virginia, 88,581 students attended 606 private schools, accounting for 7 percent of the 221,797 students enrolled in K12 schools in 1999. In Hampton Roads, private-school students comprised 8 percent of the total number of enrolled students. Since 30 percent of all schools in Hampton Roads are private, this reveals that the typical private school is
substantially smaller in size than the typical public school.
Of the VCPE schools offering classes through the 12th grade, 92 percent of their students in the class of 2001 were collegebound, with 85 percent matriculating at a four-year college or university, and 7 percent planning to attend a two-year college.
Minority students comprised 22 percent of the fall 1999 enrollment in private schools nationwide as reported in the NCES
survey. Table 2 compares minority enrollment nationally, in the South and in Hampton Roads.
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TABLE 2
Fall 1999 Minority Enrollment in Private Schools

White, Non-Hispanic
Black, Non-Hispanic
Hispanic
American Indian/
Alaskan Native
Asian/Pacific Islander
Total Minority

United States
78.2 percent
9 percent
7.8 percent

Southern United States
80 percent
9.8 percent
7.2 percent

Hampton Roads
81.3 percent
10.5 percent
2.3 percent

0.5 percent
4.5 percent
21.8 percent

0.3 percent
2.6 percent
20 percent

0.3 percent
5.5 percent
18.6 percent

Source: (NCES) Private School Universe Study, 1999

School Programs
Private schools actively help shape the area’s educational agenda. They are a microcosm of the diversity of beliefs and
varieties of education philosophies, and reflect the remarkable pluralism of options in American education. Approximately
66 percent of Hampton Roads private schools have a religious orientation, with the largest group composed of those affiliated with the Baptist church. The diversity of private-school options in Hampton Roads is seen in the wide variety of the religious schools, including other Christian, Jewish and Islamic schools. Thirty-four percent are nonsectarian, including “independent”
schools. The schools encompass different missions and different governance structures. Some are recently founded; the oldest
traces its history to 1728.
It is very difficult to generalize about the programs of private schools in Hampton Roads. Suffice to say, there is more diversity
and variability in the programming of private schools in Hampton Roads than in the public schools. This stands to reason,
because specific private schools often were created as a means to establish alternatives to public education. Programs available
for nonpublic-school students vary depending on the type of school, and from school to school. Some offer a more traditional
curriculum than one currently sees in public education, while others are highly experimental. Some offer a highly competitive academic atmosphere with strong emphasis on grades and class standing, while others provide a more nurturing environment.
Technology has a significant impact on budgets, curriculum and professional-development activities. Of the schools responding to
the VCPE survey, the ratio of students to computers is 8:1, and 50 percent of the classrooms have at least one Internet-connected
computer. Public schools nationwide reported a 5:1 ratio of students to computers, and 77 percent of classrooms with at least
one Internet-connected classroom in a 2000 technology survey conducted by NCES. Thus, the typical private school has less
technology available than the typical public school. This underlines the “nonstandard” approach of private schools to K-12 education. Some deliberately choose to avoid reliance upon technology in the teaching-learning process.
According to a survey of VCPE schools in Hampton Roads, advanced placement (AP) courses are offered by 60 percent of private secondary schools, with 9.2 being the median number of courses offered. Some schools offer as many as 18 AP courses.
One independent school in the region intends to offer the highly rigorous International Baccalaureate Program.
Athletics are an important part of middle and secondary school programs, and the same sports played in public schools (and
sometimes others) are offered in most private secondary schools. The schools compete against each other in several privateschool leagues, and on occasion they also compete against their public-school counterparts.
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Teachers
Teacher education requirements for nonpublic schools are not prescribed by the state or localities in Virginia, and may vary from
school to school. However, the associations that accredit their member schools develop their own standards and the Virginia
State Board of Education recognizes these standards through the school and association membership in VCPE. Thus, private
schools have great flexibility in selecting their roster of teachers and are more likely than public schools to employ people with
considerable experience in a specific disciplinary area (for example, music) who may not be certified to teach in a public
school. Most observers view this as a plus.
The Virginia State Board of Education does offer state licensure to qualified nonpublic-school teachers, and several schools in
Hampton Roads require their teachers and other professional staff to be licensed by the state. Teacher qualifications developed
by accrediting associations are often similar to the state standards. Associations generally accept state licensure – in some cases
with additional qualifications that must be met as well – as meeting the association’s requirement for teachers in its member
schools.
Contrary to the notion that private-school teachers are paid more than their public-school counterparts, such is not usually
the case. While some private schools pay their professional staffs salaries equivalent to public-school salaries, many pay
significantly less. Table 3 displays 2000 public-school teacher salary ranges in Hampton Roads cities listed by the Virginia
Education Association, compared with the ranges reported by VCPE schools.
Table 4 contains faculty experience/average salary information from the VCPE survey of private schools in Hampton Roads. Two
of every five private-school teachers have five or fewer years of experience and their average level of experience is 10.5 years.
Their mean annual salary level is slightly less than $29,000. Thus, private-school teachers are about as experienced as publicschool teachers, but (on average) earn substantially less. The VCPE survey also indicates that 40.7 percent of all private-school
teachers hold a graduate degree. This is less than the comparable percentage for public schools, where salary schedules place
a premium on master’s degree attainment.
Table 5 reports students-to-teacher ratios in Hampton Roads schools. In 13 of 14 cases where data are available, the ratios
in private schools are smaller than those for the public schools in the same city. For example, in the region’s largest school
district, Virginia Beach, the private-school students-to-teacher ratio is 11.9, whereas it is 14.7 in the city’s public schools.
These data are consistent with the notion that small class sizes and individual student attention are among the most important reasons why parents choose to send their children to private schools.
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TABLE 3
2000-2001 Public- and Private-School Teacher Salary Ranges
Hampton Roads
Communities
Chesapeake
Franklin
Gloucester
Hampton
Isle of Wight
Mathews
Newport News
Norfolk
Poquoson
Portsmouth
Southampton
Suffolk
Surry
Williamsburg/
James City County
Virginia Beach
York

Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private

Minimum
Salaries
$29,790
18,000
30,589
na
28,112
na
29250
22,887
27,815
na
27,515
na
29,178
17,900
30,000
18,000
26,997
na
28,877
18,500
27,800
na
29,318
24,300
30,000
na

Maximum
Salaries
$61,891
38,712
48,933
na
48,893
na
50,689
27,432
53,887
na
40,515
na
56,727
48,451
51,100
66,994
52,804
na
61,464
24,000
49,699
na
48,714
48,599
51,398
na

Average
Salaries
$39,800
23,600
36,572
na
35,466
na
37,264
24,300
39,481
na
31,713
na
36,753
30,400
37,663
37,000
39,591
na
36.599
30,900
35,201
na
36,961
33,100
38,738
na

Public
Private
Public
Private
Public
Private

28,500
na
29,750
21,500
29,018
na

59,097
na
53.910
49,356
49,137
na

39,215
na
40,351
29,700
38,050
na

17,900

66,994

28,300

23,372

62,993

40,399

Private Schools in
Hampton Roads
Public Schools
in Virginia

Source: 2001 Survey of VCPE Schools; Virginia Education Association: 2000-2001 Salary Schedules for Teachers; Virginia Department of Education
2000-2001 Teacher Salary Survey Results.
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TABLE 4
2000 Private-School Experience/Salary
Experience

Percentage of
Full-Time Teachers
40.9%
20.3%
13.5%
10.6%
14.7%

1-5 years
6-10 years
1-15 years
16-20 years
21 + years

Mean Salary of
Teachers in the Group
$24,200
$29,300
$29,800
$32,500
$38,200

Source: 2001 Survey of VCPE Schools

TABLE 5
Students-to-Teacher Ratios in Hampton Roads Schools

Chesapeake
Franklin
Gloucester
Hampton
Isle of Wight
Mathews
Newport News
Norfolk
Poquoson
Portsmouth
Southampton
Suffolk
Surry
Virginia Beach
Williamsburg/James City County
York

Private Schools
11.4
10.6
13.0
11.4
12.5
—
12.3
9.6
7.5
9.3
12.9
9.9
—
11.9
14.5
20.6

Public Schools
15.1
12.1
14.3
13.9
14.2
13.4
14.8
13.7
15.3
13.4
12.7
14.2
12.9
14.7
13.9
15.6

Source: (NCES) Private School Universe Survey, 1999; 1999-2000 Salary Schedule for Teachers, Virginia Education Association, February 2000
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Funding And Programatic Information
Studies of public perceptions of private schools indicate that the public perceives private-school students to be from financially
affluent families. However, according to the report on Social and Economic Characteristics of Students released in October
1998 by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, 81 percent of K-12 students from families with annual incomes of $75,000 or more
attend public schools. That is, only 19 percent of these students from more affluent families attend private schools. Among all
private-school students, less than a third are from families with incomes at or above $75,000. These data may surprise
some; however, it should be remembered that private schools, especially those sponsored by religious denominations in
large cities, tend to enroll many students who come from lower-income families. Note that this does not necessarily imply the
typical student attending an independent private school has a similar financial background.
Most schools provide some need-based financial aid to their students. The National Association of Independent Schools reports
that member schools provided need-based aid to more than 16 percent of their students in 1999, with the average grant being
over $7,000. In Hampton Roads, 90 percent of the schools responding to the survey question grant financial aid. Ten schools in
Hampton Roads, which are members of the Virginia Association of Independent Schools, provided a total $3.36 million in
need-based aid in the 2000-01 school year.
While school-funding formulae vary by type of school and from school to school, most private schools depend on tuition revenue
to fund the bulk of school operations. Some parochial schools receive funding from the religious organizations with which they
are affiliated. However, private schools are tuition-driven and hence their ability to attract and retain students is critical to their
survival and prosperity. Contrast this to the typical public-school district, where the financial impact of losing a student is not as
immediate, and generally is smaller in magnitude in any case.
Tuition rates vary widely in Hampton Roads private schools, as they do nationally. As Table 6 illustrates, tuition is higher in high
schools than in elementary and elementary/middle schools. It also is true that tuition is generally higher in the independent
schools than in the church-related schools.

TABLE 6
Average Tuition Rates in Hampton Roads Private Schools, 2000-2001
Grades
Rates

K-3
$4,410

4-6
$4,840

7-8
$5,300

9-10
$6,120

11-12
$6,370

Source: 2001 Survey of VCPE School Hampton Roads Schools

Some federal programs allocate funds, usually channeled through state or local governments, to nonpublic schools for specific
purposes, with funding usually based on the number of students. This funding is an infinitesimal percentage of the total school
budget, and some private schools will not accept the funding because of a concern that accepting any government funding, no
matter how small, could lead to government involvement in the operation of the school.
While Hampton Roads has not seen the appearance of publicly funded private schools, there is a growing national tendency to
do so, as reported in a draft study on accreditation being conducted by the National Association of Independent Schools:
“Current and contemplated state actions challenge traditional relationships between the public and private educational communities. New publicly funded educational initiatives are blurring the lines between public and private schooling as, for example, states are creating magnet boarding public schools and chartering
mission-driven schools deriving funding support from (both) public and private sources. Legislative bodies are
expanding the scope of public oversight in education with an inevitable diminishment of the autonomy and
independence granted to even nonpublic schools.”
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Of course, public support of private schools, especially those sponsored by religious groups, poses significant constitutional
questions. It is an issue that provokes emotional responses, not the least because that support frequently has been postulated in the form of tuition vouchers. There appears to be considerable public support, especially among minority citizens
and in large cities, for some form of tuition voucher system. Such a system would help parents pay to send their children to
private schools and introduce additional competition into K-12 education. However, public-teacher unions and their political
confederates have come to regard this issue worthy of a fight to the bitter end.
Private schools typically engage in a variety of fund-raising activities to provide financial and in-kind support to supplement tuition
revenue and help keep the cost of tuition lower. Some schools report that as much as 15 percent of operational expenses are
met by contributions realized from fund raising.
Capital improvements – specifically new construction, modernization of buildings, purchase and replacement of major equipment
and maintaining endowments – are funded by capital fund-raising efforts. Tuition revenue is rarely sufficient for capital improvements, and funds are raised primarily from constituents of the school – parents, alumni, relatives and friends of the school – and
from endowments. As in the case of funding for operations, some schools get money from churches or affiliated organizations,
and there are private foundations and corporations that provide some resources for capital improvements. Constituents, however,
provide the bulk of the resources.
Private schools have significant impacts on the local economy. One such impact relates to the costs private schools enable
taxpayers to avoid. In Hampton Roads, school divisions do not have to build, maintain and operate schools for the region’s
27,430 nonpublic-school students. One way to measure the magnitude of this contribution is to examine private-school
operating budgets. In 2000-01, the private schools in the region had an estimated total operating budget of more than
$130 million, of which an estimated $80 million was payroll. It is reasonable to assume that taxpayers would have to bear
all of these costs (or more) if no private schools existed.
Further, 31 regional private schools reported having spent $66 million on construction and capital improvements in the past
three years. And, 31 schools indicated they plan to spend $50 million on construction and capital improvements over the next
three to five years. To some considerable extent, these capital expenditures would have to be financed by taxpayers were there
no private schools in Hampton Roads and all private-school students began to attend public schools.

Accountability
Accountability remains a high-interest topic in education, no less so as applied to private schools. Typically, parents invest significant time and energy in identifying and applying to a private school and back their decision with tuition checks. Hence,
accountability is a daily, crucial concern for private schools. Since parents and students who are not satisfied with the school
may choose to withdraw their support, private schools that are not successful in meeting the needs of their constituency fail.
While nearly all private schools are nonprofit in nature, they face the same bottom-line financial test as any for-profit business.
Revenue must cover expenditures, or the enterprise will fail.
Standardized tests are one means of holding schools accountable. The Standards of Learning (SOL) tests are the “high visibility”
standardized test in Virginia and Hampton Roads. Virginia public schools are required by legislative mandate to administer SOL
tests, but private schools do not participate in SOL testing. However, the survey of VCPE schools reveals extensive use of nationally normed standardized tests to assess the progress of students. Among those frequently used are the Educational Records
Bureau Tests, the Stanford Achievement Tests, Terra Nova, Assessment of Catholic Religious Education Tests, the Metropolitan
Readiness Test, Brigance, and the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills. Many schools also place emphasis upon the Preliminary Scholastic
Aptitude Test, given annually throughout the country to college-bound students in October. Others focus upon the annual national
language exams in Latin, French, Spanish and German. Still others encourage students to take the College Board Advanced
Placement Exams. Private-school parents pay close attention to such scores and often shop around to find the school they believe
is most likely to produce superior scores for their children. Shopping in response to test scores, then, is much more common in
private schools than in public schools.
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Accreditation by state, regional and national organizations is another way private schools are held accountable to their constituents and to the accrediting associations to which they belong. Accreditation allows schools to maintain their independence,
while providing credibility and accountability by complying with demanding standards for all aspects of instruction, administration and governance. The Virginia Board of Education recognizes private schools that are accredited by one or more of the
accrediting associations that are members of the Virginia Council of Private Education.

Reasons For Choosing A Private School
The 1999 Public Opinion Poll conducted by the National Association of Independent Schools revealed that 77 percent of the
Virginia respondents rated the quality of local public schools overall as “excellent” or “good,” with only 3 percent rating
the quality of public schools as “poor.” Similarly, the poll found that when respondents were asked about educational preferences without regard to cost or proximity, 49 percent would send their children to public schools even if the costs or
proximity were not factors in deterring attendance at a private school.
The reasons why parents and students choose private school are varied. When asked about educational preferences without
regard to cost or proximity, 58 percent of the respondents in the National Public Opinion Poll indicated they would send their
children to private schools. Of these, 28 percent said they would choose a parochial school, and 30 percent an independent
school without religious affiliation. The principal reason for the choice of those who selected parochial options was a clear preference for attention to religious and moral issues (41 percent). The key reason cited for choosing independent schools was small
classes and individual attention (35 percent). For respondents choosing public schools, the most frequently cited reason was a
perceived lack of diversity at independent schools (20 percent). Twelve percent felt that independent schools do not offer education that is noticeably better than what is available at public school.
The poll highlighted different public perceptions of public and private schools. In many areas, poll respondents saw relatively
little difference in the student performances generated by public and independent schools. However, there were some areas
where differences in the perceptions of the two school categories were seen. Public schools were perceived as outperforming
independent schools in the following areas:
• Having students from a range of cultures, races and income groups
• Having students involved in athletics and sports
• Being visible in the community
• Attending to the needs of children with learning disabilities.
On the other hand, private/independent schools were seen doing a better job in the following categories:
• Maintaining discipline
• Keeping class sizes small
• Encouraging moral and spiritual development
• Teaching values and manners
• Maintaining bonds with graduates.
The 1999 poll also revealed that the public believes the words “structured,” “safe,” “selective, “personalized” and “caring” are
descriptive of independent schools. The words “affordable” and “diverse” were not words the public associates with independent schools.
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Looking Ahead
Respondents to the Hampton Roads Survey of Private Schools shared a panoply of concerns for the future. Leading the list in the
minds of private-school leaders were funding issues: how to deal with rising operating costs and keep tuition affordable, the
increasing need to rely on fund raising, and the desire to seek federal funding for textbooks and transportation. Of special concern was faculty compensation; repeatedly, the respondents cited the need for increased faculty salaries and benefits. We
already have seen that the salaries of private-school faculty lag those of their public-school counterparts. Consequently, attracting
and retaining excellent teachers was seen as an ongoing challenge, particularly in light of the current teacher shortage.
Technology was seen as presenting additional major challenges. Finding the ways and means to support technology-driven
instruction was a serious concern for most private-school leaders, though some regard technology as overemphasized and not
strongly related to actual learning. The schools’ desire to enroll a diverse student body was another frequently cited concern, as
was improving support for special-needs students.
When all is said and done, these are concerns and challenges that differ little from those of public K-12 education. In this sense,
private and public schools have much in common. Where differences do exist, they relate primarily to how these institutions
choose to deal with these concerns and challenges. That is, there is much greater diversity in how private schools choose to
organize their academic lives, find revenues and expend their funds. The choices that Cape Henry Collegiate in Virginia Beach
or Trinity Lutheran School in Norfolk make are quite different from those made by Denbigh High School in Newport News or Dr.
Hugo Owens School in Chesapeake.
Several of the private schools in Hampton Roads were founded as a means to avoid racial integration. To some extent, this
perception continues to plague the region’s private schools today, even though private-school student bodies have become
much more racially diverse. While this motive may still be present in some cases, the overriding reasons why parents
choose private schools for their children today relate to perceptions of educational quality. In particular, parents believe (correctly) that private-school class sizes typically are smaller than those in public schools and consequently that their children will
receive more individual attention in a private school. Further, they hope their children will go to school with other children from
highly motivated families. The result, they believe, will be a superior education.
From a financial standpoint, the existence of private schools enables taxpayers to avoid millions of dollars of annual expenditures
upon public K-12 education. A rough approximation is $150 million to $200 million per year. In addition, private schools provide competition to public schools that presumably keeps them on their toes.
It is worth noting that early in the history of the United States, there was relatively little public K-12 education, as private schools
dominated the scene. This changed dramatically early in the 19th century. Given the dissatisfaction of some with public K-12
education today, we may be witnessing a partial return to the country’s private-school roots. Whether this is a good or bad
development can be debated, but the winds of change are blowing, and K-12 education in Hampton Roads has not been
exempt from this trend. Private and independent schools in the region likely will become increasingly attractive as more parents
and students seek alternatives to public education.
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